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under the ~RxxxkxxxkmeHxxaxxxRx religious EXHXR clauseJ was initially 
held for consdieration in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.602 and then 
--------.... 
remanded to the Supreme Court of South Carolina for reconsideration in 
light of th~ourt's decision in Lemon and its companion cases. -~ j . ~. 
C.Otlrt hr..j n otu • l r I rec.o-rJS :JeveJ o...,._J if.s. Jec.is io~ iS c....(Jpe..o-Le J • 
South Carolina passed an Act to provide financing for insti-
tutions of higher learning throughx the state's issuance of revenue bon& 
2RRXXRX~RHaRHK~X~X~KXXKX~RXXRgR 
The overall ~XH purpose of the Act is to permit colleges to borrow 
funds advantageously x by using the State's income tax free basis as XR 
relates to the issuance of bonds. 
The resp., Baptist College of Charleston, :R:kkXJttldtfi!l!!!Eisi:Jd~ 
has petitioned the state revenue bond Authority under the Actxee seek-
ing the preliminary approval of the Autpority for the issuance of 3 and 
a half milllion assxx dollars in revenue bonds so that the college may 
pay off certain outstanding indebtedness incnrred in the purchase 
of certain equipment ad trailers, ~x ~XH purchase school equipment 
and sxkex make other capital improvements, and xe~ refund certain other 
indebtedness. 
In accordanc8 with the provisions of the Act, the College ~xs~xex 
proposes to convey substantially all its campus to the state of S.C. 
{ at no cost. The Authority would then lease the property so conveyed 
---------
back to the College under a lease agreement whereby the College would 
be obligated to operate xsx and maintain it as an institution of higher 
learning and to pay to the Authrity rentals in such amount as to meet 
the principal and interest as they become due on the proposed revenue 
bonds. 
The question, of course, is whether the advantages the Baptist 
College derives from use of trestatesxx power to issue low interest 
revenue bonds(low interest because interest and dividends from the 
bonds are tax-free to bondholders) so KXE entangles the state in the 
administration£ of tre College as to violate treFirst ' Amendment. 
In Lemon, an action was brought agai~ state officials kx~ by Penn. 
residentg Ej challenging the constitutionality of a statute which ~xsxx~ 
provided for state reimbursement of non-publiv elementary and secondary 
schools ase for the cost of teacher's salaries, textbooks, and instruc-
tional materials in~ertain specified XHkjeExX seculaE subjects, but prok 
hibiting reimbursement for any course that contained any subject mateer 
expressing any religious teaching or xxx training. The Court held that 
the Penn. statute was unconstitutional under the religion EXXX clause 
of the First Amendment as fostering exc~ssive entanglement between govt. 
and religion. In so holding, The Court considered a wide variety of 
factors including (1) the religious purpose and operation £ of elem-
..-------
entary and secondary schools (2) the enhancement of the process of reli~ 
ious indoctrination resulting from the impressionable age of the EkxxixR 
children enrolled, particularly in elementary schomls(3)the necessity 
of state surveillance to insure that teachers who were subject to ERRKXR 
control ~k by religious orgamizations,~ observed the restrictions to 
teach only purely secular subjects (4) the state's examination of the 
parochial schools finamcial XRB recoras to HRKRXXm determine which 
expenditures were religious and which were secular. One thing should 
be pointed out: under Lemon, the Court devised a stringent "entanglemant 
test based on multiple factors but it did not outlaw entirely state 
aid to parochial schools. 
The South CArolina court was thus left with the task of 
applying to xxxx the state aid process described above the test enun-
ciated by the Court in Lemon. It ERREXHHRH upheld the aid on the 
ground that the "state plays a pxxx passive and very limited role in 
the implementation of thek Act, serving principally as a mi mere 
conduit through whichkx institutions may borrow funds for the purposes 
of the Act of a tax-free basis. Theee is in no sense a banking relation-
ship between the Authority and institutions which utilize the Act." 
~ 47 
The~court concluded that thek ERxxRgR state would not become too 
.. 
entangled in the administration of the College, claiming thar the basic 
function of the Authrity is "to see that religion is not promoted on KE 
the leased premises, and that fees are charged XHHHXX sufficient to 
------
~ 
meet the bond payments. 
I 
Appellants challenge this interpretation of the Act, sgating that 
the "Authority is under strong motivation, both because of xx its duty 
to the bondholders and its duty to the state, to be at all times 
concerned with the College and itsx financial condition." 
I do not think the South ~rolina court's characterization of 
the Act an unreasonble one, thoughx admittedly, under this Act there 
is the temptation for the State to supervise the College's operations 
to make certain its obligations to bondholders might be met. But the 
· financing here does not appear to be in the sensitive area of textbooks 
---------------------------------------------------- ----
and teacher's salaries as in Lemon. xx As a realistic matter, I do not 
believe this arrangement really threatens state-chruch separation and 
I also do not think the Court wants to take anotther case of this nature 
so soon after Lemon. 
AFFIRM JHW 
~-~ Y-o L ~ ,, I0/<1/""-' 
/5 ::{J - w-1< () ~ ~ z;:;:;;:.:r-
Justice Powell: ' ~~._,. ~ ~~ ~ 
Here are my relists for the confe~e this Friday. In most 
cases I have written a~xextex a full cert note and wish to stand 
by what I have said. A good many of t~esse these cases were relisted 
to allow Douglas to write. I do not think you need to read over 
all the H cert notes as you voted correctly the first time and 
would not wish to change your vote. I saw no case where you had a 
substantial auestion you wish me to ~BS consider. I i~~iM~Hxt~HSHX 
give you these cases merely for your convenience. After you have 
finished, if you give them to Larry, they can then be included in the ,., 
cert book .. conference. 
JHW OTSCUSS 
-
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Notes on No. 71-1523, Hunt v. McNair 
WCK 
February 21, 1973 
As I explained yesterday, this field is a 
new one for me, and I come to it without strong 
predispositions reagarding whether assistance of 
the kind at issue here violates the Establishment 
Clause. It may be useful for you, as it was for 
me, to go quickly through the major Establishment 
Clause cases decided prior to Lemon and Tilton. 
In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1(1947), 
the Court upheld a state statute providing bus 
transportation for 
In Board of 
the loan of textbooks on secular subjects to 
parochial school children. And in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 
397 U.S.664(1970), the Court held that the granting of 
a property tax exemption to religious institutions 
did not vkiate the Establishment Clause, although 
it heavily emphasized the strong historical roots of 
such exemptions. I do not find much guidance for 
the present case in Everson or Allen-"both involved 
direct payments or services to children and both 
were clearly non-sectarian. Nor do I find much guidance 
in Walz. In a sense, Walz cuts both ways--the Court 
did allow some aid to the institutions rather than 
to studexnts but relied in large part on the history 
of tax exemptions. The absence of such a history in 
the present case weighs in against the state claim. 
-2-
;!, 
With these cases to the side,then, the problem 
turns primarily on the interpretation of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 u.s. 602(1971), and of Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
u.s. 672(1971). In Lemon, The C~ief wrote the Court's 
opinion. At issue there were two state educational 
acts. The Rhode Island act authorizes state officials 
to subsidize the salaries of certain teachers in 
certain nonpublic elementary schools in an amount 
not to exceed 15% pf the teacher's salary. Under 
thad tl.D) 
the terms of the statute, the teacher ~gree not 
to teach courses in religion and to use only teaching 
materials which are used in public schools. The school 
in which the teacher teache~e one at which 
per"pupil expenditures on the secular aspects of education 
~ot exceed those in the average public school. 
The Pennsylvania act authorized state officials to 
reimburse nonpublic schools for teacher's salaries, 
textbooks and instructional materials in certain 
secualr subjects. Textbooks and material• s were subject 
to approval by state officials, and the nonpublic 
schools 0 accounting was subject to state audit. 
The opinion summarized the prior cases and 
stated the "tests"• 
"Three • • • tests may be gleaned fom our 
cases. First, the statute must have a 
secular legislative purpose; second, its 
prin~ipal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion , ••• ; 
finally, the statute must not foster 'an 
excessive government entanglement with religion 8 ," at 613 
-3-
Evaluating the Rhode Island program in terms of 
these tests, the Court first examined the nature of 
the elementary schools in question, noting that the 
school buildings contained religious symbols throughout, 
that religion was taught directly for about thirty 
minutes per day, that there were religiously oriented 
,. 
and apparently compulsory extracu~icular activities, 
that two-thirds of the teachers were nuns, and 
that the atmosphere was heavily religious. The Court 
quoted the district court 9 s finding that the 
schools were "a powerful vehicle for transmitting 
the Catholic faith to the next geeration". at 616. 
"LV he considerable religious activities of these 
schools led the legislature to provide for careful 
governmental controls and surveillance by state 
authoriites in order to ensure that state aid supports 
only secular instruction." at 616. The Court pointed 
out that principals and nuns were appointed by 
religimus orders and bishops and that teachers were 
hired by parish priests, and mentioned that a 
school handbook stated .. that "religious formation 
is not limited to formal courses; nor is it restricted 
tBi a single subject area." In striking down the 
statute, though, the Court did not assume that the 
schools would be unable to separate religious from secular, 
but relied on the fact that the state would be forced, 
-4-
in order effectively to police the use of the funds, 
t~o evaluate school programs in terms of religious 
or secular content, not only to insure that teachers 
abide by their commitments but to ascertain whether 
a nonpublic school spends less per p4il on secular 
instruction than does the average public school. 
The Court's anal~sl of the Pennsylvania 
program was much briefer because it relied heavily, 
by implication,on its analysis of the Rhode Island 
statute. The Court stateda 
The history of government grants of a continuing 
cash ..., subsidy indicates that such programs 
have almost always been accompanied by varying 
measures of control and surveillance. The 
government cash grants before us now provide 
no basis for predicting that comprehensive 
measures of surveillance and controls will 
not follow. In particular, the government's 
post-audit power to inspect and evaluate 
a church"related school's financial records 
and to determine which expenditures are religious 
and which are secular creates an• intimate and 
continuing relationship between church and state." at 621-22. 
The Court closed with two other points. The 
first was that the very fact that aid to parochial 
schools was becoming a political football made the 
degree of entanglement greater. The other was that 
Walz could be distinguished onthe ground that the 
property tax exemption was unlikely to be a first step 
toward greater involvement since it represented 200 
years of consistent practice. 
The thrust of the Chief 8 s opinion in Lemon is, 
- ·5-
I think, that where the state deals with a heavily 
religious institutiont , the Establishment Clause 
is all but inevitably violated because in order to 
insure that public money is not being spent for 
religious purposes a State must become entangled 
in the operation of the religious institution. 
Douglas, with whom Black and Marshall joined, 
wrote a concurrence which contains a number of intertesting 
tidbits about parochial education and the views of 
Jefferson but is otherwise not helpful. Justice 
Brennan wrote a concurrence, which I will discuss 
below, and Justice White concurred as to the Pennsylvania 
statute, but dissented as to the Rhode Island statute, 
and I will discuss this opinion below also. . ::rr 
In Tilton, the Chief wrote a plurality opinion, 
which was joined by Harlan, Stewart and Blackmun. 
That case involved the constitutionality of Title 
I of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, 
a federal act. The Act authorized construction 
grants to nonpublic institutions of higher education, 
but excluded from a eligibility any building 
to be used for I religious instruction or worship. 
The Commissioner of Education required applicant 
institutions to agree not to use any fa~ilities 
constructed with Title I money for any religious 
purpose , the agreement to continue for twenty years on 
-6-
pain of forfeiture, "During the 20-year period, the 
statutory restrictions are enforced by the Office of 
Education primarily by way of on-site inspections," 
at 675, 
Again applying the three-pronged test, the 
opinion fo~t the purpose of the legislation 
was secular, The opinion then measur~the primary 
effect of the aid on those four institutions whose 
receipt of aid was challenged in that case, 
"The institutions presented evidence that there 
had been no religious services or worship 
in the federally financed facilities, that 
there are no religious symbols or• plaques 
in or on them, and that they had ... 
been used solely for nonreligious purposes." 
at 680, 
Althou~h tnere was evidence that certain institutional 
f•c fi'J 
religious restrictions on what might be 
taught, there was other evidence that these restrictions 
were nmt enforced in practice. Becaus.e it might 
have the primary effect of fostering religion, however, 
the opinion invalidated the 20-year limitation• 
on the no-religious-use cove~ant, while finding 
that the primary effect of the saatute • as a whole 
would not be to promote religion, As to the third 
prong of the test, the degree of state entanglement, 
the opinion distinguished the colleges 




"There is sa ubstance to the contention that 
college students are less impressionable 
and less suseeptible to religious indoctrination." 
"Furthermore, by their very nature, collge 
and postgraduate courses tend to limitll 
the opportunities for sectarian influence 
by virtut e of their own internal disciplines." 
While acknowledging that all four colleges required 
students to take courses in theoj logy, the opinion 
concluded that"religious indoctrination is not a 
substantial purpose or activity" of these colleges. 
The need for surveillance was correspondingly reduced: 
"the Government aid here is a one-time, single-
purpose construction grant. There are nojV 
continuing financial audits, and no governmental 
analysis of an institution ' s expenditures 
on secular as distinguished f trom religious 
activities." at 688. 
The Act was held to be constitutional . 
Justice White supplied the fifth vote. His 
opinion addressed all three of the Pennsylvania , 
Rhode Island, and federal statutes. While I have 
some difficulty understanding how he would analyse 
the problem presented, I infer that he '\Clt?Uld approve1 
more aid than would the Chief. White dissented as 
to the Rhode Island statute, and in so doing pointed 
out that the district court make express findings 
that "on the evidence before it none jof the 
teachers involved mixed religious and secular instruction". 
at 666. This finding , and the fact that the Court p* r& 1 
-8-
chose to ignore it in favor of a sort of cof mposite 
model of the Catholic elementary school, confirmed 
his feeling that the degree of entanglement 
was no greater in Rhode Island than under the federal 
statute. He notes, interestingly, that in Tilton, 
the Chief looked specifically at the evidence before 
the Court on four specific schools rather than look 
to a sort of composite religious college. He notes 
too that the federal enforcement regime might 
well involve fully as much inspection as the state 
scheme. For reasons which are n<lrt entirely clear, his 
solution would have been to uphold both. 
Justice Brennan would have ruled all three 
statutes unconstitutional. His opinion shares White's 
recognition that the Chief was distorting the facts 
in order to create an appearance of a sharp disjunction 
between the state and federal programs. His test would 
be whether the program is in fact a subsidy to a 
sectarian institution. In his view, it is obvious 
that the giving of aid to a religious institution 
for use in secular pursuits frees the institution to 
spend more of its own resources on religious matters. 
In his view, Allen add Everson are distinguishable 
because the aid there ran directly to the students 
rather than to the institutions; Walz is distinguishable 
on historixcal grounds, 
-9-
~ 
In Tilton, finally, Douglas, with who~Brennan 
and Marshall joined, dissented. Again, the opinion 
is not very helpful. 
III. 
What, then, is the state of the law after 
Lemon and Tilton? The Chief's entanglement theory 
had seven votes in Lemon(although three of the seven 
also concurred), but only four votes in Tilton. 
Lemon, then, would seem to be gospel, and Tilton 
only the Chiefvs commentary on the gospel. The 
problem in the present case is to define the Tilton 
exception to the general Lemon • rule that aid to 
a specifically religious institution is pro~scribed 
by the Establishment clause. The exc~tion has at 
least these components: 1) that the institution be 
a college or university; 2) that the degree of 
surveillance be minimal. 
Here, the papers before us• are not particularly 
helpful in defining the nature of the institution, 
We do know that it is a college, but we do not know 
what sort of college, and there presumably are 
colleges(and I would gue~that some of them are 
Baptist colleges) which have a very heavy religious 
program. We do know, though, that only 6~/o of the 
student body is Baptist, Appendix at 39. 
... lQ ... 
I would have thought .... . in view of the Lemon 
opinion's heavy emphasis on the nature of the 
institutions being aided, and Tilton°s reservation 
of judgment as to colleges other than the four before 
it, tbat the South Carolina court would have given us 
more information. If the Court affirms the judgment, 
this lack of information will make it very difficult 
to state affirmatively that religion does not pervade 
the college. And since, under the Chief's approach, 
the degree of presumed entanglement corresponds to 
to degree of religious emphasis, it is diff- icult here 
to ascertain the degree of presumed entanglement. 
It may be, however, that the terms of the 
statute are so inartfully drawn that the Court simply 
cannot conclude that there is not grave potential for 
actual as opposed to presumed entanglement. On page 
41 of the Jurisdictional Statement, for example, is 
the following statement of powers: 
"The authority may fix, revise, charge and 
collect rates, rents, fees and charges for the 
use of and for the services furnished or to be 
furnished by each project." 
And at J.S. page 36, the authority is given power: 
"to establish rules arrl regulations for the 
use of aa project or any portion thereof and 
to designate a participating institution for 
higher education as its agent to establish 
rules and regulations for the use of a 
project undertaken for such participating 
institution for higher education." 
Furthermore, the performance of these duties is not 
-11-
simply discretionary at the option of the authority, but 
may be compelled at the instance of any holder of 
revenue bonds. J.S., page 43. 
In addition to these financial responsibilities, 
the authority requires that the institution execute 
a covenant to not use the leased land or facilities 
thereon for religious pruposes. J.S. 49. Furthermore, 
"1f; 
,,Eacrh..ease Agreement shall contain a provision 
permitting the Authority or any agent of the 
Authority to conduct such inspections as may 
be necessary to determine whether the leased 
premises, or any portion thereof ••• is 
being used or has been used for sectarian 
instruction or as a place of religious worship 
•••• " J.S., at 49. 
And , these responsibilities may be enforced at the 
instance of any taxpayer of South Carolina. J.S., at 49. 
While the state(the authority) may constitute 
a bank as its agent for these purposes, or more 
exactly as a trustee for thew. bondholders, I do not 
think that this insulates the state from legal 
responsibility, as,I think, is de~nstrated by the 
fact that the device would not suffice in 
the case of the construction of a church. Surely, 
the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island schemes would not 
have been saved by the designation of a trustee to 
administer the state programs. 
In short, my present view is that the South 
Carolina scheme violates the Establishment Clause. 
While a lawyer might say that the chances of deep 
-12-
entanglement are not as a practical matter very great~ 
the face of the statute and the regulations confers 
greaJ t and continuing responsitility on the state for 
the supervision of the col~ege's financial practices 
and the monitoring of its program. We do not 
have a history of noninvolvement under this statute 
to overcome this broad statement of power• s, nor do 
we even have strong findings that the atmosphere at 
the college is overwhelmingly secular. 
I apologize for the length of this memo 
alnd its probable disorganization, but I did not 
think that the standards were comprehensible apart 
from a a detailed look at Lemon and Tilton. 
Court . ?: .c;.=. ~.~I?:~.~.~.<?~· Voted on ................ .. , 19 .. . 
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Mr. William C. Kelly, Jr. 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: April 7, 1973 
Hunt v. McNair - WCK' s draft of April 6 
I placed on your desk your first draft, which I am afraid I 
have "messed up" considerably. 
Although I have accepted your basic approach and analysis 
as sound and reasoned with your usual perceptivity, I do think it necessary 
to strengthen our opinion in the following respects: 
1. I have attempted, by riders, to convey a somewhat clearer 
picture of the College, and particularly of the revenue bondsfinancing 
with which we are concerned. It is important, I think, for the factual 
seting to be somewhat more particularized that your draft. 
2. Bearing in mind Justice Douglas' circulated opinion of 
last October (in which he emphasized that ''the state's credit is employed 
in aid" of financing the College, and referred to the state as being "a 
banker", it is desirable to make it crystal clear by a full quotation from 
the Act and otherwise - that the state's credit is in no way implicated. 
3. Although I have not undertaken to depart from your Lemon 
three-part analysis, I doubt that it is fully applicable (if, at all) to this 
type of case. For the reasons summarized in my Rider A, p. 7 (to be 
added either as a note or inserted in the text at some appropriate place), 
2. 
the "state aid" :Involved :In this case is different from that :In any case 
previously before the Court. AB I argued at the Conference, and as held 
by both the New Jersey and South Carolina courts, all that the state has 
done is provide a "conduit" or render a service. I consider this quite 
different :In principle from lending or granting money or extending credit. 
Indeed, the people who buy the bonds -induced to do so by the tax 
advantage -put up the entire cost of the "aid" rendered these educational 
institutions. 
Obviously we would have a closer case if the college here were 
in fact a sectarian institution. Possibly, no such institution may be 
rendered any service of this kind by the state - although all sorts of other 
public services (police, fire, utilities, etc. ) have traditionally been 
rendered churches as well as church schools. But we need not decide 
this question, as this Baptist college is not shown by the record to be 
sectarian in much more than name and the indirect control through the 
election of the Board of Trustees. Incidentally, I am certain that under 
general corporate law in South Carolina the board -elected for five-year 
terms - owes their primary duty to the welfare of the college without 
regard to the Baptist church or whomever may have elected them. 
In any event, I want to emphasize the uniqueness of the "aid" 
here :Involved, and not to equate it irrevocably with other types of aid 
3. 
which have been before the Court. 
4. Our decision will be of little value unless it enables ''bond counsel" 
to give an unqualified opinion as to the validity of the bonds to be issued. 
Therefore, I think your understandable catrtion - in using carefully hedged 
language at the beginning and end of the opinion - goes a bit too far. I 
doubt that bond counsel, if this language is retained, could give an unqualified 
opinion that bonds issued pursuant to this particular applicatioo. wwli be 
valid. I think we must go at least that far, as certainly it is my view -
and I believe is the view of the majority of the Court. 
* * * * * 
If you have an opportunity to review my riders over the weekend, 
we can confer during the morning on Monday. If we are fairly close 
together, then you can have a chambers copy printed during my absence. 
It will be a lit bit difficult for either of us to visualize the full opinion in 
its present form, and so a printed chambers copy may facilitate our 
progress. 
I am aware that there is some overlap among my own riders, and 
also with what was in your first draft. I simply have not had the time to 
try to clean these up. 
Attached to this memo are three riders which I dictated, but did 
not use. They may be a bit repetitive. Or you may find some place for 
them. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
h{;K 
April 11, 1973 
Hunt v. McNair 
1. Larry has read and edited this draft, and I have 
made changes to respond to his suggestions. 
2. I attach 1) your memo of April 7; 2) carbons of 
your riders; and 3) the old version of page 17 with 
your notes on it. 
3. As you will see, I ha•ve incorporated in Part I 
your riders numbered 1-4, with the exception of your 
footnote 11 3A( see rider 3), which I have omitted for 
reasons we have already discussed. 
4. In addition, I have reorganized Part I in an 
effort to make it less choppy. 
5. Your rider 5 appears in the discussion of state 
purpose on page 7 of the draft. I have omitted 
proposed footnotes -,•:-,': (because I did not think it 
added anything to the central point and because I 
doubted there would be any dispute about the number of 
students in the college) and -,•:-,•:-:: (because I did not think 
it appropriate to quote this from the complaint). 
6. With minor changes, your rider 6 appears 
on page 10 of the draft as footnote 7. I have rewritten 
the last sentence in a way which I think sharpens 
our point. 
7. An altered version of your rider 7 appears 
on page nine of the draft as the last sentence of the 
paragraph which continues over from page 8. I changed 
the sentence to drop "functions as a religious entity" 
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because I did not think that that phrase was helpful 
or particularly meaningful. 
8. Rider 8 appears as footnote 8 on page 12. 
I have omitted a good p~tion of the rider becaese 
I did not think that we had a satisfactory basis for 
making these assertions. The lack of record support 
for them is a particu•larly se~sitive point since 
we rely elsewhere . . in the opinion on the four corners 
of the record. I have substituted a reliance on Tilton 
in order to preserve your point. 
9. I did not use the other riders, other than the 
Allen quotation regarding the importance of private 
schools. 
10. I have done two things to former page 
17. The first was to drop the distinction betweenkkx 
the trustee and the Autho*rity. The trustee is chosen 
by the State and is an agent of the State for tte 
purpose of operating the College. Because, when we 
talked about this before, we agreed that we could 
not rely on t•he distinction between the ... Authority 
and the tr~stee, I thought it better not to slip it 
in near the end of the opinion without explanation. 
The other change I made was to move the discussion 
of the I~dustrial Revenue Bond Act to page 13(this 
was Larry's suggestion). I agree with him that it 
fits more smoothly into the discussion there. As 
-3-
it stood before, in Part III, it seemed awkward. 
j;lt.pt"ttttt <!feud cf tltt ~tb j;tatts 
jt~UJ!rhtgtcn, !fl. OJ. 211~~$ 
CHAMBERS OP 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
April 17, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Powell 





..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
,iu:pum:t (!Jou.rt of tqt ~tritth .itattg 
Jlagqmgron.!B. <q. :Wgt'l-$ 
April 17, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1523, Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in 
this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBER S OF 
~u:p-um:t <~tcu.rt ttf tqt ~t~ ~httts 
Jfasltittghtn. ~. <It· 2!lgt'l-~ / 
JUSTICE W M. J. BR E NNAN, JR. April 17, 1973 
RE: No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Lewis: 
I plan to write a dissent in this case. I am inclined, 
however, to think it is related to the Religion Clause cases 
argued this week and also to the Levitt cases, No. 72-269, 
et al. !,therefore, will defer writing the dissent until after 
I know what the outcome of the other cases will be. I hope 
that this doesn't mean I'll have to hold you up too long. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc : The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.inpt"ttttt ar~nrt ~f tltt ~~ .itattg 
'lhudp:nghtn. ~. <!}. 2llgi'!~ 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL April 19, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Lewis: 
I shall await the dissent of Bill 
Brennan before voting in this one. 
Sincerely, ~ 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: Conference 
.iuprtnu C4ttnrt ttf tlrt 'Jlfuittb .ihrlts 
I 
'BaslrittgLnt.lJl. '4· 2llc?'1~ 
CHAMBERS o.-
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
April 25, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1523 -Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Lewis: 
I join your opinion in this case. I may 
write a concurrence but shall await the dissent 
before deciding to do so. 
Sincerely.J 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
/ 
f" • • • · ,... 
f • 
I 
May 4, 1973 
71-1523 HUNT v. McNAIR 
TO THE CONFERENCE: 
It came to my attention today that in ·1972, after I came on the 
Court, the Virginia legislature adopted an "Educational Facilities 
Authority Act" which is quite similar (if not substantially identical) to 
the South Carolina Act involved in this case. This Virginia enactment 
was not a surprise as the new Constitution, effective July 1, 1971, * 
contained a provision (Article 10, Section 11) authorizing the legislature 
to "provide for a state agency or authority" to assist educational 
institutions in borrowing money for construction of educational .facilities, 
provided that the primary purpose of the institution is ''not to provide 
religious training or theological education" and provided further that 
"the Commonwealth shall not be liable for any debt created by such 
borrowing. "* 
I did not know until today, however, that ·washington and Lee 
University (of which I am a Trustee) had any interest in borrowing 
money through the use of such a state-created authority. In a talk 
. with the Assistant to the President there, I was informed that there 
have been some recent discussions of financing a proposed new dormitory 
complex in this manner. This is still in the "discussion stage," no 
decision has been made, and indeed the Virginia Authority is not yet a 
functioning entity. 
Washington and Lee University is strictly non-sectarian, although 
many years ago it was of Presbyterian origin. Its board of trustees 
is self-perpetuating, it is privately endowed, it derives no support 
from any religious faith or organization, has no religious requirements 
*I served on the constitutional revision commission. 
*Virginia has a very strong "Establishment" clause in its 
Constitution, Section 16 of the Virginia Bill of Rights having been 
attributed primarily to Thomas Jefferson. 
-4~00'  ......... ~·~--··-·-- ----··---•• 
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as to courses, students, qr faculty members. It noes offer some 
courses in religion, on an elective basis, as a part of a broad, 
11.t>erat.a.rt~ curriculum. 
As the only issue before us in Hunt v. McNair is the challenge 
to the South Carolina Act on the ground that it infringes the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment, our decision in McNair would not be 
applicable to Washington and Lee University. I suppose it could be said, 
nevertheless, that the similarity of the new Virginia statute and the 
possible interest of Washington and Lee in revenue bond financing of a 
new dormitory thereunder, might give me a bias in favor of this type 
of legislation even with respect to a Baptist college such as that involved 
in Hunt v. McNair. 
I personally do not feel disqualified to participate in this case. 
But I bring these facts to the attention of the Conference, and woold 
welcome and abide by the views of my Brothers. As I do not have a 
Court yet, there is no possibility of this case coming down prior to 
our next Conference. I can receive your views and we can discuss this 
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as to courses, students, or faculty members. It does offer some 
courses in religion, on an elective basis, as a part of a broad, 
ltb·er.P.l:a.rt~ curriculum. 
As the only issue before us in Hunt v. McNair is the challenge 
to the South Carolina Act on the ground that it infringes the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment, our decision in McNair would not be 
applicable to Washington and Lee University. I suppose it could be said, 
nevertheless, that the similarity of the new Virginia statute and the 
possible interest of Washington and Lee in revenue bond financing of a 
new dormitory thereunder, might give me a bias in favor of this type 
of legislation even with respect to a Baptist college such as that involved 
in Hunt v. McNair. 
I personally do not feel disqualified to participate in this case. 
But I bring these facts to the attention of the Conference, and wob.ld 
welcome and abide by the views of my Brothers. As I do not have a 
Court yet, there is no possibility of this case coming down prior to 
our next Conference. I can receive your views and we can discuss this 
further, if need be, at the May 11 Conference. 
'·· 
M:)!; 
FRANK A. PARSONS 
A88 18TAN T TO THE PRI:81DHNT 
~ ~~ 
1 
WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY 
' 
LEXINGTON, VIRGINIA 244!10 
May 4, 1973 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S. 
Supreme Court Building 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Mr. Powell: 
Enclosed you will find copies of the Act of the General Assembly 
which established the Virginia College Building Authority, the draft of 
a statement of policies and procedures provided us by the Authority's 
consultants, and a memorandum which I prepared for Mr. Howe of Wheat, 
First Securities, Inc., at his request following our discussions with 
him and Mr. Ashton on April 27. 
The notes and underscores in the draft statement are President 
Huntley's marks made upon his first reading of the original from which 
this copy was made. 
I told President Huntley of your call and interest in the Virginia 
College Building Authority, and he is pleased that you may have an oppor-
tunity to examine these materials prior to the Board meeting. He has 
asked me to obtain from our Law Librarian information about the pending 
South Carolina case for his review. 
Should you have any further questions requiring answers that I may 
be able to provide or seek, please don't hesitate to call on me. 
With kindest personal regards and best wishes, 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Frank A. Parsons 
Cc: President Huntley 






ement of Policy and Procedures 
Basic Structure of Financing 
Form of Application for Services 
DRAFT 4/5/73 
VIRGINIA COLLEGE BUILDING AUTHORITY 
----~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. 
STATEMENT OF POLICY AND PROCEDURES 
The Virginia College Building Authority (the Authority) 
has been duly created and organized under Section 23-30.25 of 
the Code of Virginia of 1950, as amended, as a public body 
corporate and as a political subdivision and agency and instru-
mentality of the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
The Authority is authorized under the ·Educational 
Facilities Authority Act (Chapter 3.3, Title 23, Code of 
Virginia of 1950, as amended) (the Act) to assist institutions 
for higher education in the Commonwealth (Institutions) in the 
acquisition, construction, financing and refinancing of Projects. 
In particular, the Act authorizes the Authority to issue revenue· 
bonds and notes for any of its corporate purposes, payable 
solely out of its revenues; to fix, charge and collect rates, 
rents, fees and charges for the use of and for the services 
furnished or to be furnished by a Project; to mortgage and pledge 
its revenues and any Project for the benefit of the holders of 
its bonds; and generally to do all things necessary or convenient 
to carry out the purposes of the Act, 
The Authority has received requests from certain 
Institutions for assistance in acquiring, constructing and 
financing Projects and anticipates that similar requests may 
-
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hereafter be received from other Institutions. The Authority 
has determined that prior to making any commitment to assist any 
Institution it is desirable to set forth the following statement 
of policies and procedures to serve as a guideline for its 
operations: 
1. In accordance with the Act, the following procedures 
shall control and limit the operations of the Authority: 
a) The Authority shall assist only nonprofit 
educational institutions in the Commonwealth whose primary 
purpose is to provide collegiate or graduate education and 
not to provide religious training or theological education. 
b) The Authority will assist in financing only 
those educationa 1 facilities which meet the definition of "Proj ect 11 
contained in the Act, i.e., 
" •.• a structure or structures suitable 
for use as a dormitory or oth~~~~~:st 
housing facility for students facul 
officers or employees, a dinin~a ~;tudent 
union, administration building, academic 
building, library, laboratory, research, facility, 
classroom, athletic facility, health care 
facility, maintenance, storage or utility 
facility and other structures or facilities 
related to any of the foregoing or required 
or useful for the instruction of students or 
the conducting of research or the operation 
of an institution for higher education, including 
parking and other facilities or structures --
essential or convenient for the orderly conduct 
of such institution for higher education, and 
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shall also include landscaping, site preparation, 
furniture, equipment and machinery and other 
- si~ilar items-necessary or convenient for the 
operation of a particular facility or structure 
in the manner for which its use is intended .•• " 
c) The Authority shall not assist in financing 
any items the costs of which are customarily deemed to result in 
a current operating charge or any facility used or to be used 
for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious worship or 
any facility used or to be used primarily in connection with any 
part of the program of a school or department of divinity for 
any religious denomination. 
2. Within the limitations set forth above and pursuant 
to the Act, the Authority will undertake the acquisition and 
construction of Projects for lease and ultimate transfer to 
the Institutions desiring to take advantage of the provisions 
of the Act, and will finance such Projects, to the extent not 
financed by the contributions of the institutions, by the 
issuance of its revenue bonds, notes and other obligations 
payable solely from and secured by a pledge of all rentals, 
revenues, receipts and income to be derived from or in con-
nection with, and mortgages on, such Projects. 
3. All bonds of the Authority, regardless of their 
date of issue and the manner in which the proceeds of their 
sale are applied, shall be issued on a parity basis and shall 
-4-
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have the same right, lien and preference to all the rentals, 
revenues, receipts and income of the Authority derived from 
or in connection with Projects financed by the Authority. 
There will be no preference, priority or distinction of certain 
obligations of the Authority over any other obligations. This 
requirement shall not, however, prevent the Authority from 
applying moneys received by it for the payment of all of its 
administrative, financing, legal and related expenses. 
4. Before committing itself to provide financial 
assistance to any Institution, the Authority shall first obtain 
from the Institution and submit to the Council of Higher Education 
for Virginia such data descriptive of the Project, the need 
therefor, the proposed financing plan and the financial resources 
of the Institution as will permit the Authority and the Council 
of Higher Education for Virginia, in conjunction with the State 
Division of Engineering and Buildings, to evaluate the need, 
financial feasibility and overall merit of the Project. In 
considering whether to assist an Institution in the financing 
of a Project, the Authority shall take into consideration, but 
shall not be required to accept, any recommendations of the 
Council of Higher Education for Virginia or the State Division 
of Engineering and Buildings. 
-5-
5. Since the success of the Authority in carrying out 
its purposes must necessarily depend in large measure upon the 
continuing financial prosperity of the Institutions it assists, 
it is recognized that the Authority may not be able to give 
financial assistance to every Institution requesting it or to 
give assistance to the degree requested in all instances. Each 
Institution applying for assistance from the Authority must 
therefore demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Authority that 
it can fully perform all of its contractual obligations under 
its lease with the Authority. Furthermore, no application shall 
be accepted unless the applicant can show to the satisfaction of 
the Authority that unencumbered revenues derived from reasonably 
collectible tuitions and income from investments and unrestricted 
~endowment and the gross receipts to be derived from the use of 
· ~ or for the services furnished by the Project to be financed 
will equal not less than three times the average annual amount 
payable by the Institution to the Authorit y under its lease 
with the Authority. 
c 
6. The Authority shall not assist in the acquisition, 
construction, financing or refinancing of any Project begun 
prior to July 1, 1972, provided however that the Authority may 
assist in the financing of alterations, enlargements, recon-




reimburse Institutions for legal, engineering, architectural or 
r 
other preliminary costs or costs of real property incurred or 
acquired prior to July 1, 1972, if such costs were incurred or 
acquired in connection with a Project financed by the Authority. 
7. The Authority, in its sole discretion, shall deter-
mine whether to assist a particular Institution, whether to 
assist in the financing of a particular Project and the priority 
for undertaking the financing of Projects. 
8. This statement of the Authority shall not under 
any circumstances be considered as constituting a contractual 
agreement with the holders of any bonds, notes or other obligations 
to be issued by the Authority, or with any Institution, or with 
any other person. 
-7-
BASIC STRUCTURE OF FINANCINGS 
The Authority will issue its revenue bonds on a parity 
basis without any preference, priority or distinction of certain 
of its obligations over any other of its obligations. All rentals, 
revenues, receipts and income shall be applied and pledged to the 
repayment of all bonds and no bonds will be issued separately by 
the Authority solely on the credit of one Institution. The 
Authority believes that only by utilizing this pooling of security 
approach will it be able to fully perform its purpose of providing 
financial assistance to the many and varied Institutions of the 
Commonwealth. 
1. Master and Supplemental Indenture 
All revenue bonds of the Authority will be issued under 
a master Indenture which will require the assignment of all 
rentals of Projects to Institutions and other revenues received by the 
Authority and to a Trustee for the equal 
renefit of all those who become holders of the bonds. The Trustee 
will be a Virginia bank. The master Indenture will contain general 
provisions for the form, details, payment, redemption and conditions 
of issuance of the bonds, the application of bond proceeds and the 
Authority's revenues,mandatory lease provisions,and the investment 
of funds by the Trustee. It will provide for the establishment 
and funding of a debt service reserve fund (DSRF), defind what 
-8-
constitutes a default on the part of the Institutions and the 
Authority, and provide for remedies in the event of a default. 
The master Indenture will also provide that each separate series 
of bonds will be issued under a Supplemental Indenture which will 
set forth the specific terms of the series, e.g., the amount, date, 
and denominations of the bonds, the interest rate, maturity schedule 
and redemption provisions. 
2. Lease Requirements 
The bonds of the Authority will be payable solely out of 
the rental payments received under leases of Projects with participat-
ing Institutions and, in the event an Institution should default 
in such payments, out of the DSRF. The rental for each Project 
shall be in an amount not less than 110% of the average annual 
debt service requirements of the bonds issued therefor over their 
amortization period, plus an amount sufficient to cover the pro-
portionate share of the Tru e's annual fees and ex enses. All 
leases will be net'?leases and will provide for the payment by the 
~· 
Insitution of all costs and expenses of operation, maintenance, 
repair or replacement of the Project and will require the Institution 
to maintain adequate insurance against fire and other casualty. 
3. Debt Service Reserve Fund 
As previously noted, the master Indenture will establish 





of the Authority. With respect to each Project, there will be 
deposited to the credit of the DSRF out of the bond proceeds an 
amount equal to 110% of the average annual debt service requirement 
of the bonds issued thereunder. Thereafter, all amounts received 
in connection with the rental of the Project remaining each year 
after meeting the debt service requirement for that year will be 
deposited to the credit of the DSRF until the balance to the 
credit of the Project is equal t g twg years' annual rental on the 
pL -Project. Once two years' rental has been accumulated in the DSRF 
7 ? r~~----
to the credit• of the Project, all rentals in excess of the annual .. 
7 
debt service requirement will be returned to the relevant Institution. 
In the event an Institution defaults in making rental 
payments on a Project, the deficiency will be made up out of the 
balance standing to the account of that Project in the DSRF and, 
if the amount of the deficiency should exceed such balance, the 
excess shall be charged on a proportionate basis against the balances 
standing in the DSRF to the credit of all other Projects. When and to 
rr 
the extent that the amounts so withdrawn from the DSRF are recovered 
from the Institution responsible therefor, such amounts shall be 
deposited to the DSRF in the proportions withdrawn. After all bonds 
issued on account of a Project are paid in full, the balance remain-
ing in the DSRF to the credit of that Project shall be returned to 
the relevant Institution. 
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4. Expenses 
All costs incurred in connection with the issuance of the 
Authority's bonds, e.g., printing, bond counsel fees, underwriting and 
financial advisors' fees, rating agency fees, and the Trustee's 
acceptance fee, will be payable out of bond proceeds. Continuing 
expenses, such as the Trustee's annual fee, will be payable by 
the participating Institution as additionalrent. The administrative 
I 
expenses of the Authority will be payable from income earned on invest-




EXAMPLE OF AN AUTHORITY FINANCING 
I. University A plans to build, over a two year construction period, 
a building estimated to cost $5,000,000. 
II. Bank B will make a loan to the Authority for the construction period 
at a 5% rate of interest since the interest is tax exempt. 
(a) The Bank Loan 
Estimated building cost 
Debt service reserve fund (DSRF) (estimated) 
Interest during the construction 
period (estimated) 





(b) The full amount of the loan is taken down at the outset and 
invested until necessary for progress payments. It is assumed 
that: 1) the funds will be expended evenly over the two year 
construction period with payments made semi-annually; 2) the 
funds are invested at a 7% rate of interest; and 3) the 
Authority's administrative expenses are $25,000 per year. 
Less: Plus: Le~s: Disbursements 
Interest Investment (Including 
6 Mos. Unexpended Funds Semi-Annua 1 Income Administrative Fee) 
1st $6,090,734 $152,268 $213,176 
2nd 4,889,142 152,268 171,120 
3rd 3,645,494 152,268 12 7' 592 
4th 2,358,318 152,268 82,541 
Balance in DSRF at end of construction 
(c)(l) Cost of building at end of construction 




Annual debt service required on twenty year 
issue of $5,850,000 at 6% assumed rate of 
interest 
Plus 10% to create one year rent reserve at 
110% of annual debt service 
















Proceeds of $5,850,000 bond sale after 
expenses (2 1/2%) 5,703,750 
Plus balance remaining in DSRF 1 2 0~6~091 
Total proceeds from financing $6,72.9,841 
Less: Repayment of bank loan and funding 
of DSRF $6,651,734 
Balance·k $ 78~107 
Income on Administrative 
Year Rental DSRF DSRF {7%} ExEense To DSRF,'d··k 
1 $561,000) $ 639,107 $44,737 $25,000 $ 70,737 
2 561,000 709,844 49,689 25,000 75,689 
3 561,000 785,533 54,987 25,000 80,987 
4 561,000 866,520 60,656 25,000 86,656 
5 561,000 953,176 66,722 25,000 92,722 
6 561,000 1,045,898 73 '213 25,000 99 213')b\· ' 7-20 561,000 1, 122, OQQi<'·k 78,540 25,000 104,540 
* These funds would be added to the DSRF to accelerate the accumulation 
of the two year DSRF. 
** At this point DSRF is fully funded and excess is returned to University A. 
From the 8th through the 20th year annual rentals would continue at 
$561,000, but they would be reduced by return to University A of the 
earnings on the DSRF and the 10% excess payment. This would make the 
effective rental during this period $456,460. After the 20t~ year, 
the DSRF would be repaid to University A and the title to the project 
would pass to University A. 
*** Income on DSRF less Administrative Expenses plus 10% to create one 
year rent reserve at 110% of debt service. 
( ( ( r I 
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Avail-
Principal DSRF Earnings Less Admin- DSRF able to 
Annual Bonds Interest and Bonds Beginning on DSRF istrative Ending Reduce 
Year Rental Retired at 6.00% Interest Outstandins:_ Balance at 7.0rffo Expense Fee Balance Rental -
l $561,000 $160,000 ~;351,000 $511,000 $5,69Q,OOO $ 639,107 $ 44,737 $ 25 ,ooo $ 708,844 $ 
2 561,000 165,000 341,400 506,400 5,525,000 708,:344 49,619 25,000 788,063 
3 561,000 180,000 3:\1,500 511,500 5,345,000 788,063 55,164 25,000 867,727 
4 561,000 190,000 320,700 510,700 5,155,000 867 '727 60,741 25,000 955,158 
5 561,000 200,000 309,300 509,300 4,955,000 955,168 66,862 25,000 1,050, 730 
6 561,000 210,000 297,300 507,300 4,745,000 1,050,730 73,551 25,000 1,150,581 28,581 
7 561,000 225,000 284,700 509 '700 4,52 0 ,000 1,122,000 78,540 25,000 1,229,240 107,240 
8 561,000 240,000 271,200 511,200 4,280,000 1,122,000 78,540 25,000 1,225,340 103,340 
9 561,000 255,000 256,800 511,800 4,02:i ,ooo 1,122,000 78,540 25,000 1,224,740 102,740 
10 561,000 270,000 2'n,5oo 511,500 3,755,000 1,122,000 78,540 25,000 1,225,040 103,040 
11 561,000 285,000 225,300 510,300 3,470,000 1,122,000 78,540 25,000 1,226,240 104,240 
12 561,000 300,000 208,200 508,500 3,170,000 1,122,000 78,540 25,000 1,228,040 106,040 
13 561,000 320,0ij0 190,200 510,200 2,850,000 1,122,000 78,540 25,000 1,226,340 104,340 
14 561,000 340,000 171,000 511,000 2,510,000 1,122,000 78,540 25,000 1,225,540 103,540 
15 561,000 360,000 1!10,600 510,600 2,150,000 1,122,000 78,540 25,000 1,225,940 103,940 
16 561,000 380,000 129,000 509,000 1, 770,000 1,122,000 78,540 25,000 1,227,540 105,-540 
17 551,000 405,000 106,200 511,200 1,36~,000 1,122,000 78,540 25,000 1,225,340 103,340 
18 561,000 430,000 81,900 511,900 93':,0CO 1,122,000 78,540 25,000 1,224,640 102,640 
19 561,000 455,000 56,100 511,100 480,000 1,122,000 78,540 25,000 1,225,440 103,440 




Name of Institution 
APPLICATION FOR SERVICES 
VIRGINIA COLLEGE BUILDING AUTHORITY 
County 
Official Business Address 
City State Zip Code 
II. DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED PROJECT: 
~ew Building(s) On Add. to Alt. to 
New Site Present Site Existing Building(s) Existing Building(s) 
·~< Other -------------------------------
Location of Proposed Project 
Street or Highway Route City or Town 
Other* 
County 
III. COST DATA (Estimated) - Continued 
1. 2. 3. *~'r 
Cost of Cost of 
Addition Alternations Total Cost 
A. STRUCTURE COST>'(: 
-
1. General $ $ $ 
2. Heating $ $ $ 
3. Plumbing $ $ $ 
4. Electrical $ $ $ 
._ 
5. Test Borings $ $ $ 
6. Provision for Water $ $ $ 
7. Other Structure Costs: 
$ $ $ 
8. Sub-total Structure $ $ $ 
B. Architect's Fee $ $ $ 
c. Movable Furniture and Equipment $ $ $ 
__, 
D. Sub-total $ $ $ 
>'( Complete a separate Cost Data Sheet, Items "A" - "D" for each separate building 
......., involved. 
;'r·k Complete only Column 3 for new building. 
- 2-
-
III. COST DATA (Estimated) - Continued 
El. Cost of Acquiring Site* 
(Include purchase price plus 
all other costs and fees 
incidental to acquisition of site) 
E2. Pre-planning Costs 
E3. Other Costs** 
E4. Total (Line D + E Items) 
F. Additional Cost 
1. Contingencies - 2% of Total 
2. Administrative & Inspect ion 
3. Total "F" Items 
* Please answer these questions: 
1. Does the site include existing buildings? 
2. If answer to question "1" is "yes": 
$ ____ _ 
$ ____ _ 
$ ____ _ 
$ ____ _ 
$ ____ _ 
$ ____ _ 
$ ____ _ 
a. What year were such buildings acquired by your College? 
$ ___ _ 
$ ____ _ 
$ ____ _ 
$ ____ _ 
b. If there any outstanding indebtedness applicable to such buildings? 
$ ____ _ 
$ ____ _ 
$ ____ _ 
$ ____ _ 
c. Does the cost of acquiring site as shown include any funds intended to repay such 
outstanding indebtedness? If so, how much? $ ____________________ __ 
d. Are there any of these buildings to which you do not contemplate additions or 
renovations under this project? 
** Not appl i cable a t t ime of or iginal application. 
- 3-
III. COST DATA (Estimated) - Continued 
G. Total Cost of Project (Sub'-total plus Line F3) 
H. Less Contributions* 
I. Adjusted Total Cost of Project 
Desired Period of Amortization Years ------
J. Financing Costs (Do Not Complete To Be Estimated By Authority) 
1. Capitalized Reserve (Line I x 
2. Bond Discount and Miscellaneous -
( % of Line I)** 
3. Capitalized I nt erest 
4. Total "J" Items 
) $ _____ _ 
$ _____ _ 
$ _ _ ___ _ 
$ _____ _ 
$ _____ _ 
$ _____ _ 
$ _____ _ 
K. Total Amount to be Financed Through Authority (Line I + Line J4) $ -------
L. Estimated Annual Rental*** $ -------
Interest Rate used in Determining 
Estimated Annual Rental ------------
SHOW TOTAL OF CASH GRANTS ONLY. DO NOT INCLUDE IN THIS TOTAL ANY FEDERAL LOANS; SUCH 
LOANS WILL BE PART OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT FINANCED BY VCBA BONDS WITH SUCH BONDS SOLD 
DIRECTLY TO THE FEDERAL AGENCY, OR BY INTEREST SUBSIDY BY THE FEDERAL AGENCY, (SHOW 
THE BREAKDOWN OF GRANTS AND FEDERAL LOANS AT PART IV, PAGE 5 OF THIS APPLICATION.) 
INCLUDES COST OF BOND DISCOUNT, BOND COUNSEL, FINANCIAL ADVISOR, TRUSTEE, PRINTING AND 
ADVERTISING. 
THE AUTHORITY CHARGES THE INSTITUTION EXACTLY THE SAME INTEREST RATE IT PAYS ON THE 
BONDS USED TO FINANCE THE PROJECT AS DETERMINED WHEN THE BONDS ARE SOLD. HOWEVER, IN 
ORDER FOR THE AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER AND PROCESS THE APPLICATION IT IS NECESSARY TO 
PROVIDE AN ESTIMATED RENT BASED ON A MAXIMUM INTEREST RATE AND SHORTEST PERIOD OF 
AMORTIZATION. NEVERTHELESS, THE RENT SET FORTH IN THE LEASE WILL BE BASED UPON THE 
ACTUAL INTEREST RATE. 
-4-
-
IV. Contribution and Federal Aid Data 
A. Private and Federal Grants 
IDENTIFY EACH ITEM COMPRISING TOTAL CONTRIBUTION LISTED ABOVE AT LINE "H". (IF A 
~ FEDERAL GRANT IS INVOLVED , THE INSTITUTION MUST SUBMIT, WITH THIS APPLICATION, A 
COPY OF AN APPROVED GRANT AGREEMENT BEFORE THE CONTRIBUTION CAN BE CONSIDERED AS 
DECREASING THE AMOUNT TO BE FINANCED BY THE AUTHORITY. FURTHERMORE, THE INSTITUTION 
MUST BE PREPARED ON BID OPENING DAY FOR CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS TO PAY OVER TO THE 
AUTHORITY, IN CASH, OR IN DEPOSIT IN A CUSTODIAL ACCOUNT UNDER CONTROL OF THE 
AUTHORITY SECURITIES, IN THE AMOUNT OF ALL GRANTS, BOTH PRIVATE AND FEDERAL LISTED 
AS CONTRIBUTIONS AT LINE "H" ABOVE. IT WILL THEN BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE 
INSTITUTION TO REIMBURSE ITSELF BY OBTAINING THE GRANT FUNDS AS THEY BECOME AVAIL-
ABLE.) 
B. Federal Loans - LIST ONLY FEDERAL LOANS FOR WHICH YOU HAVE AN APPROVED LOAN AGREEMENT 
~ FOR THIS PROJECT. A COPY OF THE APPROVED LOAN AGREEMENT MUST BE SUBMITTED WITH THIS 
APPLICATION. DO NOT INCLUDE SUCH LOANS AS A CONTRIBUTION AT LINE "H" ABOVE, SINCE 
VCBA BONDS WILL BE ISSUED AND SOLD TO THE FEDERAL AGENCY IN THE AMOUNT AND AT THE 






This is to certify that the estimated costs of the items comprising 
the total structure cost are considered to be realistic and have been made 
according to accepted architectural practices for developing preliminary 
estimates. 
Signature of Architect Date 
Address 





This certifies that the Board of Trustees of the 
----------~-------------------------College or University 
By Resolution dated 19 authorized the filing of this Application - and that the information herein is correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
- (SEAL) 
Secretary of Board of Trustees 
19 
Address 
City Zip Code 
ADDRESSES: 
(No Signature required) 
Telephone 
Chairman of Board of Trustees: 
Name Street 
City Zip Code 
Telephone Number 
President of College or University 
Name Street 
City Zip Code 
Telephone Number 
Business Manager, College or University 
Name Street 







Schedule of Enrollment 
Include actual full-time enrollment during the regular academic term (Septem-
ber - June) for the 5 year period immediately preceding this application; and projected 
full-time enrollment during the regular academic term (September - June) for the 5 year 
period immediately following this application. 
















Schedule of Tuition and Fees 
Include actual annual fees (two semesters) being charged in the current year, 
and projected annual fees (two semesters) to and including either (a) the first year in 
which the initial rental to this Authority is due, or (b) (in the case of revenue pro-
ducing projects, such as dormitories, dining facilities, or parking facilities) the 
first year in which income from all such facilities in the project are anticipated, 
whichever shall be later. 
Actual 
Current Year Tuition Room and Board Other (specify) 
$ $ $ 
Projected 
Year Tuition Room and Board Other (sped fy) 
$ $ $ 
(The above form may be altered so long as the data is presented in a brief schedule 






Statement of outstanding indebtedness 















$ ___ _ 




$ _____ _ 
EXHIBIT "D" 
Annual Fiscal Report 
(As of end of each of the three most recent fiscal years, to include:) 
Balance Sheet 
Statement of Changes in Funds 
Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements 
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!RESTRICTED ENDOWMENT INCOME 
UNRESTRICTED GIFTS AND GRANTS 
_JOSS PROJECT RECEIPTS** 
* DEDUCT THEREFROM AMOUNT OF TUITION SPECIFICALLY PLEDGED FOR SECURITY OF 
OUTSTANDING DEBTS. PLEASE INDICATE BY FOOTNOTE THE EXTENT OF ANY SUCH 
PRIOR PLEDGE MADE ON ACCOUNT OF A FEDERAL LOAN, 
** PROJECTS INVOLVING DORMITORIES WILL SHOW OCCUPANCY CHARGES AS RECEIPTS, 
PROJECTS INVOLVING CLASSROOM FACILITIES, GYMNASIUM, ETC. WILL NORMALLY 













JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.i'u.prtmt <!Jltttrlaf tJrt ~tb .i'tatts 
, -ulfi:ttghm, ~. <!J. 20,?'1j 
May 7, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Lewis: 
It sounds as if Washington and Lee's borrowing under 
the Virginia Act which you describe in your memorandum of 
May 4th would not, even under the most sweeping arguments 
of the proponents of the Establishment Clause argument, 
violate that clause. The only conceivable argument as to 
Washington and Lee's interest in the outcome of this 
decision, then, would be that if Virginia cannot make this 
aid available to "sectarian" as well as to "non-sectarian" 
colleges, it might repeal it altogether. This is so 
speculative and remote that I certainly don't feel you 
should disqualify yourself. 
Sincerely, 
,juprttttt <q ourt of tiT t ';P:nitdt ~t~ttts 
~a:sftington. gl. <!J. 2llbl"~.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS May 7, 1973 
Dear Lewis: 
I have your memo on 71-1523, 
Hunt v. MCNair. I see no reason what-
soever for your disqualification to 
sit in the case. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
ee: The Conference 
~u.pumt C!Jourt ttf tqt ~ttittb jitlttts 
Jfasfringtttn. ;!3. <q. 20,;t>~$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. May 7, 1973 
RE: No. 71-1523 -Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Lewis: 
I can see no possible reason for your 
disqualifying your self in the above for the 




Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
C H AM BERS OF 
.ittpTttn~ <Q:ttud ttf tlrt ~~h .itatts 
,ras!ringtmt. ~. <Q:. 2ll£f){._;l 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
May 7, 1973 
No. 71-1523, Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Lewis, 
Based upon the information contained 
in your thoughtful memorandum of May 4, I see 
no reason whatever why you should disqualify 
yourself in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr . Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.iu:vrtttU (!Jltltrl ttf tqt ~nitt~ ,ihtttg 
I .Mftitt:ghttt. ~. <!J. 2llbt'l-.;l ' 
May 7, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Lewis: 
This is in response to your memorandum of May 4. 
I see no reason why you should disqualify in this case. 
Sincerely, 
;/. {L. ;J. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS Of' 
.:iu:prttttt <!fttud 4lf tqt ~b .:§t~s 
' 11Jasfrittgwn.l8. <If. 2llbt'l.~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL May 8, 197 3 
Re: No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Lewis: 
I see no reason why you should 
disqualify yourself in this case. 
Sincerely,~ 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
Hunt v. McNair 
Take a look at the opinion to see whether we have quoted the 
language in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 at 685 on the difference 
between secondard and higher education. This is an excellent quote and 
at least should be put in a footnote to McNair. 
I should also consider adding a note to theeeffect that the South 
Carolina Court held - if it did (I must check) that the Act was not 
questioned as to nonreligious schools. No such question was presented in 
this Court, but I believe the South Carolina Court dealt with the point. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
lfp/ss 5/28/73 
1 ew1s F. Powell, Jr. 
McNair and Committee v. 
~ 
Larry and I agree that we like for you to be the chambers 
A. .. 
"editor" of Nyquist. 
In addition to your generally recognized qualifications, 
like you to undertake this to be sure that our opinions in McNair and 
'!iY_9..Uist lla.rmonize in every respect. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.iUVt"tmt Qj:llu.rt ltf t!rt ~ttittb .i~ta 
' :.raafrittgbm.1f}. Qj:. 2llgt:J!.$ 
June 4, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1523, Hunt v 0 McNair 
Dear Lewis, 
I see no reason why the opinion should be reassigned 
in this case 0 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
j;uptttttt Q}ttUtt of t4t ~niit~ •.;%tatts 
~a:gfrittgton. Ifl. <!}. 21lgi'-1~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
J' ''"'-T ICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS June 4, 1973 
Dear Lewis: 
As respects your mexoo of June 4th 
relative to Hunt v. McNair I see no possible 
reason for you to recuse yourself. I voted 
the other way in the ease. But I would be the 




Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
~u.;rrtmt <!Jott.tt ttf tlft 'J!ittittlt ~bt!ts , 
~CUlfrittghttt, 18. <!J. 20giJ!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE WM . ..J. BRENNAN, ..JR. June 4, 1973 
RE: No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Lewis: 
I see no reason whatever for you to 
recuse yourself. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
71-1523 Hunt v. McNair 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
This supplements my note to the Conference of May 4. 
At a recent meeting of the Board of Trustees of Washington and 
Lee University, the possibility of financing several campus buildings 
through the Authority created under the Educational Facilities Authority 
Act of Virginia was discussed. The proper officers of the University 
were authorized to continue discussions with the Authority with the 
view of determining whether financing in this manner is feasible and 
advantageous to W. & L. If the answers prove to be affirmative, I 
think W. & L. will- perhaps by next fall- utilize the Authority. 
In other respects, the situation outlined in my note of May 4 
remains the same. I was in error, however, in saying that W. & L. 
was at one time of "presbyterian origin". I am now informed that it 
always has been strictly independent of ehureh and state. 
I regret botering the Conference with what essentially is my 
problem. As McNair comes to us only because of the Establishment 
Clause issue, I see no conflict. Yet, especially in view of the Court's 
division in this ease, I would respect and defer to any differing view. 
If any Justice would prefer that the opinion be reassigned, I will 
recuse myself. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
. .., "! 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 71-1523 Hunt v. McNair 
Here is my desk copy of the first draft, on which you will 
note suggested changes or questions on the three pages indicated. 
· In addition, what would you think of adding a note to the 
effect thatJhe South CarolrWt Court held (as I believe it did) that 
the validity of the Act wasAquestioned as to nonsectarian schools. 
~ ' ' • ~· "' < .,, 
'• 
; ~.· ~<, ~~ 
1 J us 1ce Brennan told me yesterday that he expected to have 
his dlssent t'hi~. week. Mter we have seen it, and decided whether 
it requires a reply, we can recirculate. 
I believe you have checked already to be sure that the · 
language in McNair is consistent with that in Nyquist. I think 





THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
PERSONAL 
.Jttpt"nnt ~ltltrl of t4t ~~ .Jtzdtg 
,Jlrutfringhttt ~. <If. 2ilbi'!~ ' 
June 5, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1523 -Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Lewis: 
I contemplate joining you and will do so for the record 
before Friday. I want to see how this case and your Nyquist 
affect my Levitt. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMB'"RS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.§u.prtutt <!Jltttd ltf t4t ,-mttb .§taftg 
I '~htgfri:ngtcn. ~• <!J. 2ll~'1~' 
Re: No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Lewis: 
June 6, 1973 
I certainly see no reason why you should disqualify 
yourself in this case. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
~lt}tUutt (!Jttmt ltf tltt ~niftb j;htttg 
, ._asJri:tt:ghm, ~. <!J. 2llp.)l..;l , 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
June 7, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Lewis: 
This is in response to your note of June 4. I see no 
reason for the opinion to be reassigned. 
Sincerely, 
)l.u.t 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
.Jn.prtntt ~ourt of t4t 'Jnittb .Jtaftg 
Jlufri:ttght~ ~. <!f. 20bi'l>~ ' 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
June 12, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1523 -Richard W. Hunt v. Robert 
E. McNair, et al 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
'"--" CHAMBERS OF 
~ttprttttt <!J'ourl of tltt 'Jtlttiftb ~t~s 
I 'Basftington. ~. <!f. 2ll,?'l·~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 12, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1523 - Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Bill: 










~u.putttt <.!Jcu:rt of t~e ~ttitdt ~tates 
Jrnoirmgton, tn. <.q. 2.ogr;~~ · 
' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS June 15, 1973 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent 
in 71-1523, Hunt v. McNair. 
William 0. Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 





~tmt <qltttrlo-f t£rt ~nittb ,i~g 
-M£rittgbm. ~. <q. 2ll~"$ 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
June 18, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1523 .... Hunt v. McNair 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your opinion, 
I have been troubled about what you define on 
page 12 as the 11 closer issue, 11 namely, the possible 
involvement in day-to-day financial and policy decisions. 
I was tempted to consider the rate and fee power as un-
constitutional and to remand to have the state court 
consider severability. What you have done, however, 
seems about all that can be done on this sparse record. 
Thus, with some uneasiness, I join. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
1st DRAFT 








Ch ," J11,·t,~ce 
Jl'~ ic ""~,..,~la s 
Ju st~ ce Stm:art 
J'LlSt i ce V:hi tP. 
Jclst ice l~rshall 
Justice Blac'. mun 
Justice Po>,ell 
Justice Rehnquist 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAf-m· Br ... m1.n , J • 
_Gircula ted : f o '" ' 7 v 
RICHARD W. IIU~T v. ROBERT E. Me:\ AlB., 
GOVERKOR OF S01JTH CAROLIXA, E'r ALEecirculated:~· -----
ON APPEAL FROM 'l'HE SUPREME COUR'l' OF SOUTH CAR OLIN A 
~o. 71-1523. Drcickd Octobrr -, 1972 
Mrt. JusTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
I dissent from the dismissal because, contrary to the 
Court's holding, this appeal presents a substantial con-
stitutional question. 
The constitutional question presented is 'vhether 
South Carolina's assistance to the Baptist College at 
Charleston under the South Carolina Educational Facili-
ties Authority Act constitutes constitutionally imper-
missible support by the State for this sectarian institu-
tion."'· The test to which I adhere for determining such 
questions is whether the arrangement between the State 
·l:·Thi::; case wa8 initial!~· decidC'd by thC' Comt of Common PlC'as 
for Charleston County, South Carolina, which upheld ap;aiu~t Fir::;t 
Amendment attack the validity of the South Carolina Educational 
Fncilitie:; Authorit~· Act , whereby thr State Budget and Control 
Board, acting aH the Authorit~·, is authorized to as;;iRt finnming for 
in~titut ionH of higher learning; by its issuance of revenue bonds 
r>ecmed by a mortgage on the projC'ct so fmnnced. The judgment 
of that court wa ::; affirmed by the Supremr Court of South Carolina 
on October 22, 1970. Hunt v. McNair, 255 S. C. 71, 177 S. E. 2cl 
362 (1970). Appellant appealed to this Court and on .Tunc 28, 
1971, we vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina and rema ncled for "recon:;idcra t ion in I ight of this Court's 
drci~ion~ in Lemon v. Kurtzman. Earley v. DiCenso, and Robinson v. 
DiCenso, [403 U. S. 602]; and Tilton v. Richardson, f 403 U. S. 
6721." llunt v. lllcNair, 403 U . S. 945 (1971). On remand, the 
Suprrmc Court of South Carolina again affirmed the judgment of 
the Court of Common Pleas, Ilunt v. McNair, - S. C. -, 187 
S. E. 2d 645 (1972), and today this Court di~misHes npprllant's 
appeal on the ground that the case docs not pre ·cut a subHtant in! 
con~titutionnl question. 
2 HUNT v. l\TcNAIH 
a11d the Baptist College is foreclosed under the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment because among 
"those involvements of religious with secular insti-
tutions which (a) serve the essentially religious ac-
tivities of religious institutions; (b) employ the 
organs of government for essentially religious pur-
poses; or (c) use essentially religious means to secure 
governmental ends, where secular means would suf-
fice." Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 
U. S. 203, 294-295 (1963) (concurring opinion); 
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 680-681 
(1970) (concurring opinion). 
It is obvious that under that test there is a substan-
tial question whether South Carolina's statutory scheme 
is constitutional. 
The statute authorizes a financing arrangement be-
tween the Authority and the Baptist Co11ege at Charles-
ton, a South Carolina educational corporation operated 
by the South Carolina Baptist Convention. In accord-
ance \Yith the provisions of the Act, the College would 
convey a substantial portion of its campus to the Au-
thority. with the Authority then leasing the property so 
conveyed to the College at an agreed rental. The 
Authority would then issue revenue bonds of South 
Carolina in the anwunt of $3,500.000.00, which bonds 
would be payable, principal and interest, from the rent 
to be received by the Authority under the lease. The 
proceeds of the sale of the bonds would be used to pay 
off outstanding indebtedness of the College and to con-
struct additional buildings and facilities for use in its 
higher educatiou operations. When the bonds and in-
terest arc paid in fu11, the Authority would be obligated 
to convey title to the project and campus properties 
to the College free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. 
But this is not a mere mortgage arrangement. The Au-
thority is also empo,Yerccl, inter alia, to determine the 
location and character of any project; to construct; 
IIUKT v. McKAin 3 
maintain, manage, operate, lease as lessor or lessee, and 
regulate the san1e; to enter into contracts for the manage-
ment and operation of such project; to establish rules 
and regulations for the use of the project or any portion 
thereof; and to fix and revise from time to time rates, 
rents, fees and charges for the use of a project and for 
the services furnished or to be furnished by a project or 
any portion thereof. In other words, the College turns 
over to the state agency control of substantial parts of 
the fiscal operation of the school-its very life-blood. 
This involves the State in a. policing of the affairs of the 
College that presents the substantial question whether 
this plan differs in any material aspect from those the 
Court struck down in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Earley v. 
DiCenso, and Robinson v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
Sec Sanders v. Johnson, 319 F. Supp. 421, 431-432, aff'd, 
403 U.S. 955 (1971). 
Indeed, the many powers reserved to the Authority by 
the South Carolina statute also create substantial ques-
tions whether this statute could survive the "imper-
missible entanglement" test applied by the plurality in 
Lemon, Earley, and Robinson, supra, and Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). By providing the 
College with the opportunity to issue tax-exempt bonds 
under the State's name and then retaining the power to 
oversee the use of the proceeds and the terms of repay-
ment of such bonds, surely the statute presents a sub-
stantial question whether the State employs the organs 
of government for essentially religious purposes and 
creates an "intimate continuing relationship or depend-
ency between government and religiously affiliated insti-
tutions." Tilton, supra, at 688 (plurality opinion of 
BURGER, C. J.). 
I would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for 
oral argument. 
<D>: 'IJ]lle Qief' Jr~M 
Mr. hsitio~ ~Jfll~""" 
Ktr. Justic~ St~-.tl . 
Kr. Justice rut~ 
3rd DRAFT 
Kr. Justice lla.ral\( ")l 
11r. Justice Bl&m . 
llr. Justice Powell ~ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Kr. Justice Rebnquilll~ 
From. DJuglas, J. 
RICHARD W. HUNT v. ROBERT E. Mc~AIR, 
GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA, ET AL.Ciroulated: _____ _ 
)?-(:)/ ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAR0$$0'ii.roulated: 
No. 71-1523. Decided October -, 1972 
Mu. J usTICE DouGLAS, with whom MR. JusTICE MAR-
SHALL concurs, dissenting. 
The dismissal of this appeal for want of a substantial 
federal questio11 is a break with our constitutional tra-
ditions. For South Carolina is aHowed to finance a 
religious school through the use of state revenue bonds. 
Today the state finances a Baptist school. But the same 
principle vvould apply to Mormon schools, where Mor-
mons are politically in control of a State, to Catholic 
schools where the Catholic voice is dominant, or to any 
other religious school whose sponsors have sufficient po-
litical "clout." The race will now be on with a bitter 
battle among religionists to obtain state aid for their 
private schools. The casuaWes will be not merely mi-
nority religious groups nor nonbelievers who fear the 
mixture of sectarian ideas and civil administration of 
state affairs but those \vho deeply believe that when a 
church becomes dependent on and involved vvith a State, 
the secularization of a creed may ensue. Financial con-
trol usually means pervasive control; and churches that 
seek state aid today may be vYhipsa"·ed by state politics 
tomorrow. 
These are problems that the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment '"~ sought to avoid. As stated 
in Walz v. Tax C01nmis~c~~, 397 U. S. 664, 668, the 
"establishment" of a religion in the mind of the Framers 
"connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active in-
volvement of the sovereign in religious activity." 
Under the South Carolina Educational Facilities Au-
thority Act the State'sB is employed in aid of private 
-\ M~ 
I 
2 IlUl\T v. l\'TcNAIR 
sectarian iustitutions of learning. The Authority estab-
lished by the Act may issue state revenue bonds for the 
benefit of an institution of higher learning on terms that 
require the recipient institution to convey title to the 
financed facilities to the Authority for the duration of 
the bond repayment period. Here, a proposed loan to 
the Baptist College at Charlcst~n would be financed 
through state revenue bonds that 1vould issue after the 
school had conveyed a substantial portion of the campus 
to the Authority. Reconveyance to the college would 
occur upon payment in full of the bonds and interest 
subjC'ct to a condition that the facilities so financed not 
be used by the college or by any voluntary grantee of 
the college for sectarian instruction or as a place of \\"Or-
ship. Liability of the State results from the Authority's 
obligation o t 1c onclholclcrs to set ees and rentals at 
levels sufficiently hiah to insure adequate revenues to 
m~s.2..r, 1~ecty, t1roug 1_ t1e 
State's 1eed to preserve its credit rating. 
Under the test suggested by JValz there is "sponsor-
ship" of a ~cctarian institution by the State. Financing 
of it is an umbilical cord that ties C'hurch and State to-
gethrr into an ongoing relationship. 
The "financial support" mentioned in TV alz is not 
restricted to secular activities of the church school. The I 
revenue bonds of the Rtate permit refinancing of cur-
rent indebtedness some of which 'ms incurred for f'ec-
tarian purposes. 
The "active involvement" of the State in the activities 
of the church school is vital to the scheme. There 1vill 
be continuing supervision of the usc to which buildings 
are put not only during the time that title rests with the 
State, but also in perpetuity. 
During the years \\·hen the bonds remain outstanding, 
the Authority has the power and the obligation to see 
that the fees charged by the college for the use of the 
financed facilities are aclcq uatc to meet the rcpaymcn t 
obligations to bondholders. That entails an on-going 
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supervision of the College's financial wellbeing and con-
trol of the fees which it charges. Such an oversight of 
an agency of a church is an entanglement in the affairs 
of a sectarian institution that is repugnant to the Estab- ~ 
lishment Clause. As in Lemon v. Kurtzmann, 403 U. S. 
602, 619, "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing 
state surveillance will eventually be required to ensure 
that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amend-
ment otherwise respected." 
A religious school operates on one budget. Money not 
spent for one purpose becomes available for other pur-
poses. A banker-here the State-who exercises sur-
veillanc~budg~igious school may there-
fore insist to the religious group that it cut down on 
its religious courses if the bonds are to be paid. Sur-
veillance means the entanglement with the church that 
the First Amendment was designed to avoid. That 
entanglement may be a heavy cross for the devout to 
carry, for with it comes an intrusion of civil authority 
into ecclesiastical problems that Madison warned against 
in his Remonstrance.>:.· 
I ''"ould note this appeal and put the case down for 
oral argument. 
~·"We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no m:m's 
right is abridged by the institution of Civil SociPty, and that Re-
ligion is wholly exempt from its cognizance. True it is, that no 
other rule exists, by which any question which may deYide a Society, 
ran be ultimately determined, but the will of the majority; but it is 
also true, that the majority may trespass on the rights of the mi-
nority." Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments, reprinted 397 U. S. 664, 71'9, 720. 
iCier A, p. 2 (Hunt) ~/7/7~. 
(j} 
The College has applied to the Authority for the issuance 
of revenue bonds pursuant to the provisions of the Act, and proposes 
to convey without cost to the state a substantial portion of its 
campus (the Project) to the Authority. It will then lease the 
property so conveyed back to the College under a lease agreement 
pursuant to which the College will be obligated to operate and 
maintain the oject property and to pay to the Authority rentals 
in an amount sufficient to meet the payments of principal and 
interest as they bee orne due on the proposed revenue bonds. 
The Authority would issue the bonds and make the proceeds 
available to the College for the Project purposes. Afterx~epqyxmn~ 
rep yment in full of the bonds, the Project would be reconveyed 
to the College. 
\ 
lfp/ss Rider.A, p. 2A (Hunt) 4/7/73 
The Act is quite explicit that the bonds shall not be 
obligations of the state: 
'~ K) Revenue bonds issued under the provisions 
of this section shall not be deemed to constitute 
a debt or liability of the State or of any political 
subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith and 
credit of the State or of any such political sub-
division, but shall be payable solely from the 
funds herein provided therefor from revenues. 
All such revenue bonds shall contain on the face 
thereof a statement to the effect that neither the 
state of South Carolina nor the authority shall be 
obligated to pay the same or the interest thereon 
except from revenues of the project or the portion 
thereof for which they are issued and that neither 
the faith and credit nor the taxing power of the 
State of South Carolina or of any politicallllllD: 
subdivision thereof is pledged to the payment of 
the principal of or the interest on such bonds. 
The issuance of revenue bonds under the provisions 
of this act shall not directly or indirectly or 
contingently obligate the state or any political 
subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any form 
of taxation whatever therefor or to make any 
appropriation for their payment. " South Carolina 
















lfp/ss Rider A, p. 4 (Hunt) 4/7/73 
In accordance with the Act, the proposal contemplates that 
simultaneously with the execution of the lease agreement, the 
Authority and the trustee bank would enter into a talaatxiDdalx 
Trust Indenture which would create, for the benefit of the bondholders, 
a forecloseable mortgage lien on the pxm;m Project property including 
a mortgage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority in and 
to the lease agreement. " Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix B, 
p. 50. 
( Bill: I think there should be an additional reference with respect 
to the mortgage on the property but I could not put my finger on it.) 
lfp/ss Rider A,_ p. 6 (H!Jilt) 4/7/73 
The College and other private institutions of higher 
education provide these benefits to the state.* As of the school 
year 1969-70, there were 1, 548 regularly enrolled students, in 
addition to approximately 600 night students. ** It is also 
undisputed that 95% of the students at the College are residents 
of South Carolina who are thus receiving a college-level education 
without "any financial support from the State of South Carolina~*** 
*In Allen;- this Court commented on the importance of the role 
of private education in this country: 
"Underlying these cases, and underlying also 
the legislative judgments that have preceded 
the court decisions has been a recognition that 
private education has played and is playing a 
significant and valuable role in raising national 
levels of knowledge, competency and experience. " 
Alle~, sup~ 392 U. s. 236 at ___ . 
**Paragraph 11 of the Application to the Authority, which is not 
questioned, App. 20. The application further shows that 
BJIXiitieui enrollment has been increasing at a rapid rate. 
*** App., p. 16. 
I 
/ 
lfp/ss Rider A, p. 7 (~unt) 4/7/73 
Consider adding the substance of a note, referenced to the point 
indi~~t~.d <»?-_ .P.:. ~L ~!oll.~ws: - ---· _ 
It is to be noted that the "state aid" involved in this 
case is different significantly from that before the Court in our 
previous ilstablishment Clause cases. We have here no expenditure 
of publicfunds, either by grant or loan, no reimbursement by a 
state for expenditures made by a private or parochial school or 
college, and no extending or committing a state's credit. Rather, 
the only state aid consists, not of financial assistance directly or 
indirectly which would implicate public funds or credit, but the 
' creation of an instrumentality (the Authority) through which educational 
institutions may borrow funds on the basis of their own credit and 





be available. The Supreme Court of New Jersey characterized the \ 
\ 
assistance rendered an educational institution under an act generally 
similar to the South Carolina Act as merely being a "governmental 




506-507 ( 1970). The South Carolina Supreme Court, in its opinion 
below, described the role of the state as that of a "mere conduit" 
S.C. ·--- -· As we conclude that the primary effect of this 
Act neither advances nor inhibits religion for the other reasons 
stated in this opinion, we need not consider whether the "three test" 
standard of Lel!lon invariably applies to the type of "aid" presently 
before the Court. 
lfp/ss Rider A, p. 9 (Hunt) 4/7/73 
On the record in this case there is no basis to conclude 
that the c£ollege functions as a religious entity or that its operations 
are oriented significantly towards sectarian rather than secular 
education. 
/ 
lfp/ss Rider A, p. 14 (Hunt) 4/7/73_ 
Consider adding a footnote at point indicated, as follows: 
The gravity of the entanglement problem is also related, 
of course, to the extent to which the particular institution is 
in fact church related. Although the record in this case is 
abbreviated and not free from JUriiGx ambiguity, the burden is 
on appellant and he has failed to show much more than a 
/ 
' 
formalistic church relationship. There are many colleges 
throughout the country and especially in some of the southern 
states, that were organized by religious denominations and are 
still legally controlled by trustees designated by a SEe 
/ secular denominational body, as is true in this case. The trend irl 
such colleges, especially in recent years, has been away from 
religious emphasis or indoctrination and toward the providing of 
conventional college level education leading to A. B. and B. S. 
degrees, with a broadly based curriculum which may include 
relatively few, if any ;x courses oriented to the particular 
denomination which founded the college. So far as the record 
2. 
in this case goes, there is no showing that Baptist college places 
any special emphasis on Baptist~ denominational or 
any other secular type of education. As noted above, both the 
faculty and student body are open to persons of all (or no) religious 
faiths. 
lfp/ss Rider A, p. (Hunt) 4/7/73 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina expressly found that 
the bonds to be issued by the 201 Authority will "not [be] a debt 
or obligation of the state''. That court also unequivocally 
concluded that: "There is no cost to the state incident to the entire 
plan of financing. " Jurisdictional Statement, p. 19. 
lfp/ss Rid~r ~__,P=-·-_ _,_(H_un---'t )---'4"-/7..;../_73 
g~J?.~~de:t:_addinJL~ footnote as follows: 
There is nothing presented by this case which resembles the 
cumulative impact of the entangelment described in Lemon as 
follows: 
"A comprehensive, discriminating and continuing 
state surveillance will be inevitably be required 
to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and 
the First Amendment otherwise respected. " 
403 U.S. at . 
lfp/ss Rider A, p. (Hunt) 4/7/73 
The following excerpt from the lower court opinion (the 
Court of Common Pleas for Charleston County) might be added 
to a note at some appropriate place: 
"Since it is conceded that the only remedies of 
the bondholders in the event of default is to pursue 
the rights of the authority to collect from its 
lessee and if need be, to foreclose the Trust 
Indenture and have the property sold, the state's 
credit can never be adversely affected." Appendix 
37. 
* * * 
"I find that the credit of the state can in no way 
be considered as aiding in any way the Baptist 
College at Charleston. " Appendix 40. 
lfp/ss Rider A, p. (Hunt) 4/7/73 
Consider ~ding a footncte as follows: 
In ~llen, this Court commented on the importance of the 
role of private education in this country: 
"Underlying these cases, and underlying also 
the le slattve judgments that have preceded 
the Court decisions has been a recognition that 
private education has played and is playing a 
significant and valuable UJeC role in raising 
national levels of owledge, competency and 
experience. " Hen, supra 392 U. S. 236 at 
.. 
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would the Authority or the trustee be obligated to take further 
action. In that event, the Authority or trustee might either 
foreclose on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting 
~ 
of rules, charges and fees. It may be that only the former would 
" 
be consistent with the Establishment Clause, but we do not now 
chi-~ ~~ t..c.-..- H.u.- -~~ .. vv~l .. ~ 
have that situation before us;.. We-hold ~sly that ia its ppesent 
~~)~~~~1:6~ 
posturQ , tag College's finaneing ,pPop~sal does- not fstce excessive 
-k~t.~~~~~ . 
eBtangleineH:t beb,rQell tb.Q State and 1 eligion. 
k~-f~~~­
o-r_ 1-k.st- c3.-::::l ~  ../..<) 
III. a... ~-~1-t~ 
a-...-~~at~ 
A.Er-w:e-:l~re-~m!=HH:~ea--at~~~Nb. lhi s case comes to ~~ .. 
~d_A-/a_, d.e..J~ ~a<:- ' 
us -ia aH aw!QNaPd postuP~ i(s the court below pointed out, 
S.C., at ; 187 S.E.2d, at 651, the Act was patterned -- ---· 
~~ 
closely after the South Carolina Industrial Revenue Bond Act, the 
. cr . 
~ ~~ ' U.S.<..~~~ .. ~ .... /2.'"( 
~appears to confer A broad power and responsibility on the Authority. 
Yet specific provisions of the Act, the Rules and Regulations of the 
Authority, and the College's proposal ~ ~J 
' v. McNair, No. 71-1523 
9, 1973 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivtered the opinion of the Court. 
Appellant, a South Carolina taxpayer, brought 
l this action to challenge the South Carolina Educational 
. +'' ) ( 
Facilities S.C. CODE ANN. wiliiilii§J 22-41 et seq. (Cv?(J. ~upp· IQ/1) 
) 
as vit olative of the Establishment Glause of 
the First Amendment insofar as it authorizes a proposed 
~ ~c-(~~-fcr-&~ 
financing ... transaction involvingAthe Baptist College at ~ 
0 
Charleston. The trial court's denial of relief 
\ I was affirmed v ppzai by the Supreme Court 
of South Carolina. 255 s.c. 71, 
177 s.E.2d 362(1970). ..~~.a .... -.. This 
Court vacated the judgment and remanded 
the case for reconsideration in light of the 
intervening decisions in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 
602(1971)a Earley v. DiCensov 403 u.s. 602(1971) a 
Robinson v. DiCenso, 403 u.s. 602(1971); and 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 672(1971). 403 
u.s. 945(1971). On remand, the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina adhered to its earlier position. 





We begin by s~ing out the ge~eral structure 
of the Act. The Act established an Educational Facilities 
Authority(the "Authotity"), the purpose of which is "to 
assist institutions for higher education in the construction, 
financing and refinancing of projects • • II . . , S,C,CODE 
ANN, .§ 22-41. 4(Cum, Supp. 1971), primarily through the 
issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms of the 
Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities, site 
preparation and related items, but may not include 
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian 
instruction or as a place of religious worship nor 
any facility which is used of to be used primarily 
in connection with any part of the program of 
a school or department of divinity for any religious 
denomination. II s.c.CODE ANN.§ 22-41.2(b)(aum. Supp. 
1971). 
Corr-e_sft'"lJ,,...~fy, -TA Au lho,.,'l~ is o_ tctJ,.J rJ 
cer- fa,· I\ p(lwel' S CJ l)t!'" -flte p rov' ~G/~ 
1 IIi c /uc/, ~ -tA e h d.e 'i~rM,-,e -fhe..-
16,. i l..e v.S e o-f -lo 
fo e-( Ia i tJ.~ 




the Act is quite explicit that the .., bonds shall not 
be obligations of the State, directly or indirectlya 
"( K) Revenue bonds issued under the provisions 
of this section shall not be deemed to constitute 
a debt or liability of the State or of any political 
subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith and 
credit of the State or of any such political sub-
division, but shall be payable solely from the 
funds herein provided therefor from revenues. 
All such revenue bonds shall contain on the face 
thereof a statement to the effect that neither the 
State of South Carolina nor the authority shall be 
obligated to pay the same or the interest thereon 
except from revenues of the project or the portion 
thereof for which they are issued and that neither 
the faith and credit nor the taxing power of the 
State of South Carolina or of any political _.. 
subdivision thereof is pledged to the payment of 
the principal of or the interest on such bonds. 
The issuance of revenue bonds under the provisions 
of this act shall not directly or indirectly or 
contingently obligate the State or any political 
subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any form 
of taxation whatever therefor or to make any 
appropriation for their payment. " s..~ c; 1 • 
Code ' *Ann. § 22-41(10( €um. J\ipp. 1971). 
Furthermore, since all of the expenses of the Authority 
• 
must be paid from the revenues of the various projects 
in which it participates, S.C.CODE ANN. 77 II ~ 






On January 6, 1973, the College submitted to 
the Authority for preliminary approval an application for 
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the proposal, 
the Authority would issue revenue bonds and make the 
J 
proceeds available to the College fo~se in 
connection with a portion of its campus to be 
designated a project (the "Project") within the meaning 
of the Act. In return, the College would convey the 
eroject, Without cost, to the Authority, Which would then 
lease the pro• perty so conveyed back to the College. 
After repa• yment in full of the bonds, the Project 
1 would be reconveyed to the College. 
-"to..-
The Authority granted preliminary approval 
on January 16, 1970, 255 s.c., at 76; 177 s.E.2d, at 365. 
In its present form, the application requests the 
issuance of revenue bonds totaling $1, 250, 000, of which $1, 050, 000 
would be applied t~horl term financing orf5::~ 
capital improvements and $200, 000 would be applied to the completion 
2 
of dining hall facilities. The advantage of financing educational 
institutions through a state created authority derives from relevant 
provisions of federal and South Carolina state income tax laws which 
provide in effect- that the interest on such bonds is not subject 
3 
to income taxation. The income tax exempt status of the interest 
enables the Authority, as an instrumentality of the state, to market 
the bonds at a significantly lower rate of interest than ke 
c~ t> ' _ ~ I I) ~ ·, iT) 
educationatlns 1fution)borrowed the money by conventional private 
financing. 
l 1 
Because the College's application to the 
Authority was __., a preliminary one, the details 1 
of the financing arrangement have not yet been fully 
worked out. But Rules and Regulations adopted by 
-
"obligating the Institution that neither the 
leased land, nor any facility located thereon, 
shall be used for sectarian instruction or as 
a place of religious worship, or in connection 
with any part of the program of a school or 
department of divinity of any religion denom-
ination." S.C~at ; 187 S.E.2d, 
at 647. 
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agreement 
must allow the Authority to conduct inspections, and any recon-
veyance to the College must contain a restriction against use for 
sectarian purposes. 4 The Rules further provide that simultaneously 
with the execution of the lease agreement, the Authority and the 
trustee bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would create, 
for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseable mortgage lien on 
the Project property including a mortgage on the "right, title and 
interest of the Authority in and to the lease agreement." Jurisdictional 
Statement, Appendix C, p. 50. 
Our consideration of appellant's Establishment Clause claim ex-
tends only to the proposal as approved preliminarily with such addi-
tions as are contemplated by the Act, the rules, and the decisions 
-5-
II. 
The Court has recently had occasion to 
synthesize the principles which goKvern our 
consideration of challenges to statutes as 
~-' ,_ b/,..s,,_t! ,.. + 
violative of the Clausea a 
"Three • • • tests may be gleaned from our cases. 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its ,principal or primary effect 
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion, • • • 1 finally,the statute must 
not foster 'an excessive entanglement with 
religion'." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 u.s., at 613. 
With full recofgl nition that these are no more than 
helpful si. gnposts, we consider the 1111111 
present statute and the proposed transaction 
in terms of the three "tests"a purpose, effect, and 
entanglement. 
The purpose of the statute is manifestly a 
secular one. The befnefits of the Act are available 




the introductory p:Raragraph of the Ac,t represents 
anything other than a good faith statement of purposea 
••JKJ It 1s 1hereby declared that for .the benefit of the 
people of the State, the increase of their commerce, welfare 
and prosperity and the improvement of their heal.th and 
living conditions it is essential .that this and future genera-
tions of youth be given the fullest opportunity to learn and 
.to develop their intellectual and menta:! capacities; that it 
is essential that institutions for higher education within the 
State be provided with appropriate additional means to 
assist such youth in achieving the required levels of learning 
and development of their intellectual and mental capacities; 
and that it is the purpose of this section to provide a meas-
ure of assistance and an alternative method to en3ible 
institutions for higher education in the State to provide the 
facilities and· structures which are sorely needed to accom-
plish the puYiposes of ·this act, aU to the public benefit and 
good, to the extent and manner provided herein. I\ 
S,C,CODE ANN. j22.41(Cum, Supp, 1971). 
The Col•lege and other private institutions 
' 
of higher education provide these benefits to the tate, 
As of the academic year 1969-70, there were 1,548 
students enrolled in the College, in addition to 
approximately 600 night students, Of these students, 
95 % are residents of South Carolina who are thereby 
receiving a college education without financial support 
from the State lof South Carolina. 
B. 
To identify "primary effect", we narrow ou•r 
focus from the statute as a whole to the only 
transaction presently before us. Whatever may be 





proposition that the Establishment Clause prohibits 
any program which in some manner aids an institution 
with a religious affilation has consistently been 
rejected. ~.,Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 u.s. 291 
(1899); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664(1970); 
"'ftated another way'/ 
Tilton v. Richardson, supra. • I I sur -
................................ ., the Court has 
~.A-- ... ~ 1~-1 \recurrent/ 
firlfti;;6,;.;;~ ... the • I 5 I I ... argument that 
A 
all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of 
an institution frees 8t •l .. \._•/ ••T-•, ·'--·' .. to spend 
itl s other resourfees on religious ends. 
~, t-1- h.o.v 
~ v 
• ' id 
of advancing religion when 
it flows to an institution ••• in which religion _, 
is so pervasive that 
all functions are subsumed in the religious mission 
or when it funds ..................... a 
specifically religious activity in an otherwise 
~j 
substantially secular setting. In Tilton v. Richardson, 
supra, the Court refused to strike down ..., a direct 
-8-
Connecticut, MR. CHiHF JUSTICE BUR~, f~r~lity, 
concluded that .. 111111 .. 11111111111111 .. 1111., 
.. llllil .. llllllllllllllllllll.., despite some institutional 
rhetoric, none of the four colleges was pervasively 
sectarian, but held open ................ that possibiilty 
for future casesa 
"Individual projects can be properly evaluated 
if and when challenges arise with respect to 
particular recipients and some evidence is then 
presented to show that the institution does in 
fact possess these characteristics." 403 u.s., at 682, 
Appellant has introduced no evidence in the 
present case llllllllllllllllllllllllllll.,placing the 
i I I College is such a category. 
It is true that the llllll.,members of the College 
\ ..,~.f' / 
Board of Trustees are elected by ~ South 
Carolina Baptist Convention, that the approval of the 
Convention is required for certain financial transact• ions, 
and the the charter of the College may be amended only 
1 ikewi.s.E'J 
-9-
What little there is in the record concerning the 
College establishes that there are no religious 
qualification for faculty me~bership or student admission, 
'is Baptist, a percentage roughly equivalent to 
the percentage of Baptists in that area of South 
Carolina. 255 s.c., at 85; 177 s.E.2d, at 369, 
On the record in this case there is no basis to 
cone lude nttzrttm#wtts rf , . that the College's 
operations are • oriented significantly towards sectarian 
rather than secular education, 
-10-
' 
Non~llllll•' .. a~;~&R&•a .. az .......... £,can we conclude 
that • the proposed transaction will place the Authority 
in the position of providing direct support for 
religious activities, The scope of the Authority's 
power to assist institutions of higher education 
extends only to "projects", and the Act specifically 
states that a project "shall not include" any buildings 
or facilities used for religious p~oses, In the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume 
that all of the ~reposed financing and refinancing 
relates to buildings and facilities within a properly 
delimited project, It is not at all clear from the 
record that the portion of the campus to be conveyed by 
the College to the Authority and leased back 
is the same as that being 
financed, but in any event it too must be part 
of the ~oject and subject to the same prohibition 
against ll~llllllllllf use for religious pijyposes, 
In addition, as we have indicated, every lease agreement 
must contain a clause forbidding religious use 
-11-
c. 
The final aaw I 7 ]"(§" at question posed by 
a~ 
there would beAunconstitutional degree of entanglement 
between the State and the College, Appellant 
argues that the Authority would become involved in the 
operation of by inspecting the 
project to insure that it is not being used for religious 
purposes and by participating in the management 
decisions of the College, 
-12-
The Court's opinion in Lemon and the plurality 
opinion in Tilton are grounded on the proposition 
that the degree of entanglement arising from 
inspection of facilities as to use varies _... 
in large measure with the extent to which religion 
permeates the institution. In finding excessive entanglement, 
the Court in Lemon relied on the "substantial religious 
character of these church-related" elementary schools. 
11~ I Cl/lf; r i:Tus r~e. t;, ev lo , l of /w~l'l 
403 u.s., at 616. 
/ ..f'()~ -lite pltJra/,Y /,.,} l Tilton ----~------ii ...................... . 
placed considerable emphasis on the •••ziijt ........... s• 
I& I 5 fact that the federal aid there S 7 
approved would be spea nt in a college settinga 
"Since religious indoctrination iKs not 
a substantial p~ose or activity of these 
church-related ....... colleges and universities, 
there is less likelihood than in primary and 
secondary schools that religion will permeate 
the area of secular education." 403 u.s., at 687. 
~· JUSfH~fi WHI!JY ~ 
Although ' 1 • saw n~clear distinction, 
-13-
the legislation here challenged." 403 u.s. , at 664. 
A ma jority of the Court in Tilton , then, concluded 
that on the facts of that case inspection • as to use 
did not .... threas ten excessive entang• lement . 
~·••••••l•t•s .......... As we have indicated above , there 
is no evidence here to demonst• rate that the 
College is any more an instrument of •. _. .......... .. 
religious indoctrination than .- were the colleges 
~~ ~  
and universities involved in Tilto~ d g • t 1 t 
f 211&2 diE. 3 au . 3 22 7? F'fl 7 7 
~a I I L k 
I 'L 
: I I I: : ·= l" iii I liJ 
. 
I I I :c. II --~--.... ~............................. ;.:;; ~ 
J 
presented by the contention that the Authority 
<::6 (~ • ._A become dee~ly involved in the day-to- day 
financial 
\..+4f/ 
and policy decisions of~ Col£se . 
4;-w._ ~ 
The .... ~ .-· ... ia Authority is empowered!n~· r .. tilt ...... 
A 
5 2 21¢21@ .. ,. 
"(g) generally, to fix and revise from time 




person, partnership, association or co- rporation 
or other p ' ? ' body public or private in respect 
thereof; 
(h) to establish rules and regulations for 
the use of a project or any p~tion thereof and to 
designate a participating institution for higher 
education as its agent to establish rules and 
regulations for the use of a project undertaken 
for such participating institution for higher 
'{_oiiC ~ . 
education •••• II s.c.-a~ 22-41.4C PH Cum. 
u,:):!f_J 
&:-
These powers are sweeping ones, and were there ~ 
1 
~ 
.A likelihood that they ._ would be exercised in 
their full detail, the entanglement problems with 
Supp~. 
The opinion of the South Carolina Supreme Court, 
however, reflects a .. •t•e•·_. .. ._sg.-
~nterpretation ................ of the 
practical ............ ~ ............ operation of~ 





"Counsel for plaintiff argues that the broad 
language of the Act causes the ~ate, of necessity, 
to become excessively involved in the operation , I 
management• and administration of the College , 
We do not so construe the Act . • • • • [ T.]he 
basic function of the Authority is to see 
• • • that fees are charged sufficient to meet 
5. C J a.T--; /87 S.l;,c.?d 
sts a * ,. at n *sr a a J the bond payments, " 
qf- 6.s-l. 
_._ _.. ..__ M 2± .xr• zr•m •• 
As we read the College ' s proposal , the Lease Agreement 
between the Authority and the College will place on 
the College the ...... 7E777. responsibility for making 
the detailed decisions regarding the government of 
the campus and the fees to be charged _... for 
\_po.r-11 tv/a r J 
BWitiik~services. ~~~f~s~s~; .. lt-..-fi ....... t•g~nM&ss•t•a•a•z•IL 
J I 
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I Specifically, the proposal states~ that the Lease I Agreement 
"will unconditionally obligate the College 
(a) to pay sufficient rentals to mee• t the 
principal and interest requirements as they become 
due on such bonds, (b) to impose an adequate 
schedule of charges and fees in order to provide 
adequate revenues with which to operate and 
maintain the said facila ities and to make the 
rental payments • • • o II .. ' Appendix, p. 18. 
In short, under the proposed Lease Agreement, neither 
I 
the Authority nor a trustee bank 
:; ~ ~LJ~_,~g _ L-.. I 
would a=n-- ' ?£iw(rt;z=, I taking action 
~ . 
~~ or~ -
unless the College fails to make .... rental payments/~ tA-L t-4 
. --,~~~ 
Only if the College refused to meet rental payments 
or was unable to do so 
-17-
would the Authority or the trustee be obligated to take 
fu• rther action. In that event, the Authority or -
trustee might either foreclose on the mortgage or take 
a hand in the setting of rules, charges and fees. 
t iV 
~may be argued that only the former would be 
consistent with the Establishemnt Clause, but we do 
not now have that situation before us. 
III. 
This case comes to us as an action for 
injunctive and declaratory relief to test 
the constitutionality of the Act as applied to a 
proposed--rather than an actual--issuance of 
revenue bonds. As the Court below pointed out, 
ill:lill?•lllii?.-.P• ___ s. c. , at __ ; 187 S,E,2d, at 651, the 
Act was patterned ••• closely after the South 
Carolina Industrial Revenue Bond Act, and 
perhaps for this reason appear• s to confer unnec~arily 
broad power and responsibility on the Authority, 
Ye:st specific provisions of the Act, the 
Rules and Regulations of the Authority, and the 
-18-
all as interpreted by the South Carolina Supreme Court, 
delimit narrowly those otherwise untrammeled provisions, 
and no evidence has been submitted by appellant to 
undermine this narrowing. Accordingly, we affirm the 
holding of the court below that the Act is constitutional 
as intaerpreted and applied in this case. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. At various points during this litigation, appellant has made 
reference to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 
but has made no arguments specifically addressed to violations 
of that Clause except insofar as this Courtrs approach to cases 
involving the Religion Clauses represents an interaction of the 
two clauses. 
2. As originally submitted by the College and approved by the Authority, 
the proposal called for the issuance of "not exceeding $3, 500,000 
of revenue bonds .... " 255 S.C., at 75; 177 S.E.2d, at 364. As 
indicated by a stipulation of counsel in this Court, the College sub-
sequently secured a bank loan in the amount of $2 , 500, 000 and now 
proposes the issuance of only $1, 2 50, 000 in revenue bonds under 
the Act, the proceeds to be used: 
"(i) to repay in full the Colleger s Current Fund 
for the balance (approximately $250, 000) advanced 
to the Colleger s Plant Fund as aforesaid; (ii) to 
refund outstanding short-term loans in the amount 
of $800,000 whose proceeds were to pay off in-
debtedness incurred for ~ capital improvements, 
t:~nn (;;;) to fin~n~P thP comnletion of the dining 
-2-
3. Gross income for federal income tax purposes does not include 
interest on "the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession 
of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the 
foregoing .... " 26 U.S. C. § l03(a)(l). 
4. Rule 4 relating to the Lease Agreement provides in part that: 
"If the Lease Agreement contains a provision 
permitting the Institution to repurchase the 
project upon payment of the bonds, then in such 
instance the Lease Agreement shall provide that 
the Deed of reconveyance from the Authority to the 
Institution shall be rm de subject to the condidtion 
that so long as the Institution, or any voluntary 
grantee of the Institution, shall own the leased 
premises, or any part thereof, that no facility 
thereon, financed in whole or in part with the pro-
ceeds of the bonds, shall be used for secta.rian 
instruction or as a place of religious worship, or 
used in connection with any part of the program 
of a school or department of divinity of any 
religious denomination." S.C., at ---187 S.E.2d, at 647-648. 
The Rule goes on to allow the institution to remove this option in 
the case of involuntary sales: 
"The condition may provide, at the option of the 
Institution, that if the leased premises shall be-
come the subject of an involuntary judicial sale, 
as a reEUlt of any foreclosure of any mortgage, 
or sale pursuant to any order of any court, that 
the title to be vested in any purchaser at such 
judicial sale, other than the Institution, shall be 
in fee simple and shall be free of the condition 
applicable to the Institution or any voluntary 
grantee thereof." S.C. , at ; 187 S. E. 
?.n !:It f14R ~1:11:1 not1:1 inf-r_!:l __ 
-'3-
5, In Boar~ of Education v. Allen, 392 u.s. 
236unftll(l968), this Court commented • on the 
importance of the role of private ~education in 
this country a 
"Underlying these cases, and underlying also 
the legislative judgments that have preceded the 
court decisions, has been a recognition that 
private ._ education has played and is playing 
a significant and valuable role in raising national 
levels of knowledge, competency and 
experience." 392 U.S. , at 24 7. 
-"t-
-
Appellant also takes issue with the Authority's rule allowing 
a purchaser at an involuntary sale to take title free of 
restrictions as to religious use. See note __ , ante. 
Appellant's reliance on .-t Tilton v. Richardson , supra, 
in this respect is misplaced. There, the Court struck down 
a provision under which the church-related colleges would have 
unrestricted use of a federally-financed project after 20 years. 
In the present case, by contrast, the restriction against religious 
use is lifted not as to the institution seeking the assistance of 
the Authority nor as to voluntary transferees, but only as to a 
purchaser at a judicial sale. Because some other religious 
institution bidding for the property at a judicial sale could pur-
chase the property only by outbidding all other prospective pur-
chasers, there is~~~--.(j)c~dhUTI~th: 
\~~ -~~~~ 
use limitation~ to religion{~-~ ~~ 
A · - 7.~--......- ~l:i:;i-~ 
~~~<~~ 
I * . ~ i.rz!l:~tH 
8t Iii S&iihii&il£1 g *b sle sf tbs ststs in tk s r r r 1 I I, 1; ~ J/ 
~~ 
tis *z*t t 
7- The 
11 state aid 11 involved in this case is a 
of a very special sort. We have here no expenditure 
of public/funds, either by grant or loan, no reimbursement by a 
\ state for expenditures made by a f}¥~:7Jiril 8r parochial school or 
~ 
college, and no extending or committing a state's credit. Rather, 
" 
the only state aid consists, not of financial assistance directly or 
indirectly which would implicate public funds or credit, but the 
creation of an instrumentality (the Authority) through which educational 
institutions may borrow funds on the basis of their own credit and 
~ rt ~ q"W'IA.. ~ 
A securityAupon more favorable interest terms than otherwise would 
be available. The Supreme Court of New Jersey characterized the 
assistance rendered an educational institution under an act generally 
similar to the South Carolina Act as merely being a "governmental 
service. " Clayton v. Kervick, 56 N.J. 523, 530-531, 267 A. 2d 503, 
I l 
--o-
506-507 ( 1970). 
:\~he ~ 
The South Carolina Supreme Court, 1n~ 
opinion below, described the role of the State as 
that of a "mere conduit". S.c. , at 
187 S.E. 2d, at ~650-651. Because we conclude 
that the primary effect of the assistance afforded 
here is neither to advance nor to inhibit religion» 
for the other reasons stated in this opinion, we 
present case is controlled by the decision in 
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, where this eourt 




~ Although the record in this case is 
abbreviated and not free from ambiguity, the 
burden rests on appellant to show the extent to 
which the College is church-related, and he has failed to 
show more than a formalistic church relationship, 
As Tilton established, formal denominational 
control over a liberal arts college does not render 
all aid to the institution a violation of the 
Establishment elause, So far as the record * £1&5 
- here is concerned, there is no showing 
that the Collge places any special emphasis on 
Baptist denominational or any other sectarian type 
of education, As noted above, both the faculty and 
the student body are open to persons of any(or no) 
religious affiliation, 
which the College would be forced to a pay on the 
open market. 
Under the Act, the Authority would be accorded 
~wers over the project, including the powers 
to determine the fees to be charged for the 
\. r<!J'cJitt-1-t~"J/ 
use of the project and to ~stablish ~
.5ee an 'fe.. • 
! g 1 I ' ?for its adopted by the 
Authority prescribe that • every lease agreement 
ttlil$ f COil fa:f'l A afo. V .S e., 
"obligating the ~~titution that neither the leased 
land,nor any fac~lity located thereon, shall 
be used for sectarian instruction or as 
a place of religious worship, or in connection with 
any part of the program of a school or 
department of divinity of any religious 
denomination." ~ ) . C, , "f · 
------:' ..J .. -) 
. 18? S, £; Jd). t.t't ' '11 . \ hon?r:'d J 
To ~nsure that th~s co• venant ~s • 1 1 • , 
each lease agreement must allow the authority 
-4-
~The proposal contemplates that simultaneously 
with IR the execution of the lease agreement, 
the Authority and 
Trust Indenture, which "shall mortgage 
the right, title and interest of the Authority 
in and to the Lease Agreement", 
flpP~" ot,:tf, . ..ro . 
.. ]f 2973 I I I S' 
On January 6, 1970, the College submitted its 
proposal to the Authority for preliminary approval._ 
and indicated that ................ ~ ...... ~~ ...... . 
.................... it would present specific 
forms for a Lease Agreement and a ... Trust Indenture 
if preliminary approval was forthcoming. 
Appendix, pp, 16-21. 
The Autho~ty granted preliminary ,approval 
t97D
1 
J.f.I"S:'-.,t:J&+7C;t11 J".E.l.t11 .,+ 
on January l6, 
but no final terms 
have been setr•h•ta_.t•c: .......... ~~r•n•s_.t_.E .... •s~a•z ........ . 
A (' - .., -- //,,.. _. j I -
-17-
would the Authority or the trustee be obligated to 
take further act ion. In that event , kilt &AdJ 2 1 'mr• 
the Authority or trustee might 
either fomolos~ mortgage or take a hand in the 
setting of rules, .. charges and fees. 
hi 
\It may be that j 
L .it 5 ? 1 61 only the former would 
be consistent with the Establishment Clause, jut 
we do not now have that situation before us. 
\ve hold only that in its present post~e, the 
College • s financing proposal does not 7 SIB 
:uausaa:aa force excessive entanglement~ 
~between the State and religion, 
III. 
As we have emphasized throughout, this case 
comes to us in an~J .. •a•t~· .... i_. ..... a.awkward posture. 
l) 
Ind~strial Revenue Bond Act, the Act appears to 
confer broad ant power and responsibility on 
- . 
- 3-
"obligating the Institution that neither the 
leased land, nor any facility located thereon, 
shall be used for sectarian instruction or as 
a place of religious worship, or in connection 
with any part of the program of a school or 
department of divinity of any religion denom-
ination." S.C. at ; 187 S.E.2d, 
at 647. , __ 
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agreement 
I 
must allow the Authority to conduct inspections, and any recon-
veyance to the College must contain a restriction against use for 
simultaneously with the execution of the lease agreement, the 
Authority and the trustee bank would enter into a .. lllilllillllll• 
Trust Indenture which would create, for the benefit of the bondholders, 
a forecloseable mortgage lien on the t j a Project property including 
a mortgage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority in and 
to the lease agreement. " Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix , 
p. 50. 
Ovr Co ~.1./J '@l'etlt o' 11 
b s-! a. h (, i!r nt~n. I Cia.(.) s ~ 
J 
CJ f' afJ~ /lo11 f 5 
c 1~ , ·l"'f\ e)( t n d .J 
I - " - -- ·- j 
l 
l 
FOOTNOTE TO HUNT, 'PAGE 1 
I At various points during this litigation, 
appe. llant has ... --- made reference to the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 
but has • made no arguments 1 ' 5I 33§ specifically 
addressed to violations of that Clause except insot far 
as this Court's approach to cases involving the 
Riligion Clauses represents an i~teraction of 
the two clauses. 
FOOTNOTE TO HUNT, PAG 2a 
tm College and 
approved by the Authority, .._ the proposal called 
for the issuance of "not exceeding $3,500,000 
of revenue bonds •••• " 255 S.C., at 75; 177 S.E.2d, at 364. 
As indicated by a stipulation of counsel in this 
Court, the College subsequently secured a ba~k 
loan in the amount of t?2 ,500, 000 and now ' a 
...a proposes the issuance of only $1,250,000 in 
revenue bonds under the Act, the proceeds to be used' 
,, 
, (i) to repay in full the-cOllege's urrent 
Fun or e balance (approximately $250,000) advanced 
to the College's Plant Fund as aforesaid; (ii) to refund 
outstanding short-term loans in the amount of $800,000 
whose proceeds were to pay off indebtedness incurred for 
capital improvements, and (iii) to finance the completion 
of the dlping hall facilities at a cost of approximately 
$200,000. 
Appendix, p. 49. 
FOOTNOTE TO HUNT, PAGE 2a 
Gross income for federal income tax purposes 
does not include interest on "the obliga• tions 
of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United 
States, or any political subdivia sion of any of the 
foregoing ••• ," 26 u.s.c. J l03(a)(l). 
FOOTNOTE TO HUNT, PAGE THREE. 
Rule• 4 relating to the Lease Agreement 
provides in part thats 
''•· If the LeaseA.greement contains a provision permit-
ting the Institution to repurchase the project upon pay-
ment of the bonds, then in such instance the Lease Agree-
ment shall provide that the Deed of reconveyance from the 
Authority to the Institution shall be made subject to the 
condition that so long as the Institution, or any voluntary 
grantee of the Institution, .shall own the leased premises, 
or any part thereof, that no facility thereon, financed in 
whole or in part with the proceeds of the bonds, shall be 
used for .sectarian instruction or as a place of religious 
worship, or used in connection with any part of the pro-
gram of a school or department of divinity of any religious 
denomination. ,... 11 
_ S: c ,,_a:r_ j I 8 / .S: t?.. ;J~ q·t- ( 4 7-C 'f8. 
The Rule goes on to allow the institution to remove 
this• option in the case of involuntary saless 
See.. 
~ 
fhe condition may provide, at the option of 
the Institution, that if the leased prernises shall become the 
subject of an involuntary judicial sale, as a !l'esult of any 
foreclosure of any mortgage, or sale pursuant to any order 
of any court, that the title to be vested in any .purchaser at 
,such judicial sale, other than the Institution, shall be in fee 
simple and shall be free of the condition applicwble to the 
Institution or 1any vo'luntary grantee thereof." 
FOOTNOTE TO HUNT, PAGE TEN. 
~Appellant also takes issue with the Authority's 
rule allowing ... a•• a purchaser at an involuntary sale 
to take title free of restrictions as to religious use, 
See note , ante. Appell*ant's reliance on 
supra, in tQis respect is misplaced. 
There, the Court struck down a provision under which 
the church-related colleges would have unrestricted use 
of a federally-f~ed project after 20 years. 
l'h& st , trni'Mid z 1 , ibg samz&&&li@&£ ts It r 
•tuz it zab&&h&&nnennlian 2 2 a mrumm , 3 3 
LF 5 rrrm t ' 7 ii Ed& i u z ; ;assn 
eo 3 In the present case, - by contrast, 
the restriction against religious use is lifted 
not as to th 2 , ? g the institution seeking the 
assitance of the Authority nor as to volutary 
trasnferees, but only as to a purchaser at a 
judicial sale. Because -•~~t~••••• some 
other religious i • nstitution bidding for the property 
at a judicial sale could purchase the property only 
. ., 
I 
FOOTNOTE TO HUNT, PAGE FOURTEEN 
6, 
In summarizing the role of the state in 
the proposed transaction, the court stated: 
"The State plays a passive and very limited role 
in the implementation of the Act, serving 
principally as a mere conduit through which 
--ins titutions may borrow funds for the purposes v 
of the Act on a tax-free basis," ~ 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
No. 71-15:23 
Richard W. Hunt, Appellant, 
1'. 
Robert E. Mc:\lair, Governor 
of South Caroliua, et al. 
On Appeal from the ~u ­
preme Court of South 
Carolina., 
[April -. H)73J 
MR. JusTJCB PowE:LL delivered thP opinion of the 
Court 
Appellant. a ::-louth Caroli11a taxpayt:>r. brought thlt' 
action to challenge the ~outh Carolina Educational 
Facilities Act (the "Act"). ~. C. Code Ann. ~~ :2:2-41 
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1971). as violative of the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment insofar as it au-
thorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the 
issuance of revenue bonds for the beuefit of the BaptiRt 
College at Charleston (the "College") .' Thf' trial court 'R 
denial of relief was affirmed by the ~upreme Court of 
South Carolina. 255 S. C. 71. 177 S. E. 2d :3o2 ( HJ70) . 
This Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case 
for reconsideration in light of the interveniug dPcisions in 
Lemon \'. Kurtzman, 403 F. S. 602 ( 1971); Earle.y ,. 
DiCenso, 403 r. S. 602 ( 1071) ; Robinson "· DiCenso , 
403 e. S. 602 ( 1971); and Tilton , .. Richardson, 40:3 
G. D. 672 (1971). 403 P. S. 94.5 (l~l71J . Ou r(>marHl, 
the SupremE' Court of South Carolina adhPn'd to its 
1 A1 \'a rtou~ pomt~ dunng tht~ ltttgatton. aptwllnnt hm; uuul<· 
rderrHcP to tlw FrPP Ext>rrt~l' Cia 11~r of tlw Fir~t Am<>ndnwnt . 
but ha,.; madE' no arguml'llt~ ~pPrifirall~· addn•H,.;<'d to viOlation" of 
that ria u~p ('XC'C'jlt tn:sofn r lit' t lu,.; Court'" a ppron eh to C':t"<'" mvoh·-
)ng thP HPl!gton ( 'Jau,.;p" rrprp,.;pnt" an intNaetwn of tlw t wu 
rJHI I ~P:O:, 
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earlier position. - S. C. -, 187 S. E. 2d 645 ( Hl7:2.\ , 
We now hold that the Act is constitutional. 
I 
We begin by setting out the general structure of th<' 
Act, The Act established an Educational Facilities Au~ 
thority (the "Authority"), the purpose of which is "to 
assist institutions for higher education in the construe· 
tion, financing and refinancing of projects , . , .", 8. C. 
Code Ann. § 22-41.4 (Cum. 8upp. 1971 ), primarily 
through the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms 
of the Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities, 
site preparation and related items, but may not include 
"any facility used or to be used for sectaria11 in-
struction or as a place of religious worship nor any· 
facility which is used or to be used primarily in: 
connection with any part of the program of a schoof 
or department of divinity for any religious denomi-
nation," S. C. Code Ann. ~ 22-41.2 (bl (Cum, 
Supp, 1971). 
Correspondingly, the Authority is accorded certain pow-
ers over the project, including the powers to determinEt 
the fees to be charged for the use of the pro.iect and to 
establish regulations for its use. See pp. ---, infra. 
While revenue bonds to be used in connection with 
a project are issued by the Authority, the Act is quit~ 
explicit that the bonds shall not be obligations of the 
State, directly or indirectly: 
"Revenue bonds issued under the provisions of 
this chapter shall not be deemed to constitute a 
debt or liability of the State or of any political sub-. 
division thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit 
of the State or of any such political subdivision, but 
shall be payable solely from the funds herein pro-
vided therefor from revenues. AU such revenue: 
honds shall con tai.n ou the face therf'of a staternf'nt 
'i 1-152;~-0 Pl:'-JlO ;-,; 
HU~T v. :\lcNAlH 
to the effect that neither the ~tate of :-)outh Car~ 
olina nor the Authority shall be obligated to pay 
the same or the interest thereon except from reve-
nues of the project or the portion thcr·eof for which 
they are issued and that neither the faith and credit 
nor the taxiJJg power of the Stat<' of South Caroli11a 
or of any political subdivision thereof is pledged W 
the payment of the principal of or the interest on 
such bonds. The issuance of revenue bonds u ncler' 
the provisions of this act shall not dir(:\ctly or in~ 
directly or contingently obligate the ~tate or any 
political subdivision thereof to levy or to pledgt' any 
form of taxation whatever therefor or to make any 
appropriation for their payment." S. C. Code Ann, 
~ 22-41.10 (Cum. Supp. 1971). 
Moreover. since all of the expense>s of the Authority 
must be paid from the revenues of the various projects 
in which it participates. S.C. Code Ann.~ 22-41.5 (Cum . 
~upp. 1971 ). none of the general revenuPs of ~outh 
Carolina is used to support a project. 
On January 6, 1970, the College submitted to thC' 
Authority for preliminary approval an application for 
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the proposal. thC" 
Authority would issue the bonds and make the pro-
ceeds available to tlw College for usr in connection with 
a portion of its campus to be designated a project ( tht> 
"Project") within the meaning of the Act. fn rrturn. 
the College would convey the Project. without cost, ta 
the Authority, which would then lease the property so 
conveyed back to the College. After repayment in full 
of the bonds, the Project ,,·ould be reconvcyf'd to tlw 
College. The Authority granted preliminary approval 
on January 16. 1970. 251) i-1. C .. at 76; 177 ~ - E. 2d. at 3ti5 
In its present form. th<' application rPquests the is-
suance of revenue bonds totaling $1.250.000. of which 
$.1,0,1)0,000 would lw applied to refund short tt'rm finane · 
ing of r.api tal im provenwu tR and $200.000 would h~ 
71-1523-0PINTON 
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applied to the completion of dining hall facilities." Thfi 
advantage of financing educational institutions through 
a state created authority derives from relevant pro-
visions of federal and South Carolina state income tax 
laws which provide in eft'ect that the interest on such 
bonds is not subject to income taxation." The income tax 
exempt status of the interest enables the Authority, as 
all instrumentality of the State, to market the bonds at 
a significantly lower rate of interest than the educa~ 
twnal ii1stitution would be forced to pay if it borrowed 
the money by conventional private financing. 
Because the College's application to the Authonty was 
a preliminary one, the details of the financing arrange~ 
ment have not yet been fully worked out. But Rules 
and Regulations adopted by the Authority govern cer~ 
taiu of its aspects. See Jurisdictional Statement, Ap-
2 As onginally submitted by the College and ;1pproved by thr 
Authority, the proposal called for the issuance of "hot exceeding 
$3,500,000 of rrvenue bonds. . . .'' 255 S. C., at 75; 177 S. E. 
2d, at 364. As indicated by a stipulation of counsel m this Court, 
the College subsequently :secmrd a bank loan ·m the amount of 
$2,500,000 and now proposes the Issuance of only $1,250,000 in 
n•venue bonds under the Act, the proc~'eds to br i.tsf'rl. 
'· (i) to rrpay m full the Collrge's CurrE:>nt Fund for tlw balanct' 
(approximately $250,000) advanced to the CollE>ge's Plant Fund al:l 
aforE:>said ; ( ii) to refund outstanding short -term loans iu the amount 
of $800,000 whose proreeds werE> to pay ofT indebtednes;; mcurrNI 
for capital tmp1'overnents, and (iii) to finance thr completion of the 
dming hall facilities at a cost of approximately $200,000." (Empha-
sis m anginal.) App., p. 49. 
"Gros:-; incoml' for federal incorm· tax }JUrposes does not include 
interest on "thr obrigations of a State, a Territory, or a pos~e~~tOil 
of tlw 1Jnited States, or any polittcal i:iubdivision of any of the 
foregoing .. . .'' 26 0. S.C. §103 (a)(l). For statE> tncome tax 
purposel:i, gross mcome does nor mcludr interel:it "upon obhga twn~ 
of the Umted Statel:i or Jtl:i posse8l:iions or of thts State or auy 
p olitical :-;ubdivibion thereof ., S. C. Code· Ann. ~ 65-25:3 (4) 
(Cum. Supp. 1971) 
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pendix C, pp. 47-51. Every lease agreement between the 
Authority and an institution must contain a clause 
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased 
land, nor any facility located thereon, shall be used 
for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious 
worship, or in connection with any part of the pro-
gram of a school or department of divinity of any 
religious denomination.'' - 8. C., at -: 1~7 
S. E. 2ct. at 647. 
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agree-
ment must allow the Authority to conduct inspections, 
and any reconveyance to the College must contain a 
restriction against use for sectarian purposes. 1 The Rules 
further provide that simultaneously with the executi011 
'1 Rulr 4 rrlatmg to thr Lem;e Agreement provide~ 1n part that: 
''If the Lea~e Agreemrnt contains a provision prrmitting thr Insti-
l ution to repurchase the projrct upon payment of the bonds, thrn 
in such instance the Lease Agreement shall provide that the Deed 
of reconvryancr from the Authority to the Institution shall be mach• 
subject to the condition that so long as the lnstitutwn, or any 
voluntary grantee of the Institution, shall own the leased prt>m1se::;, 
or any part thereof, that no facility thereon, financed m whole or 
in part w1th the proceeds of tht> bond;;, ~;hall be used for secranan 
instrnct1011 or a;,; a placr of religious worsh1p, or used 111 connection 
with any part of the program of a school or department of divmit~· 
of any religiou~ denomination." - S. C., at -; 187 S E. 2d, at 
647-(:\48. 
The Rule goe~ on to allow the institution to remove th1s optwn Ill 
the case of involuntary sales: 
"The condition may prov1de, at the option of tht> Institution, that 
i[ the leased premises shall become thr subject of an mvoluntar~· 
judicml ~alt>, as a result of any foreclosure of any mortgnge, or ::;a](' 
pursuant to any order of any court, that the titlr to be vested in 
any purchn~er at such Judicial tiHle, otlwr than the lnstitutwn, shall 
bt> m fee simple and shall br free of tlw condition applirnble to thP 
Inst1tutwn or any voluntary granter thereof'" - S. C., at -·: 
IH7 S E 2d, at 04N. Set' n. fi, infra .. 
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of the lease agreement, the Authority and the trustee 
bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would 
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseablE' 
mortgage lieu on the Project property including a mort-
gage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority in 
and to the lease agreement." Jurisdictional Statement. 
Appendix C', p. 50. 
Our consideration of appellant's Establishment Clause 
claim extends only to the proposal as approved pre-
liminarily with such additions as are contemplated by 
the Act, the rules, and thP decisions of thP courts below. 
II 
This Court has recently had occasion to synthesize thE' 
principles which govern our consideration of challenges 
to statutes as violativE' of the Establishment ClausP · 
"Three . . . tests may be gleaned from our cases. 
First, the statute must have a secular legislativ(:' 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must 
be one that neither advances nor inhibits reh-
gion, . . . ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an 
excessive entanglement with religion.' ,. Lemon \ r. 
Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., at 612-fH3. 
With full recognition that these are no more than help-
ful signposts, we consider the present statute and the 
proposed transaction in terms of thP threP "tests" . pur-
pose, effect. and entanglement. 
A 
The purpose of the statute is manifestly a secular mw 
ThP benefits of the Act are available to all institutious 
of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not 
having a religious affiliation. While a legislature's decla-
ration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to it!). 
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true intent, appellant makes no suggestion that the in~ 
troductory paragraph of the Act represents anything 
other than a good faith statement of purpose · 
"It is hereby declared that for the benefit of thE~ 
people of the State, the increase of their commerce, 
welfare and prosperity and the improvement of 
their health and living conditions it is essential that 
this, and future generations of youth be given the 
fullest opportunity to learn and to develop theil' 
intellectual and mental capacities; that it is es-
sential that institutions for higher education within 
the State be provided with appropriate additional 
J'!leans to assist such youth in achieving the required 
levels of learning and development of their intel-
lectual and mental capacities; and that it is the 
purpose of this section to provide a measure of aR~ 
sistance and an alternative method to enable in-
stitutions for higher education in the State to pro-
vide the facilities and structures which are sorely 
needed to accomplish the purposes of this act, all 
to the public benefit and good, to the extent and 
manner provided herein." S. C. Code Ann. ~ 22.41 
(Cum . Supp. 1971). 
The College and other private institutions of higher 
eduqation provide these benefits to the State.'' As of the 
academic year 1969-1970, there were l.M8 studentR 
5 In Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 2:36 ( 19ok) , thir; Com1 
commrnted on the importance of the rolr of privatr educatwn w 
this country: 
"Underlying thr~e caRes, and underlying also the lrgisla!ivr judg-
ment::; .that havr preceded the court decisions, has been a recognition 
that pnvate educatwn has played and i8 playing a tligmficant and 
wtluable rolr in nosing natiOILc'll lrvrl~ of knowlrdge , com]wtrnrP, and 
e'xpenenrr." :{92 F. 8., at 247. 
71-1523-0PINION 
8 HTTNT 1•. McNAIR 
enrolled in the College, in addition to approximately 600 
night students. Of these students, 95% an~ residents of 
Routh Carolina who are thereby receiving a college edu-
cation without financial support from the Stat<' of South 
C'arolina. 
B 
To identify "primary effect," we narrow our focus fron1 
the statute as a whole to the only transaction presently 
before us. Whatever may be its initial appeal, the prop-
osition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any pro-
gram which in some manner aids an institution with a 
religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. E. y., 
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Tilton \'. Richardson , 
supra. Stated another way, the Court has not accepted 
the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden becausE> 
aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its 
other resources 011 religious ends. 
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect 
of advancing religion when it flows to an institution iu 
which religion is so pervasive that all functions are sub-
sumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifi-
cally religious activity in an otherwise substantially 
secular setting. In Tilton v. Richardson, supra, th0· 
Court refused to strike down a direct federal grant to 
four colleges and universities in Connecticut. MH. 
CHIEF JusrJcE BuHGEH, for the plurality, concluded that 
despite some institutional rhetoric, noue of the four 
colleges was pervasively sectarian, but held open that 
possibility for future cas0s . 
"Individual projects can be properly evaluated 1f 
and wheu challenges arise with respect to particular 
rPcipients and some evidence is then presented to 
show that the institution Joes in fact possess thesf'; 
c:baractPristics. ·· 403 11. S .. at fiR~. 
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Appellant has introduced uo evidence in the preseut 
case placing the College in such a category. It is truE\ 
that the members of the College Board of Trustees an=1 
Plected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention, that 
the approval of the Convention is rPquired for certain 
financial transactions, and that the charter of the Collegt> 
may be amended only by the Convention. But it was 
likewise true of the institutions involved in Tilton that 
they were "governed by Catholic religious organizations.'' 
403 U. S., at 686. What little there is in the record con~ 
cerning the College establishes that there are no rc·-
ligious qualifications for faculty membership or student 
admission, and that only 60% of the College student body 
is Baptist. a percentage roughly equivalent to the per-
centage of Baptists in that area of South Caroliua. 
255 S.C., at 85; 177 S. E. 2d, at 369. On the record i1f 
this case there is no basis to couclude that the Collegers 
operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian· 
rather than secular educatioll. 
Nor can we conclude that the proposPd transactiolf 
will place the Authority in the position of providing: 
direct support for religious activities. The scope of tlw 
Authority's power to assist institutions of highPr educa-
tiOn extends only to "projects," and the Act. specifically 
states that a project "shall not include" any buildings or 
facilities used for religious purposes. In the absence of 
evidencP to the contrary, we must assume that all of 
the proposed financing and refinancing relates to build-
ings and facilities within a properly delimited project . 
1 t is not at all clear from the rPcord that thP portion 
of the campus to be conveyed by tlw College to the Au-
thority and leased back is the same as that being financed. 
but in any eveut it too must be part of the Project a1HI 
subjPct to thP same prohibition against use for religiou::; 
purposes. In addition, as we have indicated. every least· 
agrePnwnt must nontaill a clausP forhidding religiow~ U1-\e 
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aml another allowing inspC'ctions to enforce the agrec3-' 
ment." For these reasons. we are satisfied that imple-
mentation of the proposal will not have the primary rft'ec·t 
of advancing or inhibiting religiou.' 
"Apprllant al::>o takl'::> I::>l:iUt' wtth tl1l' Authonty'~ rule allowutp; :1 
purrha:,;n at an mvoluntary "'alr to takt' ltlll' fn't' of rr:,;tnctiOn~ :t:< 
to rl•ligiou~ u"'r. t:lee n. 4. aute. AppPllant',; rdtHJlCl' Oil 'l'1lt011 
v. ltu:harrl8on, 8upra. in thi::> re::;prct I::> mt~placrd. Thc•re, tlw Court 
::>truck down a provi~ion under whtch thr church-rrlate•d college·~ 
would ha V<' unrr~t rlcted u;;r of a fpderally fin a IH'Pd pro.ie'rt a ftrr 
20 yt'a r::>. In tl1C' prt>::>ent ra;;r, b~· coni ra,;t, 1 he re~t rict 1011 aga in~l 
religion:; u::>e I::> lifted not a:s 1 o t lw in~lttutwn ::>Peking i ht' a;;::>I~tanec• 
of thr Authority nor a~ to voiuntar~· t ran~frrrr;; , but only as to a 
purcha;;er at a judicial t::alr. Bc'cau::>e ;;ome other religiou~ 111::>1 It utwn 
bidding for the propNty at a judicial ;;ale· could JHircha;;r thr prop-
en~· only by out bidding all other pro::;pect tvr purcba::>t'rs , thpre ~~ 
onl.1· a ~peeulat ive possibiht ~· that t lw a.b:srnce of a use lunita t ioll 
would ever afford :ud to rdtgtoll. Evc'll 111 ::;uch a11 PvPnt, the 
acquinng rel!gwu:s in;;tJtlltiO!l pn•sumabi~· would have· had to pay 
the tlH'tl f:ur valup of thr propPrt~· . 
'Tl1C' "::;tate aid" mvolvrd in th1,; ca,;e 1:,; of a vrry tiJWCial sort 
We have here no expenditun' of public fund::; , eithrr b~· grant or 
loan, no rrnnbur::;pmpnt by a Statr for expPmliturr:s made by a 
parochial ::;chool or colh·gP, and uo Pxtendmg; or commit t mg of a 
Statr ';; rrrdti. Hathrr , tlw onl~· ::;tatc• mel coutii:st~. not of finanr11tl 
a~ti i"tancr directly or mc!Ircctly wh1rh would nrplicate public fund:-: 
or rrPdit , but tlw crPat1on of an tn;;trumruta!tty (thP Authority) 
through wlllch PducatiOnal Ill~tit utton,.; may borrow fund:-: on thP 
ha~i" of thc'Ir own credit nud thr ;;Pctlrit~· of tlwll' own propNiy 
upou more favorablP mten':st tenn~ than othprwi::;P would he~ avaii-
abk. The Supr<'mP Court of New .Je·r~<'~· dJHrartcnz<'d thl' a:-:tit::;t-
anct· rC'nclen'd an t~clucational m;;titutiOn undPr an act gc'IH'rHll~ · 
~imtlar to the South Carolina Art ati mpr('[y bemg a "govrrnnwntal 
~NvirC'" Clayton v K ermrk. 5o ~ .. J. 52:~ . 5:30- 5:31, :257 A. :2cl 
50:3. 50{i- 507 (1970). Tlw South Cnrollna 8upn'll1l' Court, 111 tht> 
op1n10n bPlow. de::;rnbed tlw role• of the State a;; that ol a "nwn· 
condtut." - S. C. , at -; 1S7 S. E. :Zd. nt H50. Becau::;c• w<· 
('Ollrlude thnl tlw primilr~ · c•ff<'ct of the ati::; t:-:lance afforded hrrc• i~ 
lWithPr to aclvnnrl' nor to inll!blt n•hgwn under Lemo·n and Tiltoli. 
W<' tH•ed not d('cidr whl'ther. n:-: appellC't· :11·gm·;;, Appl'llee '::; Bm{ ]J 
I.} , thn nnportaiH'C' of thl' tax c•xPnlption 111 the' South C.\nohna 
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'rhe final question poseu by this case is whether unckr 
the arrangement there would be an unconstitutional cle~ 
gree of entanglement between the State and the CollP~H' . 
Appellant argues that the Authority would become .ill-
volved in the operation of the College both by inspecting 
the project to insure that it is not being used for religious 
purposes and by participating in the management de-
cisions of the College. 
The Court's opinion in Lemon and the plurality opin-
ion in Tilto·n are grounded on the proposition that the 
degree of entanglement arising from inspection of faM 
cilities as to use varies in large measure with the extent 
to which religion permeates the institutiou. In finding 
excessive entan.glement, the ' Court in Lemon relied on 
the "substantial religious character of these ch urchM 
related" elementary schools. 403 U. S., at '616. MR. 
CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER's opinion for the plurality in 
Tilton placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the 
federal aid there approved would be spent in a colle~e 
setting : 
"'~ince religious indoctnnation .is not a substan-
tial purpose or activity of these church-related col ~ 
leges and universities, there is less likelihood than 
in primary ancl secondary schools that religion vvill 
permeate thP area of secular education." 403 U.:...;. 
at f\H7. 
Although MR. JusTICB WHITB saw nu such clear distinr-
tion. he concurred in the result, stating 
"It 1s enough for me that ... the Federal Govem-
ment I is I financing a separable functiop of OV('r-
;;clwmc bnug~ tlw prl'~<·nt ra~<' UJI(IN Wa/z \' . Tax C01run'u , snprn. 
wlwrr th1~ Comt uplwld a local prop<'rty l<IX <'X<'mption whirh 111 
<'ludcd rrhgJous Justit\Jtion~ . 
if-1 ,'):2:{-01'[\[()~ 
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ndi ng im portaiH'P i 11 order to sustain the IPgislatioi t 
here challenged." 403 t:. S .. at ()04 
A 1najority of the Court in 'l'illo11, tlH'Il. concluded that 
on the facts of that case inspection as to usc did not. 
thn•aten c•xcc•ssive entangknwnt. As W<' have indicated 
abow. there is no evidenc<' here to dc•monstrate that the 
College> is any more an instrUinent of religious indoctrina-
tion than were tlw eolleges and universities in vol V('d in 
T'ilto11 .' 
r\ closc•r ISsue liiHler our precedents is presented by 
the contentiou that the Authority could become deeply 
involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions 
of the College. The Authority is empowNed by the Act. 
" (g) lg I eiierally. to fix and revise from tinlt' to 
time and charge and collect rates. n~nts. fees and 
charges for the• use of a1td for the servicPs furnishPd 
or to ])(' furnished by a project or any portion tht•rcof 
and to contract "·ith any perso11, partitership. asso-
ciation or corporation or other body public or pn-
vate i11 r<'Sl)('Ct tlwreof; 
"(h) to establish rulc•s a1td regulatwns for the U!::C' 
of a pro.JPCt or a11y portion thereof and to designate' 
a participating institution for higher education as 
its agent to establish rulE's and n•gulations for the 
'Althoulo(h the n·C'ord 111 thi>< c·;)~t· 1~ HhiJn•vJHtc•d a11d 11ut fn•t· 
from amllilo(tlil.\' , llw hurdc•11 n·><t" 011 appeiiHIIt to ~ho\\' ilw c•xtent 
to which tlw ('ollc•gt· 1~ !'hurrh-rPIHtc·cl. d. Board of Hdtu·atiull ,., 
A/leu. &U/11'11. :m:2 l'. :-;., :tt :2-J.:-:, :tnd he• ha~ failrd to ~how mon• 
than :t formali,tH· ('hurC'h rC'Iatiollt<lllp . ..-\~ Tilton P~tHhli,hcd. for-
mal dc·nomJn<tl ion:tl C'ont rol uyc•r a lil)('r:tl art~ collc·~?;P doC'' not 
rrndf•r all aid to iiH· in,.;tttlltton a nolalwn of thp J<:,tahli,.;hntl•nt 
Clau,.;l' . Ro far a~ IIH• rc ·C'onl hPn· It< c·otH·t•rnrd. tlwrP 1,.; no ~bowing 
that lhc• C'ollc·gc· plael·~ an~ · "Jll'elltl t•lnpha"l" on Bapt1,.;1 cll'IIOllltll;t -
ttOll<ll or :111~ · other ,.;(•c·tnnan t~ ' ]H' of f•clucation . !\~ notc>d ai>Ovc·. 
both tlw faC'ult~ · and tlw "tudC'Jlt hod~ · an· opPn to p('l',.;on" of an: 
( tll' 110) rPitgtoll" :dfiita I ton. 
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usc' of a pro.wet undertaken for such participating 
i11Stitution for higlwr eclucatiou. S. C. Code 
Ann. ~ :2:2- 41.4 (C'ulll. Supp. 1071 ). 
These powers are sweeping ones. and we're there !:l 
realistic likelihood that thPy would be exercised in thei1· 
full cktail. tlH' rntanglelllent problems \\·ith the pro-
posed transaction would 110t be insignificant. 
AI' the ~outh Carolina ~uprcme Court pointC'd out. 
the Act was patterned closely after the South Carolina 
fnctustrial Revenue Bond Act. - ~. C .. at - ; 187 
S. E. :2d. at ()51. and perhaps for this reason appears to 
confer UlllWCCssarily broau power and responsibility on 
th~ Authority. The opinion of that court. howevc•r. r<'-
flects a narr<m interpretation of the practical OJWratioJI 
of thesf' powers. 
"CouJJsel for plaintiff argues that the broad lan-
guage of the Act causes the StatE'. of nec<'ssity. to 
lwconw <'xeessi ve ly involved in the operation. maJJ-
agement and administration of the College. We do 
not so c·onstrue the Act. . . IT I he basic fulletion 
of the Authority is to see ... that fees arc charged 
sufficient to meet the boud payments." - S. (' .. 
at - : 1R7 ~. E. :2d, at 651 
As \H' read the ( 'ollege's proposal. the Lease Agn'cment 
between the Authority and the College will place on the 
( 'ollege the responsibility for making the detailed dE'-
ci8ions regarding the govprnment of the campus and tlw 
fees to be charged for particular services. Specifically. 
the proposal states that the Lease Agreenwn t 
"will unconditionally obligate the College (a) to 
pay sufficient rentals to meet tlw principal and in. 
terest requirPments as they become due on such 
bonds. I andl (b) to impose an adequate schedule of 
charges and fees in order to provide' adequatP reve, 
14 
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nues with which to operate and maintain tlw said 
facilities and to make the rental paynH'Jits . . . :· 
App., p. 1~. 
Jn short. under the proposed Lease Agreement. neither 
the Authority nor a trustee bank would be j ustificd in 
taking action unless the College fails to make the pn•-
scribecl rental payments or otherwise defaults in it::; 
obligations. Only if the College refused to meet rental 
payments or was unable to do so would the Authorit_,. 
or the trustee be obligated to take further actio11. In 
that (-'vent, the Authority or trustee might either fore-
close on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting of 
rules. charges. and fees. It may be argued that only 
the former would be consistent with the Establishment 
Clause, but we do not now have that situation beforr us 
HI 
This case comes to us as an actwn for Ill.Juncbve and 
declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of thr 
Act as applied to a proposed-rather than an actual-
issuance of revenue bonds. The specific provisions uf 
the Act under which the bonds will be issued. the Rules 
and Regulations of the Authority, and the College's pro-
posal- a!J as interpreted by the South Carolina :-luprE'nw 
Court- confine the scope of the assistance to the secular 
aspEcts of this liberal arts college and do not foreshad<)IY 
excessive entanglement between the State and religio11 . 
Accordingly. v,:c affirm the holding of the court below 
that the Act is constitutional as interpreted and applied 
ll\ this case . 
Chambers Draft 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71-1523 
Richa.rd W. Hunt, Appellant, 
v. 
Robert E. MeN air. Governor 
of South Carolina, et al. 
On Appeal from the Su-
preme Court of South 
Carolina. 
f April -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the op1n10n of the 
Court. 
Appellant, a South Carolina taxpayer, brought this 
action to challenge the South Carolina Educational 
Facilities Act (the "Act"), S. C. Code Ann. §§ 22-41 
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1971), as violative of the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment insofar as it au-
thorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the 
issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of the Baptist 
College at Charleston.t The trial court's denial of re-
lief was affirmed by the Supreme Court of South Car-
olina. 255 S. C. 71, 177 S. E. 2d 362 (1970). This 
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for 
reconsideration in light of the intervening decisions in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Earlery v. 
DiCenso, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Robinson v. DiCenso, 
403 U. S. 602 (1971); and 1'ilton v. Richardson, 403 
U. S. 672 (1971). 403 U. S. 945 (1971). On remand, 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina adhered to its 
1 At various points during this litigation, appellant has made 
reference to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 
but has made no arguments specifically addressed to violations of 
that clause except insofar as this Court's approach to cases inYolv-
ing the Religion Clauses represents an interaction of the t\v() 
clauses. 
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earlier position. - S.C.-, 187 S. E. 2d 645 (1972). 
We now hold that the Act is constitutional. 
I 
We begin by setting out the general structure of the 
Act. The Act established an Educational Facilities Au-
thority (the "Authority"), the purpose of which is "to 
assist institutions for higher education in the construc-
tion, financing and refinancing of projects .... ", S. C. 
Code Ann. § 22--41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971), primarily 
through the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms 
of the Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities, 
site preparation and related items, but may not include 
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian in-
struction or as a place of religious worship nor any 
facility which is used or to be used primarily in 
connection >vith any part of the program of a school 
or department of divinity for any religious denomi-
nation." S. C. Code Ann. § 22-41.2 (b) (Cum. 
Supp. 1971). 
Correspondingly, the Authority is accorded certain pow-
ers over the project, including the powers to determine 
the fees to be charged for the use of the project and to 
establish regulations for its usc. See pp.-- -,infra. 
While revenue bonds to be used in connection with 
a project arc issued by the Authority, the Act is quite 
explicit that the bonds shall not be obligations of the 
State, directly or indirectly: 
"(K) Revenue bonds issued under the provisions 
of this section shall not be deemed to constitute a 
debt or liability of the State or of any political sub-
division thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit 
of the State or of any such political subdivision, but 
shall be payable solely from the funds herein pro-
vided therefor from revenues. All such revenue 
bonds shall contain on tho face thereof a statement 
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to the effect that neither the State of South Car-
olina nor the authority shall be obligated to pay 
the same or the interest thereon except from reve-
nues of the project or the portion thereof for which 
they are issued and that neither the faith and credit 
nor the taxing power of the State of South Carolina 
or of any political subdivision thereof is pledged to 
the payment of the principal of or the interest on 
such bonds. The issuance of revenue bonds under 
the provisions of this act shall not directly or in-
directly or contingently obligate the State or any 
political subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any 
form of taxation whatever therefor or to make any 
appropriation for their payment." S. C. Code Ann. 
§ 22-41 (10) (Cum. Supp. 1971). 
Furthermore, since all of the expenses of the Authority 
must be paid from the revenues of the various projects 
in which it participates, S. C. Code Ann. § 22-41.5 (Cum. 
Supp. 1971), none of the general revenues of South 
Carolina is used to support a project. 
On January 6, 1973, the College submitted to the 
Authority for preliminary approval an application for 
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the proposal, the 
Authority would issue revenue bonds and make the pro-
ceeds available to the College for use in connection with 
a portion of its campus to be designated a project (the 
"Project") within the meaning of the Act. In return, 
the College would convey the Project, without cost, to 
the Authority, which would then lease the property so 
conveyed back to the College. After repayment in full 
of the bonds, the Project would be reconveyed to the 
College. The Authority granted preliminary approval 
on January 16, 1970, 255 S.C., at 76; 177 S. E. 2d, at 365. 
In its present form, the application requests the is-
suance of revenue bonds totaling $1,250,000, of w·hich 
$1,050,000 would be applied to refund short term financ-
ing of capital improvements and $200,000 would be 
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applied to the completion of dining hall facilities. 2 The 
advantage of financing educational institutions through 
a state created authority derives from relevant pro-
visions of federal and South Carolina state income tax 
laws which provide in effect that the interest on such 
bonds is not subject to income taxation.R The income tax 
exempt status of the interest enables the Authority, as 
an instrumentality of the State, to market the bonds at 
a significantly lower rate of interest than the educa-
tional institution would be forced to pay if it borrowed 
the money by conventional private financing. 
Because the College's application to the Authority was 
a preliminary one, the details of the financing arrange-
ment have not yet been fully worked out. But Rules 
and Regulations adopted by the Authority govern cer-
tain of its aspects. See Jurisdictional Statement, Ap-
pendix C, pp. 47-51. Every lease agreement between the 
Authority and an institution must contain a clause 
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased 
land, nor any facility located thereon, shall be used 
2 As originally submitted by the College and approved by the 
Authority, the proposal called for the issuance of "not exceeding 
$3,500,000 of revenue bonds .... " 255 S. C., at 75; 177 S. E. 
2d, at 364. As indicated by a stipulation of counsel in this Court, 
the College subsequently secured a bank loan in the amount of 
$2,500,000 and now proposes the issuance of only $1,250,000 in 
revenue bonds under the Act, the proceeds to be used: 
"(i) to repay in full the College's Current Fund for the balance 
(approximately $250,000) advanced to the College's Plant Fund as 
aforesaid; (ii) to refund outstanding short-term loans in the amount 
of $800,000 whose proceeds were to pay off indebtedness incurred 
for capital improvements, and (iii) to finance the completion of the 
dining hall facilities at a cost of approximately $200,000." App., 
p. 49. 
a Gross income for federal income tax purposes docs not include 
interest on "the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession 
of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the 
foregoing .... " 26 U. S. C. § 103 (a) (1). 
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for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious 
worship, or in connection with any part of the pro-
gram of a school or department of divinity of any 
religion denomination." -S.C., at-; 187 S. E. 
2d, at 647. 
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agree-
ment must allow the Authority to conduct inspections, 
and any reconveyance to the College must contain a 
restriction against use for sectarian purposes.1 The Rules 
further provide that simultaneously with the execution 
of the lease agreement, the Authority and the trustee 
bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would 
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseable 
mortgage lien on the Project property including a mort-
gage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority in 
4 Rule 4 relating to the Lease Agreement provides in part that: 
''If the Lease Agreement contains a provision permitting the Insti-
tution to repurchase the project upon payment of the bonds, then 
in such instance the Lease Agreement shall provide that the Deed 
of reconveyance from the Authority to the Institution shall be made 
subject to the condition that so long as the Institution, or any 
voluntary grantee of the Institution, shall own the leased premises, 
or an~r part thereof, that no facility thereon, financed in whole or 
in part with the proceeds of the bonds, shall be used for sectarian 
instruction or as a place of rrligious worship , or used in connection 
with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity 
of any religious denomination." - S. C., at-; 187 S. E. 2d, at 
647-648. 
The Rule goes on to allow the institution to remove this option in 
the case of involuntary sales: 
"The condition may provide, at the option of the Institution, that 
if the leased premises shall become the subject of an involuntary 
judicial sale, as a result of any foreclosure of any 'mortgage, or sale 
pursuant to any order of any court, that the title to be vesLed in 
any purchaser at such judicial sale, other Limn the Institution, shnll 
be in fee simple and shall be free of the condition applicable to the 
Iust itution or any voluntary grantee thereof." - S. C., at -; 
187 S. E. 2d, at 648. See n. -, infra. 
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and to the lease agreement." Jurisdictional Statement, 
Appendix C, p. 50. 
Our consideration of appellant's Establishment Clause 
claim extends only to the proposal as approved pre-
liminarily with such additions as are contemplated by 
the Act, the rules, and the decisions of the courts below. 
II 
The Court has recently had occasion to synthesize the 
principles which govern our consideration of challenges 
to statutes as violative of the Establishment Clause: 
"Three . . . tests may be gleaned from our cases. 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must 
be one that neither· advances nor· inhibits reli-
gion, ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an 
excessive entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., at 613. 
With full recognition that these are no more than help-
ful signposts, we consider the present statute and the 
proposed transaction in terms of the three "tests": pur-
pose, effect, and entanglement. 
A 
The purpose of the statute is manifestly a secular one. 
The benefits of the Act are available to all institutions 
of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not 
having a religious affiliation. While a legislature's decla-
ration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its 
true intent, appellant makes no suggestion that the in-
troductory paragraph of the Act represents anything 
other than a good faith statement of purpose: 
"It is hereby declared that for the benefit of the 
people of the State, the increase of their commerce, 
welfare and prosperity and the improvement of 
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their health and living conditions it is essential that 
this and future generations of youth be given the 
fullest opportunity to learn and to develop their 
intellectual and mental capacities; that it is es-
sential that institutions for higher education within 
the State be provided with appropriate additional 
means to assist such youth in achieving the required 
levels of learning and development of their intel-
lectual and mental capacities; and that it is the 
purpose of this section to provide a measure of as-
sistance and an alternative method to enable in-
stitutions for higher education in the State to pro-
vide the facilities and structures which are sorely 
needed to accomplish the purposes of this act, all 
to the public benefit and good, to the extent and 
manner provided herein." S. C. Code Ann. § 22.41 
(Cum. Supp. 1971). 
The College and other private institutions of higher 
education provide these benefits to the State." As of the 
aeademic year 1969-1970, there were 1,548 students 
enrolled in the College, in addition to approxima.tely 600 
night students. Of these students, 95% are residents of 
South Carolina who are thereby receiving a college edu-
cation without financial support from the State of South 
Carolina. 
B 
To identify "primary effect," we narrow our focus from 
the statute as a whole to the only transaction presently 
5 In Boatd of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 ( 1968), this Court 
commented on the importance of the role of private education in 
this country: 
"Underlying theF<e case<', and underlying also the legi~lnti,·e judg-
ments that have preceded the court decision~, hns been a recognition 
that printte education has played and is playillg a significant and 
valuable role in raising national levels of knowledge, competency and 
experience." 392 U. S., at 247. 
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before us. Whatever may be its initial appeal, the prop-
osition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any pro-
gram which in some manner aids an institution with a 
religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. E. g., 
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Tax 
Cornrn'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Tilton v. Richardson, 
supra. Stated another way, the Court has not accepted 
the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because 
aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its 
other resources on religious ends. 
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect 
of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in 
which religion is so pervasive that all functions are sub-
sumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifi-
cally religious activity in an otherwise substantially 
secular setting. In Tilton v. Richardson, supra, the 
Court refused to strike down a direct federal grant to 
four colleges and universities in Connecticut. MR. 
CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER, for the plurality, concluded that 
despite some institutional rhetoric, none of the four 
colleges was pervasively sectarian, but held open that 
possibility for future cases: 
"Individual projects can be properly evaluated if 
and when challenges arise with respect to particular 
recipients and some evidence is then presented to 
show that the institution does in fact possess these 
characteristics." 403 U. S., at 682. 
Appellant has introduced no evidence in the present 
case placing the College in such a category. It is true 
that the members of the College Board of Trustees are 
elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention, that 
the approval of the Convention is required for certain 
financial transactions, and the charter of the College 
may be amended only by the Convention. But it was 
likewise true of the institutions involved in 'Pilton that 
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they were "governed by Catholic religious organizations." 
403 U. S., at 686. What little there is in the record con-
cerning the College establishes that there are no re-
ligious qualifications for faculty membership or student 
admission, and that only 607o of the College student body 
is Baptist, a percentage roughly equivalent to the per-
centage of Baptists in that area of South Carolina. 
255 S. C., at 85; 177 S. E. 2d, at 369. On the record in 
this case there is no basis to conclude that the College's 
operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian 
rather than secular education. 
Nor can we conclude that the proposed transaction 
will place the Authority in the position of providing 
direct support for religious activities. The scope of the 
Authority's power to assist institutions of higher educa-
tion extends only to "projects," and the Act specifically 
states that a project "shall not include" any buildings or 
facilities used for religious purposes. In the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, we must assume that all of 
the proposed financing and refinancing relates to build-
ings and facilities within a properly delimited project. 
It is not at all clear from the record that the portion 
of the campus to be conveyed by the College to the Au-
thority and leased back is the same as that being financed, 
but in any event it too must be part of the Project and 
subject to the same prohibition against use for religious 
purposes. In addition, as we have indicated, every lease 
agreement must contain a clause forbidding religious use 
and another allowing inspections to enforce the agree-
ment.6 For these reasons, we are satisfied that imple-
6 Appellant abo takes issue with the Authori ty's rule allowiug a 
purchaser at an involuntary sale to take t itle free of restrictions as 
to religious use. See n. -, ante. Appellant's reliance on Tilton 
v. Richardson, supra, in this respect is misplaced. There, the Court, 
struek down a provision under which the church-related colleges 
would ha1·e unrestricted usc of a federally financed project a fter 
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mentation of the proposal will not have the primary effect 
of advancing or inhibiting religion.7 
c 
The final question posed by this case is whether under 
the arrangement there would be an unconstitutional de-
20 ~·enrR. In the present cnse, by contrnst, the rrstriction nl!;ninst 
rrligions uRe is lifted not as to the inst itntion serking the aRsistnnre 
of the Authorit~r nor as to voluntnry trnnsfrrees. but only ns to a 
Jlurrhnser nt n ,iudicinl sale. Becnuse f'ome othPI' religions institution 
bidding for the property nt a jndirial sale could purchase the prop-
Nt~r only by outbidding all other pro>:perti1·e purcha~ers, there is 
only n speeulntiw possibilit~· thr~t the r~bRrlwe of a usr limitation 
would evrr nfford aid to rrli~tion. En:•n in such nn e1·cnt , the 
nrquiring religion" institution prrsumnbl~· would hnYr hnd to pn~· 
the then fnir vnlue of the propert~· · 
7 The "state aid" involved in this cnse is of n very special sort. 
We hnvc here no exprnditme of public funds, either by grnnt. or 
lor~n, no reimbmsement b~· a State for expenditures mr~de b~· a 
pnrochinl school or college, and no extending or committing of a 
Str~tc's rredit. Rather, the on!~· stnte nid ronsists, not of finnnrinl 
nssistnnre dirrrtly or indirertl~· whirh would implicnte public funds 
or credit, but the rrention of an instrumentality (the Anthorit~·) 
through which rducntionnl institutions mn~· borrow funds on the 
bn~is of their own credit and the srrurit~' of their m1·n proprrty 
upon morr f:n·ornhlc interest terms thnn otherwise \Yatud be nvnil-
nble. The Suprcmr Court of New .Tcr~ry chnrnrtcrized the [tssist-
nnre rendcrrd rtn educntional institution undrr nn net gcncrnlly 
~imil::tr to thr Routh Carolinn Art ns mere!~· bring n "govcmrncntnl 
scn·irc." Clayton "· Krrvick. 56 N . .T. 52::l. 530-531, 267 A. 2d 
503. 506-507 ( 1970). Thr So nth Cnrolinn Supreme Court, in the 
opinion below, dcRcribcd the role of the Stnte fiR thrtt of n "mere 
rondnit." - S. C., nt. -; 1~7 8. E. 2d, nt 650-6f>l. Bcrnnse 
\Ye conclude thnt llH' primnr~· effect of the nssistance nffordrd here 
i~ ncithrr to nd1·anre nor to inhibit religion for the otb<'l' rrnson~ 
stntcd in t hiR opinion. \\' P nrNl not drridr wbrthcr. ns nppcllcr n rgurs, 
Apprllcc's Brief, p. 14. the prc~cnt rnsc i~ controlled b~· the drrision 
in TValz "· Comm'n. supra. whrrr thi~ Comt upheld n propcrt~· tnx 
exrmption which inrludcd rrli!):ions institutions. 
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gree of entanglement between the State and the College. 
Appellant argues that the Authority \Yould become in-
voi\red in the operation of the College both by inspecting 
the project to insure that it is not being used for religious 
purposes and by participating in the management de-
cisions of the College. 
The Court's opinion in Lemon a11d the plurality opin-
ion in Tilton are grounded on the proposition that the 
degree of entanglement arising from inspection of fa-
cilities as to use varies in large measure with the extent 
to \Yhich religion permeates the institution. In finding 
excessive entanglement, the Court in Lemon relied on 
the "substantial religious character of these church-
related" elementary schools. 403 U. S., at 616. Mr.. 
CHIEF JusTICE BeRGEn's opinion for the plurality in 
Tilton placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the 
federal aid there approved would be spent in a college 
setting: 
'"Since religious indoctrination is not a substan-
tial purpose or activity of these church-rela.ted col-
leges and universities, there is less likelihood than 
in primary and secondary schools that religion will 
permeate the area of secular education." 403 U. S., 
at 687. 
Although Mn.. JusTICE WHITE saw no such clear distinc-
tion, he concurred in the result, stating: 
"It is enough for me that ... the Federal Govern-
ment [is] financing a separable function of over-
riding importance in order to sustain the legislation 
here challenged." 403 U. S., at 664. 
A majority of the Court in Tilton, then , concluded that 
on the facts of that case inspection as to use did not 
threaten excessive entanglement. As we have indicated 
above, there is no evidence here to demonstrate that the 
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College is any more an instrument of religious indictrina-
tion than were the colleges and universities involved in 
Tilton. 8 
A closer issue under our precedents is presented by 
the contention that the Authority could become deeply 
involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions 
of the College. The Authority is empowered by the Act: 
"(g) generally, to fix and revise from time to 
time and charge and collect rates, rents, fees and 
charges for the use of and for the services furnished 
or to be furnished by a project or any portion thereof 
and to contract with any person, partnership, asso-
ciation or corporation or other body public or pri-
vate in respect thereof; 
"(h) to establish rules and regulations for the use 
of a project or any portion thereof and to designate 
a participating institution for higher education as 
its agent to establish rules and regulations for the 
use of a project undertaken for such participating 
institution for higher education .... " S. C. Code 
Ann., § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971). 
These powers are sweeping ones, and were there a 
realistic likelihood that they would be exercised in their 
full detail, the entanglement problems with the pro-
posed transaction would not be insignificant. 
8 Although the record in this case is n bbrcviatrd and not free 
from ambiguity, the burden rests on appellant to show the extent 
to which the College is church-related, and he has failed to show 
more than a formalistic church relationship . As Tilton rRtablished, 
formal denominational control over a liberal arts college does not 
render all aid to the institution a violation of the E8tnblishment 
Clause. So far as the record here iR concerned, there is no showing 
that the College places nny special emphasis on Baptist denomina-
tional or any other sectarian type of education. As noted above, 
both the faculty and the student body arc open to persons of any 
(or no) religious affiliation. 
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The opmwn of the South Carolina Supreme Court,. 
however, reflects a narrow interpretation of the practical 
operation of these powers. According to that Court, 
"Counsel for plaintiff argues that the broad lan-
guage of the Act causes the State, of necessity, t(} 
become excessively involved in the operation, man-
agement and administration of the College. We do 
not so construe the Act. . . . [T]he basic function 
of the Authority is to see ... that fees are charged 
sufficient to meet the bond payments." - S. C., 
at -; 187 S. E. 2d, at 651. 
As we read the College's proposal, the Lease Agreement 
between the Authority and the College will place on the 
College the responsibility for making the detailed de-
cisions regarding the government of the campus and the 
fees to be charged for particular services. Specifically, 
the proposal states that the Lease Agreement 
"will unconditionally obligate the College (a) to 
pay sufficient rentals to meet the principal and in-
terest requirements as they become due on such 
bonds, (b) to impose an adequate schedule of charges 
and fees in order to provide adequate revenues with 
which to operate and maintain the said facilities a.nd 
to make the rental payments .... " App., p. 18. 
In short, under the proposed Lease Agreement, neither 
the Authority nor a trustee bank would be justified in 
taking action unless the College fails to make the pre-
scribed rental payments or otherwise defaults in its 
obligations. Only if the College refused to meet rental 
payments or was unable to do so would the Authority 
or the trustee be obligated to take further action. In 
that event, the Authority or trustee might either fore-
close on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting of 
rules, charges, and fees. It may be argued that only 
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the former would be consistent with the Establishment 
Clause, but we do not now have that situation before us. 
III 
This case comes to us as an action for injunctive and 
declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of the 
Act as applied to a proposed- rather than an actual-
issuance of revenue bonds. As the Court below pointed 
out, - S. C., at -; 187 S. E. 2d, at 651, the Act was 
patterned closely after the South Carolina Industrial 
Revenue Bond Act, and perhaps for this reason appears 
to confer unnecessarily broad power and responsibility 
on the Authority. Yet specific provisions of the Act, the 
Rules and Regulations of the Authority, and the College's 
proposal, all as interpreted by the South Carolina Su-
preme Court, delimit narrowly those otherwise untram-
meled provisions, and no evidence has been submitted 
by appellant to undermine this narrowing. Accordingly, 
we affirm the holding of the court below that the Act is 
constitutional as interpreted and applied in this case. 
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Richard W. Hunt, Appellant, 
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Robert E. McNair, Governor 
of South Carolina, et al. 
On Appeal from the Su-
preme Court of South 
Carolina. 
f April -, 19731 
MR. JusTICE: Pow·ELL delivered the op1mon of the 
Court. 
Appellant, a South Carolina taxpayer, brought this 
action to challenge the South Carolina Educational 
Facilities Act (the "Act"), S. C. Code Ann. §§ 22-41 
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1971), as violative of the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment insofar as it au-
thorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the 
issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of the Baptist 
College at Charlestol).; 1 The trial court's denial o re-
lief was affirmed by the Suprcn1e Court of South Car-
. olina. 255 S. C. 71, 177 S. E. 2d 362 (1970). This 
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for 
reconsideration in light of the intervening decisions in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Eaf7e.y v. 
DiCe·nso, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Robinson v. DiCe·nso, 
403 U.S. 602 (1971); and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U. S. 672 (1971). 403 U. S. 945 (1971). On remand, 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina adhered to its 
1 At various points during this litigation, appellant has made 
reference to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 
but has made no arguments specifically addressed to violations of 
that clause except insofar as this Court's approach to cases involv-
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earlier position. - S.C. -, 187 S. E. 2d 645 (1972). 
We now hold that the Act is constitutional. 
I 
We begin by setting out the general structure of the 
Act. The Act established an Educational Facilities Au-
thority (the "Authority") , the purpose of which is "to 
assist institutiolls for higher education in the construc-
tion, financing and refinancing of projects .... ", S. C. 
Code Ann. § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971), primarily 
through the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms 
of the Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities, 
site preparation and related items, but may not include 
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian in-
struction or as a place of religious worship nor any 
facility which is used or to be used primarily in 
connection with any part of the program of a school 
or depart1nent of divinity for any religious denomi-
nation." S. C. Code Ann. § 22- 41.2 (b) (Cum. 
Supp. 1971). 
Correspondingly, the Authority is accorded certain pow-
ers over the project, including the powers to determine 
the fees to be charged for the use of the project and to 
establish regulations for its use. See pp. ---, infra. 
While revenue bonds to be used in connection with 
a project arc issued by the Authority, the Act is quite 
explicit that the bonds shall not be obligations of the 
State, directly or indirectly: 
~ Revenue bonds issued u11der the provisions 
, shall not be deemed to constitute a 
Chtlf -/C!' r r debt or liability of the State or of any political sub-
division thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit 
of the State or of any such political subdivision, but 
shall be payable solely from the funds herein pro-
vided therefor from revenues. All such revenue 
bonds shall contain on the face thereof a statement 
A 
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to the effect that neither the State of South Car-
olina nor th uthority shall be obligated to pay 
the same or the interest thereon except from reve-
nues of the project or the portion thereof for which 
they are issued and that neither the faith and credit 
nor the taxing power of the State of South Carolina 
or of any political subdivision thereof is pledged to 
the payment of the principal of or the interest on 
such bonds. The issuance of revenue bonds under 
the provisions of this act shall not directly or in-
directly or contingently obligate the State or any 
political subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any 
form of taxation whatever therefor or to make any 
appropriation for their payment." S. C. Code Ann. 
§ gg 4],(1Q) (Cum. Supp. 1971). 
-.1:'-H-f'iifl-ei:'H*WC, since all of the expenses of the Authority 
must be paid from the revenues of the various projects 
in which it participates, S. C. Code Ann. § 22-41.5 (Cum. 
Supp. 1971), none of the general revenues of South 
Carolina is used to sup )Ort a project. 
n anuary 6, 1 , the College submitted to the 
Authority for preliminary approval an application for 
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the proposal, the c~ 
Authority would issue reven1:1e bonds and make the pr~ ~-­
ceeds available to the College for use in connection with 
a portion of its campus to be designated a project (the 
"Project") within the meaning of the Act. In return, 
the College would convey the Project, without cost, to 
the Authority, which would then lease the property so 
conveyed back to the College. After repayment in full 
of the bonds, the Project would be reconveyed to the 
College. The Authority granted preliminary approval 
on January 16, 1970, 255 S. C., at 76; 177 S. E. 2d, at 365. 
In its present form, the application requests the is-
suance of revenue bonds totaling $1,250,000, of which 
$1,050,000 would be applied to refund short term financ-
ing of capital improvements and $200,000 would be 
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applied to the completion of dining hall facilities. 2 The 
advantage of financing educational institutions through 
a state created authority derives from relevant pro-
visions of federal and South Carolina state income tax 
laws which provide in effect that the interest on such 
bonds is not subject to income taxation.a The income tax 
exempt status of the interest enables the Authority, as 
an instrumentality of the State, to market the bonds at 
a significantly lower rate of interest than the educa-
tional institution would be forced to pay if it borrowed 
the money by conventional private financing. 
Because the College's application to the Authority was 
a preliminary one, the details of the financing arrange-
ment have not yet been fully worked out. But Rules 
and Regulations adopted by the Authority govern cer-
tain of its aspects. See Jurisdictional Statement, Ap~ 
pendix C, pp. 47-51. Every lease agreement between the 
Authority and an institution must contain a clause 
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased 
land, nor any facility located thereon, shall be used 
2 As originally submitted by the College and approved by the 
Authority, the proposal called for the issuance of "not exceeding 
$3,500,000 of revenue bonds .... " 255 S. C., at 75; 177 S. E. 
2d, at 364. As indicated by a stipulation of counsel in this Court, 
the College subsequently secured a bank loan in the amount of 
$2,500,000 and now proposes the issuance of only $1,250,000 in 
revenue bonds under the Act, the proceeds to be used: 
"(i) to repay in full the College's Current Fund for the balance 
(approximately $250,000) advanced to the College's Plant Fund as 
aforesaid; (ii) to refund outstanding short-term loans in the amount 
of SSOO,OOO whose proceeds were to pay off indebtedness incurred 
for capital improvements, and (iii) to finance the completion of the r 
dining hall facilities at a cost of approximately $200,000."~ LE'~ph~~-~ls '~ 
p. 49. 
ross income for federal income tax purposes docs not include 
interrst on "the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession 
of the United Sta.tes, or any political subdivision of any of the 
foregoing .... " 26 U. S. C. § 103 (a) (1). fOr- 51~ 1(9. 
P1to...,@ -/a.y purpoSI!"$; !fro.5.5 ,·nco~e cfo~..s 
~,,.t ,,;c.!vde ,~f~,E>.s"'/ ''...,~fo"' ohlj()itcn..J 
eJ-f i Ae ()" ,· I(!>J S' l1tl o... ds posse5St01f.S 
or o-P -1-h•:S Sfrde or ~t'ly po/,ltctl/ 
.£ v bj, vi..st 011 f-It et"e of' • , , . '' ~C. Cde f.Jnn. ft,s--J..f 3( 11 )({., .... Sul¥".t?rj 
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for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious 
worship, or in connection with any part of the pro-
,..gram of a school or department of divinity of any 
It rQligioo denomination." -S.C., at-; 187 S. E. 
2d, at 647 . ....__ 
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agree-
ment must allow the Authority to conduct inspections, 
and any reconveyance to the College must contain a 
restriction against use for sectarian purposes.4 The Rules 
further provide that simultaneously with the executio:n.....-----
of the lease agreement, the Authority and the trustee 
bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would 
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseable 
mortgage lien on the Project property including a mort-
gage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority in 
4 Rule 4 relating to the Lease Agreement provides in part that: 
''If the Lea e Agreement contains a provision permitting the Insti-
tution to repurchase the project upon payment of the bonds, then 
in such instance the Lease Agreement shall provide that the Deed 
of reconveyance from the Authority to the Institution shall be made 
subject to the condition that so long as the Institution, or any 
voluntary grantee of the Institution, shall own the leased premises, 
or any part thereof, that no facility thereon, financed in whole or 
in part with the proceeds of the bonds, shall be used for sectarian 
instruction or as a place of religious worship, or used in connection 
with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity 
of any religious denomination." - S. C., at-; 187 S. E. 2d, at. 
647-648. 
The Rule goes on to allow the institution to remove this option in 
the case of involuntary sales: 
"The condition may provide, at the opt ion of the Institution, that 
if the leased premises shall become the subject of an involuntary 
judicial sale, as a result of any foreclosure of any mortgage, or sale 
punmant to any order of any court, that the title to be vested in 
any purchaser at such judicial sale, other than the Institution, shall 
be in fee simple and shall be free of the condition applicable to the 
Institution or any voluntary grantee thereof." - S. C., at -; 
187 S. E. 2d, at 648. Sec n. infm. 
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and to the lease agreement." Jurisdictional Statement, 
Appendix C, p. 50. 
Our consideration of appellant 's Establishment Clause 
claim extends only to the proposal as approved pre-
liminarily with such additions as are contemplated by 
the Act, the rules, and the decisions of the courts below. 
II 
(J../--~T-1-'fit-ee Court has recently had occasion to synthesize the 
principles which govern our consideration of challenges 
to statutes as violative of the Establishment Clause: 
"Three ... tests may be gleaned from our cases. 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principa1 or primary effect must 
be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion, ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an 
excessive entanglement \Yith religion.' " Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S., at m... _______ _,.J ~ 1-;) -( IS .. 
With full recognition that these are no more than help-
ful signposts, we consider the present statute and the 
proposed transaction in terms of the three "tests": pur-
pose, effect, and entanglement. 
A 
The purpose of the statute is manifestly a secular one. 
The benefits of the Act are available to all institutions 
of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not 
having a religious affiliation. While a legislature's decla-
ration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its 
,/ 
true intent, appellant makes no suggestion that the in-
troductory paragraph of the Act represents anything 
other than a good faith statement of purpose: 
"It is hereby declared that for the benefit of the 
people of the State, the increase of their commerce, 
welfare and prosperity and the improvement of 
71-1523-0PI~ION 
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their health and living conditions it is essential that 
this and future generations of youth be given the 
fullest opportunity to learn and to develop their 
intellectual and mental capacities; that it is es-
sential that illstitutions for higher education within 
the State be provided with appropriate additional 
means to assist such youth in achieving the required 
levels of learning and development of their intel-
lectual and mental capacities; and that it is the 
purpose of this section to provide a measure of as-
sistance and an alternative method to enable in-
stitutions for higher education in the State to pro-
vide the facilities and structures which are sorely 
needed to accomplish the purposes of this act, all 
to the public benefit and good, to the extent and 
manner provided herein." S. C. Code Ann. § 22.41 
(Cum. Supp. 1971). 
The College and other private institutions of higher 
education provide these benefits to the State." As of the 
academic year 1969-1970, there were 1,548 students -enrolled in the College, in addition to approximately 600 
night students. Of these students, 957o are residents of 
South Carolina who are thereby receiving a college edu-
cation without financial support from the State of South 
Carolina. 
B 
To identify "primary effect," we narrow our focus from 
the statute as a whole to the only transaction presently 
"In Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), this Court 
commrnted on the importance of the role of priYate education in 
this country: 
" Underlying these cases, and underlying also the legislnti\·e judg-
ments that have preceded the court decisions, has been a recognition 
that private education has played and is pla~·ing a significant and 
valuable role in raising national levels of knowledge, ~and 1 f 
experience." 392 U. S., at 247. '---1 Cof'l'l pe en Ct!!. J 
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before us. Whatever may be its initial appeal, the prop-
osition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any pro-
gram which in some manner aids an institution with a 
religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. E. g., 
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Tilton v. Richardson, 
supra. Stated another way, the Court has not accepted 
the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because 
aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its 
other resources on religious ends. 
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect 
of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in 
which religion is so pervasive that all functions are sub-
sumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifi-
cally religious activity in an otherwise substantially 
secular setting. In Tilton v. Richardson, supra, the 
Court refused to strike down a direct federal grant to 
four colleges and universities in Connecticut. MR. 
CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER, for the plurality, concluded that 
despite some institutional rhetoric, none of the four 
colleges was pervasively sectarian, but held open that 
possibility for future cases: 
"Individual projects can be properly evaluated if 
and when challenges arise with respect to particular 
recipients and some evidence is then presented to 
show that the institution does in fact possess these 
characteristics." 403 U. S., at 682. / 
Appellant has introduced no evidence in the present 
case placing the College in such a category. It is true 
that the members of the College Board of Trustees are 
elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention , that 
the approval of the Convention is required for certain 
financial transactions, and ~he charter of the College 
may be amended only by t o Convention. But it was 
likewise true of the institutions involved in Tilton that 
.. 
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they were "governed by Catholic religious organizations." 
403 U. S., at 686. What little there is in the record con-
cerning the College establishes that there are no re-
ligious qualifications for faculty membership or student 
admission, and that only 60% of the College student body 
is Baptist, a percentage roughly equivalent to the per-
centage of Baptists in that area of South Carolina. 
255 S. C., at 85; 177 S. E. 2d, at 369. On the record in 
this case there is no basis to conclude that the College's 
operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian 
rather than secular education. 
Nor can we conclude that the proposed transaction 
will place the Authority in the position of providing 
direct support for religious activities. The scope of the 
Authority's power to assist institutions of higher educa-
tion extends only to "projects," and the Act specifically 
states that a project "shall not include" any buildings or 
facilities used for religious purposes. In the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, we must assume that all of 
the proposed financing and refinancing relates to build-
ings and facilities within a properly delimited project. 
It is not at all clear from the record that the portion 
of the campus to be conveyed by the College to the Au-
thority and leased back is the same as tha.t being financed, 
but in any event it too must be part of the Project and 
subject to the same prohibition against use for religious 
purposes. In addition, as we have indicated, every lease 
agreement must contain a clause forbidding religious use/ 
and another allowing inspections to enforce the agree-
ment.6 For these reasons, we are satisfied that imple-
6 Appellant also takes issue with the Authority's rule allowing a 
purchaser at an involuntary sale to take title free of restrict ions as 
to religious use. See n. , ante. Appellant's reliance on 'l'itton 
!C tanlson, supra, in this respect is misplaced. There, the Court 
struck down a provision under which the church-related colleges 
would haYe unrestricted use of a federally financed project after 
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mentation of the proposal will not have the primary effect 
of advancing or inhibiting religion.7 
c 
The final question posed by this case is whether under 
the arrangement there would be an unconstitutional de-
20 years. In the prrsrnt rase, by contrast, the re~triclion ngninst 
rrligious use is ~not ns to the instttutwn seekmg the a~SJRtance 
of the Authority nor as to voluntary tram: feree~ . but only as to a 
purrha er at a judicial sale. Because some other religious institution 
bidding for the property at a judicial sale could purchase the prop-
rrty only by outbidding all other prosp<:>ctive purchn~rrR, there i~ 
only a speculative possibility thnt the nbsenr<:> of a usc limitntion 
would ever afford aid to religion. Even in such an rvrnt, the 
nrquiring religious institution prrsumabl~· would hnw had to pn~r 
the thrn fair vnlue of the propert~·. 
1 The "state aid" involved in this case is of a very sperifll sort. 
We have here no expenditure of public funds, either by gmnt or 
lonn, no reimbursement br a State for rxpcnditurrs mnde b~· a 
parochial school or rollrgc, n nd no ext<:>nding or commit! ing of a 
Rtnte's credit. Rather, the onl~r stnte aid consists. not of financial 
:tssistflnce directly or indirertl~· which would impliratc pnblir funds 
or crrdit, bnt the crrlltion of an instrumentalit~r (thr Authority) 
I hrongh which educnt ionnl institutions mny borrow funds on the 
ba~is of their own credit and the security of t hrir own prop<'rty 
upon more fnvorabl<' interest trrms than otherwise would br nvail-
nble. The Supreme Court of New .J<:>rscy charnrterized the nssist-
a nee rendered nn educational institution under nn net grnrrnlly 
~imilar to thr South Cnrolina Art as mrrely being n "govrmmental 
service." Clayton v. Ke1'vir·lc. 56 N . .T. 523. 530-531 , 267 A. 2d 
503 , 506-507 (1970). The South Carolina Suprrme Comt, in the 
· · ~.~dow, desrribed the .rol<:> of the State ns thnt of a ''~ 
conchnt. - S. C. , at -, 187 S. E. 2d, nt 65~-
we ronrludr thnt the primnry rffrrt of the assistance affordrd here 
is neither to ndvance nor to inhibit religion , Uti rJ.- r- Le, o '1 
1..>"-..l:.:l.t.QQ..~-t.fi'~~I'H{l.U. wr nrrd not decidE' wlwthrr. :18 app~?ller argurs, 17 /I 
Appellee's Brief. p. 14, ti-tQ preH!:Rt ~tt~e ir etmtrg!led P? ' iRe tlel"~  1 o.,) 
m._I£!ilz & Cli!:llWi lji...M'fit'!i1 ·,.[w>re +okifilo~•r*'~PIHI'fi""' 'l'f'Mt~:.'"""'""..._-v 
the importance of the tax ~ption in the South~ 
Carolina scheme brings the present case under 
Walz v.Tax Comm'n, supra, where this Court upheld 
a local property tax exemption which included 
religious institUions. 
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gree of entanglement between the State u.nd the College. 
Appellant argues that the Authority would become in-
volved in the operation of the College both by inspecting 
the project to insure that it is not being used for religious 
purposes and by participating in the management de-
cisions of the College. 
The Court's opinion in Lemon and the plurality opin-
ion in Tilton are grounded on the proposition that the 
degree of entanglement arising from inspection of fa-
cilities as to use varies in large measure with the extent 
to which religion permeates the institution. In finding 
excessive entanglement, the Court in Lemon relied on 
the "substantial religious character of these church-
related" elementary schools. 403 U. S., at 616. MR. 
CHIEF JusTICE BrRGER's opinion for the plurality in 
Tilton placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the 
federal aiel there approved would be spent in a college 
setting: 
"'Since religious indoctrination is not a substan-
tial purpose or activity of these church-related col-
leges and universities, there is less likelihood than 
in primary and secondary schools that religion will 
permeate the area of secular education." 403 U. S., 
at 687. 
Although MR. JusTICE WHITE saw no such clear distinc-
tion, he concurred in the result, stating: 
"It is enough for me that ... the Federal Govern-
ment [is] financing a separable function of over-/ 
riding importance in order to sustain the legislation 
here challenged." 403 U. S., at 664. 
A majority of the Court in Tilton, then, concluded that 
on the facts of that case inspection as to use did not 
threaten excessive entanglement. As we have indicated 
above, there is no evidence here to demonstrate that the 
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College is any more an instrument of religious indctrina- l 
tion than were the colleges and universities involved in 
TiUor0 
A closer issue under our precedents is presented by 
the contention that the Authority could become deeply 
involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions 
of the College. The Authority is empowered by the Act: 
L--~'....;' (:..liog.._)_j;"":enerally, to fix and revise from time to £:1] t time and charge and collect rates, rents, fees and 
charges for the use of and for the services furnished 
or to be furnished by a project or any portion thereof 
and to contract with any person, partnership, asso-
ciation or corporation or other body public or pri-
vate in respect thereof; 
"(h) to establish rules and regulations for the use 
of a project or any portion thereof and to designate 
a participating institution for higher education as 
its agent to establish rules and regulations for the 
use of a project undertaken for such participating,... 
institution for higher education .... " S. C. Code 
>"-o ___ A_n_n_..;; § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971). 
/ 
These powers are sweeping ones, and were there a 
realistic likelihood that they would be exercised in their 
full detail, the entanglement problems with the pro-
posed transaction would not be insignificant. 
8 Although the record in this case is abbreviated and not free 
from ambiguity, the burden rests on appellant to show tho extent 
--"'"'o which the College is church-related, "ft'nd he has failed to snow 
more than a formalistic church rel::ttionship. As Tilton established, 
formal denominational control over a liberal arts college does not 
"'---::r~on~er all aid to the institution a violation of tho E8tablishmont 
Clause. So far as the record here iR concerned, there is no showing 
that the College places any special emphasis on Baptist denomina-
tional or any other sectarian type of education. As noted above, 
both tho faculty and the student body arc open to persons of any 
(or no) religious affiliation. 
AS ~ne ~oa~n ~aro1~na ~upreme cour~ po~n~ea ou~, 
the Act was patterned closely
1 
after the South Carolina 
Industrial Revenue Bond Act, S.C., at ; 187 
S.E.2d, at 651, and perhaps for this reason appears 
to confer unnecessarily broad power a~d responsibility 
~ the ~uthority.,The opinion of that court, however, 
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~he opinion ef the Ssl:lt'R CaroliJ;~:8s ~w~reme C~niF~ 
~~~O@f\ reflects a narrow interpretation of the practical 
operation of these powerS: Aeetmhllg to th11:t CQurt_<_ 
"Counsel for plaintiff argues that the broad lan-
guage of the Act causes the State, of necessity, to· 
become excessively involved in the operation, man-
agement and administration of the College. We do 
not so construe the Act. . . . [T] he basic function 
of the Authority is to see ... that fees are charged 
sufficient to meet the bond payments." - S. C., 
at -; 187 S. E. 2d, at 651. 
As we read the College's proposal, the Lease Agreement 
between the Authority and the College will place on the-
College the responsibility for making the detailed de-
cisions regarding the government of the campus and the-
fees to be charged for particular services. Specifically,. 
the proposal states that the Lease Agreement 
"will unconditionally obligate the College (a) to 
pay sufficient rentals to meet the principal and in-
l terest requirements as they become due on such ~ v')~ ----~b::.:,o~nd~s~ll\(b) to impose an adequate schedule of charges 
and fees in order to provide adequate revenues with 
which to operate and maintain the said facilities and 
to make the rental payments .... " App., p. 18. 
In short, under the proposed Lease Agreement, neither 
the Authority nor a trustee bank would be justified in 
taking action unless the College fails to make the pre-
scribed rental payments or otherwise defaults in its 
obligations. Only if the College refused to meet rental 
payments or was unable to do so would the Authority 
or the trustee be obligated to take further action . In 
that event, the Authority or trustee might either fore-
close on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting of 
rules, charges, and fees. It may be argued that only 
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the former would be consistent with the Establishment 
Clause, but we do not now have that situation before us. 
III 
This case comes to us as an action for injunctive and 
declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of the 
Act as applied to a proposed-rather than an actual- _ 
issuance of revenue bonds. r-
The specific provisions of the Act under which the bonds 
will be issued, the Rules and Regulations of the 
Authority, and the College's proposal--all as interpreted 
by the South Carolina Supreme Court--confine the 
scope of the assistance to the secular aspects of 
this liberal arts college and do not foreshadow 
excessive entanglement between the State and religion. 
Accordingly, we affirm the holding of the court below 
that the Act is constitutional as interpreted and 
applied in this case. 
;L~~ 
J.ai'DRAF1' 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71-1523 
R ichard W. Hunt, Appellant. 
v. 
Robert E. McNair, Govemor 
of South Carolina, et al. 
On Appeal from tJw Su-
preme Court of South 
Carolina., 
~-. 1973] 
Mn. Jus'l'JCB PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Appellant, a South Carolina taxpayer. brought this 
action to challenge the · South Carolina Educational 
Facilities Act (the "Act"), S. (' . Code AmL ~ ~ 22-41 
et seq . (Cum. Supp. 1971 ), as violative of the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Ame ndment insOfar as it au-
thorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the 
issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of the Baptist 
College at Charleston (the "Coll ege") .1 The trial court's 
denial of relief was affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina. 256 S. C. 71. 177 S. E. 2d 362 ( 1970). 
This Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case 
for reconsideration in light of the intervening decisions fn 
Lemon , .. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1071); Earle.y \', 
DiCenso, 403 U. S. 602 ( 1971); Robin.sO'II v. DiCerr1so, 
403 U. S. 602 ( 1971); and Tilton \'. Richardson, 4o:3 
U.S. 672 (1971). 403 U.S. 945 (1971). On remand, 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina adhen'd to its 
1 At vano11~ point~ dunng tht~ litigatiOn , <l]lprllanl il:1~ mad1· 
rderencc to thl' Frrr Exrrci~(· CJau~c of thP Fir~t AmrndmP11t. 
bur has mndP no argumcnt~ :-;pccificall~· acldrc•H,.:ed to violation~ of' 
that clau:-;<' <'X('Pp1 in~ufar a~ thi~ Court·~ appruaeil 10 <'ii~C'~ tttvoh·-
)ng; thr HP!ig;10n Clnn~<'~ rpprP~Pnt . ..; an int<'rnrtwn of th1· twu 
dntl~t'~. 
7i-1523-0PINION 
HUNT v. McNAIR 
earlier position. -S.C.-, 187 S. E. 2d 645 (1972) , 
W. e Hw:u ~t$id tlrzttl tlhe Ae~ ie B8AI!titutiQJ<&l: I I'll" ' CJ.1'tlf'l"\11 
I 
We begin by setting out the general structure of thfl 
Act. The Act established an Educational Facilities Au" 
thority (the "Authority"), the purpose of which is "t6 
assist institutions for higher education in thE' construe· 
tion, financing and refinancing of projects , . , .'', 8 . C. 
Code Ann. § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971), primarily 
through the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms 
of the Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities, 
site preparation and related items, but may not include 
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian in-
structiou or as a place of religious worship nor any 
facility which is used or to be used primarily irr 
connection with any part of the program of a schooT 
or department of divinity fQr any religious denomiM 
nation," S. C. Code Ann. ~ 2;2-41.2 (b) (Cum, 
Supp, 1971). 
Correspondingly, the Authority is accorded certain pow-
ers over the project, including the powers to determine 
the fees to be charged for the use of the project and to 
establish regulations for its use. See pp. - - - , infra. 
While revenue bonds to be used in connection with 
a project are issued by the Authority, the Act is quit~ 
explicit that the bonds shall not be obligations of the 
State, directly or indirectly: 
"Revenue bonds issued under the provisions of 
this chapter shall not be deemed to constitute a 
debt or liability of the State or of any political sub-· 
division thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit 
of the State or of any such political subdivision, but 
shall be payable solely from the funds herein pro-
vided therefor from revenues. All such revenue· 
oonds shall con tai11 on the face therf'of a statement. 
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to the effect that neither the State of 8outh Car= 
olina nor the Authority shall be obligated to pay 
the sanw or the interest thereon except from revt'-
n ues of the project or the portion thereof for which 
they are issued and that neither the faith and credit 
nor the taxing power of the State of South Carolina 
or of any political subdivision thereof is pledged tu 
the payment of the principal of or the interest on 
such bo11ds. Tlw issuance of revenue bonds under' 
the provisions of this act shall not directly or in-
directly or contingently obligate the Ntate or any 
political subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any 
form of taxatio11 \vhat{'ver therefor or to make any 
appropriation for their payment." ~- ('.Code Ann, 
~ 22- 41.10 (Cum. Supp. 1971). 
Moreover, since all of the expenses of the Authority 
must be paid from the revenues of the various pro.i<'ets 
in which it participates. S.C. Code Ann.~ 22- 41.5 (Cum . 
Supp. 1971). none of the general revenues of South 
Carolina is used to support a project. 
On January 6, 1970. the College submitted to tlw 
Authority for preliminary approval an application for 
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under thP proposal. tlw 
Authority would issue the bonds and makP the pro-
ceeds available to the College for usc in connection with 
a portion of its campus to be designated a project ( tlw 
"Project") within the meaning of the Act. fn return. 
the College would convey the Project, without cost. to 
the Authority, which would then lease tfw property so 
conveyed back to the College. After repayment in full 
of the bonds. the Project would be rPCOJlveyed to tlw 
College . The Authority granted preliminary approval 
on .January 16. 1H70. 255 S.C.. at 76; 177 S. E. 2d. at :3!-H) . 
111 its present form. thP application requests the is 
suance of rPvenuc bonds totaling $1.250.000. of which 
$.1,0M),000 would lw applied to refu1Hl short term finane. 
ing of rapital improvcmruts and $~00 .000 would he 
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applied to the completion of dining hall facilities.~ The 
advantage of financing educational institutions through 
a state created authority derives from relevant pro-
visions of federal and South Carolilla state income tax 
laws which provide in effect that the interest on such 
bonds is not subject to income taxation." The income tax 
exempt status of the interest enables the Authority. as 
an instrumentality of the State, to market the bonds at 
a significantly lower rate of interest than the educa~ 
tional ii1stitution would be forced to pay if it borrowed 
the money by conventional private financing. 
Because the College's application to the Authority was 
a preliminary one, the details of the financing arrange~ 
ment have not yet been fully worked out. But Rules 
and Regulations adopted by the Authority govern cer~ 
tain of its aspects. See Jurisdictional Statement, Ap~ 
~A:; onginally :;ubmJtted by the College and approved by tlw 
Authority, the J)roposal called for the lssuance of ''hot exceeding 
$3,500,000 of rrvenue bonds .... '' 255 S. C., at 75; 177 S. E. 
2d, at 364. At> indicated by a stipulation of counsel m this Cour1, 
the College :;ub::;equently ::;ecurrd a bank loan ·in the amount of 
$2,500,000 and now proposes the 1ssuance of only $1,250,000 in 
revenue bonds under the Act, the procred~:> to br iJsrd. 
' · (i) to repay m full the Collrge':; Current Fund for the balanet· 
(approximatrly $250,000) advanced to the College's Plant Fund a~ 
afore,;aid; (ii) to refund outstanding ::;hort-term loans ill the amount 
of $800,000 who:;P proceeds were to pay off mdebtedne::;:-; mcurrrd 
for capital tmp1'ovements, and (iii) to finance the completiOn of the 
dming hall facilitir:; at a cost of approximately $200,000." (Empha-· 
::;i::; m original.) App., p. 41:.1. 
a Gro:;s incomP for federal mcome tax })Urposes dor:; not include> 
interest on '' the obrigatiom; of a State, a Territory, or a po::;;;c~::<Ion 
of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of thr 
foregoing .. .. '' 26 U. S. C. § 103 (a) ( 1). For statC' mcome tax 
purpose:;, gro::;s mcome doC's nor mcludC' interest ··upon obligation~ 
of the Umted States or Its po:;s(':;:;ion~ or of this State or anr 
pc.Jit1cal subdivi:-ion thereof .. . .'' S . C. Codr Ann. § (i5- 25:{ (4) 
(Cum . Supp. 1971) 
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pendix C, pp. 47-51. Every lease agreement between the 
Authority and an institution must contain a clause 
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased 
land, nor any facility located thereon, shall be used 
for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious 
worship, or in connection with any part of the pro-
gram of a school or department of divinity of any 
religious denomination.'' - fl. C., at -: 1M 
S. E. 2d, at 647. 
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agree-
ment must allow the Authority to conduct inspections. 
and any reconveyance to the College must contain a 
restriction against use for sectarian purposes.' The Rules 
further provide that simultaneously with the executiOIJ 
1 Rulr 4 rrlatmg to thr Lraor Agrermrnt providr::; m part thai : 
''If the Lease Agreemrnt contains a provision prrmitting thr Insti-
tution to rrpurchase the project upon paymrnt of the bonclti, thrn 
in such instance the Lrase Agrerment shall J1rovidr that t hr Dred 
of reconveyance from the Authority to the Institution shall be madr 
subjrct to the condition that l:iO long ao the lnstitut10n, or auy 
~·oluntary grantPe of thP Institution, shall own tlw leai:iPd JH'Pmlse:;, 
or any part thereof, that no facility thereon, financPd m whole or 
in part w1th tlw procPeds of tlw bondo, Hhall be u ·eel for ~ectanan 
inst rnct iou or as a place of religiouo worohlp, or used m connectiOn 
with any part of the program of a ::;chool or departmpnt of divmity 
of any rPligiou:s denomination." - S. C .. at-; 187 S E. 2d, at 
647-648. 
The Rule goe:; on to allow the inotitution to removr th1s opt10n m 
the case of involuntary sales: 
''Tlw condition may prov1dP, at the option of thP lnstJtution , that 
if the leased premises :;hall bPcomP the :;ubjPct of an mvoluntary 
judicwl ::;ale, as a result of any foreclo ·ure of any mortgagr , or saJr 
pun;uant to any ordf'I' of any court, that the title to be vrsted in 
any purcha:ser at ::;uch Judicial ::;ale, other than the lnstitut10n, :;hall 
bP 111 feP :;unplP and shall bP frre of the condition applicablp to tlw 
ln::;t itut10n or any voluntary granteP therrof." - S C., at -·~ 
!~7 S. E :Zd, at 64R Scr n. 6, infra. 
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of the lease agreement, the Authority and the trustee 
bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would 
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseablt> 
mortgage lieu on the Project property including a mort-
gage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority in 
and to the lease agreement." Jurisdictional Statement. 
Appendix C, p. 50. 
Our consideration of appellant's Establishment Clause 
claim extends only to the proposal as approved pre-
liminarily with such additions as are contemplated by 
the Act. the rules, and the decisions of thP courts bPiow. 
II 
This Court has recently had occasion to synthesize the 
principles which govern our consideration of challenges 
to statutes as violative of the Establishment Clause : 
"Three ... tests may be gleaned from our cases, 
First, the statute must have a secular legislativE' 
vurpose; second, its principal or primary effect must 
be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion, ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an 
excessive eatanglement with religion.' ·· Lemon ' '· 
Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., at 612- 613. 
With full recognition that these are no more than help-
ful signposts, we consider the present statute and the 
proposed transaction in terms of the threp "tPsts" : pur-
pose, effect. and entanglement. 
A 
The purpose of the statute is manifestly a secular 01w, 
The benefits of the Act are available to all institutions 
of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not 
having a religious affiliation. While a legislature's decla~ 
ration of purpose may not always be a fair guidP to it~?. 
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true intent, appellant makes no suggestion that the in~ 
troductory paragraph of the Act represents anything 
other than a good faith statement of purposc> · 
"It is hereby declared that for the benefit of the 
people of the State, the increase of their commeree, 
welfare and prosperity and the improvement of 
their health and living conditions it is essential that 
this and future generations of youth be given thr 
fullest opportunity to learn and to develop theit 
intellectual and mental capacities; that it is es~ 
sential that institutions for higher education within 
the State be provided with appropriate additional 
I!leans to assist such youth in achieving the required 
levels of learning and development of their intel-
lectual and mental capacities; and that it is the• 
purpose of this section to provide a measure of as~ 
sistancc and an alternative method to enable in~ 
stitutions for higher education in the State to pro-
vide the facilities and structures which are sorely 
needed to accomplish the purposes of this a~t. all 
to the public benefit and good, to the extent and 
manner provided herein." S. C. Code Ann. ~ :22.41 
(Cum. Supp. 1971). 
The College and other private i11stitutious of higher 
edu~ation provide these benefits to the State. '' As of thP 
academic year 1969-1970, there were 1.548 students 
qn Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 2:36 (19(:\k), thi~ Court 
commrnted on thr importance of the role of private rducalwn iu 
this country: 
" Underlying the~e caset>, and underlying alt;o the ll'gi;;]ativr judg-
ments .that havr preceded the court drcisions, has bern a recognition 
that private educatiOn has played and i::; playing a ;;igmficant and 
valuable role in raising national leveb of knowledgr , compe1 enc·<', and 
c'xpenenre.'' :{02 P . R. , at 247. 
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enrolled in the College, in addition to approximately 600 
night students. Of these students, 95% are residents of 
South Carolina who are thereby receiving a college edu-
cation without financial support from the ~tate of Routh 
Carolina. 
R 
To identify ''primary effect," we narrow our focus fron1 
the statute as a whole to the only transaction presently 
before us. Whatever may be its initial appeal, the prop-
osition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any pro-
gram which in some manner aids an institution with a 
religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. E. y., 
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Ta:t 
Com.m'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Tilton v. Richardson, 
S'upra. Stated another way, the Court has uot accepted 
the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because 
aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its 
other resources ou religious ends. 
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect 
of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in 
which religion is so pervasive that unctions are sub-
sumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifi-
cally religious activity in an otherwise substantially 
secular setting. Jn Tilton v. Richardson, supra, th«:>· 
Court refused to trike down a direct federal grant to 
four colleges and universities in Connecticut. MR. 
CHIEF JusTICE BUIWER, for the plurality, concluded that 
despite some institutional rhetoric, none of the four 
colleges was pervasively sectarian, but held open that 
possibility for future cases . --"1 ndividual projects can be properly evaluated tf 
and when challenges arise with respect to particular 
recipients and some evidence is then presented to 
show that the institution does in fact possess thesP.· 
cbaracteristics.' ' 403 TT. S .. at 6R~ . 
0 cv hs f o,. l/o} 
p (),. .,_, ·a, 0 r 
if-.5 
-I he ,-e lt/,ov.: Cit $ . 
Of po s<!' J +o fie. 
s ~ c v I o...,. et " f; v; h ~..r 
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Appellant has introduced 110 evidence in the present 
case placing the College in such a category. 1t is tru(:l 
that the members of the College Board of Trustees ar0 
elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention. that 
the approval of the Convention is required for certain 
finaucial transactions. and that the charter of the Collegr 
may be amended only by the Convention . But it was 
likewise true of the institutions involved in Tilton that 
they were "governed by Catholic religious organizations. '' 
403 U. ~ .. at 686. What little there is in the record con "' 
cerning the College establishes that there are no re-
ligious qualifications for faculty membership or student 
admission, and that only 60% of the College student body 
is Baptist. a percentage roughly equivalent to the per-
centage of Baptists in that area of South Carolina. 
255 S. C., at 85; 177 S. E. 2d, at 369. On the record i11' 
this case there is no basis to conclude that the College 's 
operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian· 
rather than secular education . 
Nor can we conclude that the proposed transaction 
I will place the Authority in the position of providin · 
dire.etJ SMf3J.39rt fm religiel1':'1 aebiviti:tS The scope of t e 
/ Authority's power to assist institutions of higher educa-
tion rxtends only to "projects," and the Act specifically 
states that a project "shall not include'' any buildings or 
facilities used for religious purposes. In the absencf' of 
evidencP to the contrary. we must assume that all of 
the proposed financing and refinancing relates to build-
ings and facilities within a properly delimited project. 
1 t is not at all clear from the record that the portion 
of the campus to be conveyed by the College to the Au-
thority and leased back is the samr as that being financed . 
but in any event it too must be part of the Project and 
subject to thr same prohibition against usc for religious 
purposes. In addition, as we have indicated. every leas<· 
agreemc~llt must ~ontaill a (dauRP forhidding religious use 
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and another allowing inspections to enforce the agre(""" 
ment." For these reasons. we are satisfied that implP-
mentation of the proposal will not have the primary effeet 
of advancing or inhibiting rPligion .' 
"Appellant al~o takro; t~;;u<· wtth tlw Authonn··~ rulr allow!llg :( 
purcha~rr at an mvoluntary ,;:dr to takr t1tiP frN· of rp~tnctwnK a,.: 
to rrligiou;; tl~<'. ~rr 11 . .J. . ante. Appellaut'::; rPha11ce ou 'i'?ltull 
v. fttchardsun, supra. m thi;; rr;;pect 1~ mt~placPcl. Therr, thr Comt 
::;truck down a provi:::ion under winch tlw church-rrlatPd college•,.: 
would have unrl':strlctPd u~r of a f!'clrrnlly finanerd pro.i<•ct afiPr 
20 yrn r::;. I u tlw pn'~Pni ca~e, by contra~!, t hr rr;;trictton agn m~t 
religiou~ u ·e 1:s lifted not a::; to the lntitJtutton ::;pekmg Ow a;;HJ::>t:ulc<' 
of thP Authorit~· nor a~ to voluntar~· tran~feree::; , but only a>< to a 
purcha:ser at a judlcut! :::alP. BPcau:::e :>Otn<' otlwr religious 111 :>t 1tution 
bidding for t hr pro pert~· at a judicial :sale could purcha::;r rlw prop-
Prt)· only by out bidding all ot hrr pro. ·prct tve purcha::;N,;, t hPre 1 ~ 
on]~- a sp('cttlative llO~><ibiltt~ · that tlw ab;;encP of a u,;p limitation 
would Pvrr afford rucl to rcltgton. Even 111 ~uch an Pv<•nt, th<' 
acqumng rrhg10u::; i11:st1tutton prr"umabl~· would havP hnd to p:t,\' 
t hr t hPn f:ur value of tlw propNt ~· . 
'Tlw ";;tatr aid" mvolvrd in th1~ ea~<' is of a very ~rwcial ::;ort . 
We havr hrrP no rxpenditun' of public fund,.;, rither b~· grant or 
loan, no rPJtnbur~emPnt by a Statr for Pxpemliture:s mad<' u.\· a 
parochial ~chool or co !leg<' , aud uo PXtPnding or commit t 111g of a 
Statr';; credtt. Hather, tlw on!~· :statt• ;ucl coH:::i::<t::;, not of financial 
a~~i,.;tancr dtrrctl~· or mclm•ctly wlueh would nrplicate publ1c fund:; 
or crt>dit, but the crPatwn of an tn::;trum<•utnltty (tlw Authority) 
through wllleh Pducatwual lllKtlt ut tou~ ma~ borrow fu11d" on tlH' 
IJa,.;i" of thr1r own credtt nud tlw K<'<'ttrity of tlwll' own jH'OfWl't)' 
upou more favorabiP 111trrP~t t<•rm" than otlwrwl~e would he· avatl-
ablc·. Thr Suprrme Court of NPw .kn:><·~· l'haractenzl'd tlw aK~:>t::::t­
:lllC<' rrndPrPd an l'ducational tn;;titutJOII under an net gen<'rall~ · 
~im tlar to tlw Soul h Cnrolina Act a::: ITIN<'l~· bring a "govr rnmpntal 
,.;ervicP." Clayton \' KerV1tk. 5() :-: . . J. 52:~, 5:30-5:31, :2()7 A. ld 
50:3, 506- 507 (1970). Tlw South Carolwa SuprPITI<' Comt, lll thP 
optlllOtl bPlow, drt;crtbPd tht• roll' of thP Stat<' a:; that ot a "m<•rc· 
concltut ." - S. C. , at -; 1K7 S. E. :ld. at ()50. BPc:tu:::P w<· 
concludP that t h<' pnma ry rtf ret of the <lti:>I"tauce afforded hrrl' 1~ 
tH'lthc•r to :tdv:t net· nor to inlubtt r<'hgtou unc!Pr /,enu)'// :llld 7'zltol•, 
w<· u<·Pd not ckcide whether. a::: appriiP<' :t rgu e;;. Ap1wllep':; Bnrf, p 
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The final question posed by this case is whether under 
the arrangement there would be an unconstitutional de-
gree of entanglement between the State and the College. 
Appellant argues that the Authority would become in-
volved in the operation of the College both by inspecting 
the project to insure that it is not being used for religious 
purposes and by participating in the management de-
cisions of the College. 
Th<" Court's opinion in Lemon and the plurality opin-
ion in Tilton are grounded on the proposition that the 
degree of entanglement arising from inspection of fa-
cilities as to use varies in large measure with the extent 
to which religion permeates ,the institution. Jn finding 
excessive entanglement, the Court in Lemon relied on 
the "substantial religious character of these church-
related" elementary schools. 403 U. S., at '616. MR. 
CHIEF Jus'riCE BuRGER's opinion for the plurality in 
Tilton placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the 
federal aid there approved would be spent in a college 
setting : 
'"~ince religious indoctnnation is not a substan-
tial purpose or activity of these church-related col ~ 
leges and universities, there is less likelihood thau 
in primary and secondary schools that rrligion will 
permeatr thr area of secular education." 403 U. ~ . 
at. f\R7. 
Although MR. JusTICE WHITE saw no such clear d1stinr~ 
tion. he concurred in the result, stating 
"It 1s enough for me that .. . the Federal Govem-
ment I is I finanr,ing a separable function of owr-
::~rhrm<' brmg~ 1 lw pr<'~<'nl ra~t' uJJcl<'f ll'alz \' . Tax Cumm ·u. :; upm . 
wbrrr lht~ C'omt uplwld a local proprrt\· 111x rxrmption whirl! 111 
clnd<'d religton~ tn~tit\1t ion:;. 
l:Z 
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riding 1111 portance in order to sustain tlw l<>gislatiou 
Jwrc challenged." 403 C !:-1 •• at (i(i4 
A majority of the ('ourt in 1'ilto11, then, concluded that 
on the facts of that case inspection as to us<' did not. 
thrc'aten excPssive <'ntanglemrnt. As w<' have indicated 
aboVP. ther<' is no evidence here to d0monstrate that tlw 
C'ollcge is any more an instru1nent of religious indoctrina-
tion than were the' C'olleges and unive1·sities involv('d in 
1'1:/ton .' 
r\ closer lSSU<' under our precedents is presented hy 
th0 contentioll that the Authority could bPeoiH<' d<'eply 
involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions 
of the Coll0ge. Th0 Authority is empowered by the Aet. 
''(gl lgje1wrally . to fix and n'vise from time to 
tin1e and charge and collect rates. re11ts. fpes and 
chargef' for the use of a11d for th0 sl'rvice::; furnished 
or to ))(' furuish0d by a project or any portion thereof 
and to eontract \\'ith any perso11, partnl'rship, asso-
('iation or corporatio11 or other body public or pn-
vate i11 n'stwet thcr<'of, 
" (h) to establish rulrs and regulatwns for the use 
of a proJect or any portion thereof and to designat<' 
a participating i11stitution for higher education as 
its ag<'nt to establish rult's and regulatioilS for th<' 
'A lthough the n·(·ord 111 thi~ (':1~<' 1~ ;lhhn•vwtt•d illld uot fn•t· 
from ambiguit~·. llw IHII'dl'll n·~t~ 011 app<'ll:tnl to .- how tlw l'Xll'nt 
to whirlt till' Colll'gt• 1~ cltl!rrh-rrlatl•d. d. Boal'd of 8duratio11 ,., 
Allen , &upm. :l!J:Z l'. S., '' ' 1-li-i, :1nd lw llil ~ faihl to ~how mor(' 
than a fonn:di~tH· ehur('li n·latiomd11p. A~ Tilton t•stahli~lwd. 1'01'-
mal dt·nolllllliillona I l'Oiit rol o1·<·r :t libl'fili art~ roll<•gp dol '~ not 
rrnd<·r all aid to till' in~t1111tion a ,-,olatlon of thl' E~tahli,dmwnt 
Clall ~l'. So l'i!r a~ tilt• l'l'l'OI'd hl·n· 1 ~ l'OII<'<'I'Ilrd. tht•n• ~~ no ~howing 
that llw ( 'olll'gl' plae<·~ a 111· ~Jll'l'Jal ('lll]JII<I~i~ on Bapt 1st dl'IIO!lllll:l · 
twnal or an~ · oth('f' ~l'l' l ill'lilll t~· JH ' of (•duealion . A~ not<•d abO\'('. 
hath till' fil('lllty :tlld till' ~tlldl' llt hod~· :11'<' OJH' Il to Jlf'I',.;QII~ of an; 
(OI' 110) I'C'iJg[OII~ aJJiiJat lOll. 
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usc' of a pro.icet undertaken for such participating 
institutio11 for higlwr <'ducatiou. S. C. Cock 
Ann. ~ 22- 41.4 (C'UJn. Supp. 1971 ). 
These powC'rs are SvYeepi ng ones. and we're then' a 
realistic likelihood that th<>y would be' pxcrcisc,d in tlwiJ· 
full detail. the eJJtanglement problems with the pro~ 
posed transaction would not be insignificant. 
As tlH' South Carolina Supreme Court pointed out. 
the Act was pattemed closely after the South Carolina 
fnctustrial Revenue' Bond Act. - S. C .. at -; 187 
S. E. 2d. at ()51. a1HI perhaps for this reason appears to 
confH unnecessarily broad power and responsibility on 
th~ Authority. The opinion of that court. howcvPr. rP-
fiects a narnm interpretation of the practical opPratioJl 
of thc'SE' J)OW(')':S . 
''Counsel for plaintiff argues that the broad lan -
guage of tlw Act causes the State'. of necessity. to 
beconw c·xeessively involved in the operation. tnaJl -
agement and administration of the College. We do 
not so COIJStruC' the Act. . . IT I he basic function 
of the Authority is to sec ... that fees are charg<'d 
suff:icic'Jit to meet tlw bond payments." - S. ( ' .. 
at - ; 1R7 ::-i. E. 2d, at 651 
As we read thP ( 'ollege 's proposal. the Lease Agreement 
bet,~·een the Authority and the College will place on the 
( 'ollege the respon sibi lity for making the detailed de-
cisions regardi11g the govprnmC'nt of the cam pus and the' 
fees to b<' charged for particular services. :-lpecifically. 
thP proposal states that the Lease Agreem<'n t 
"will UIICOtHiitiona1ly obligate the College (a) to 
pay sufficient rentals to meet the principal and in-
terest requirPments as they become clue on such 
bonds. Iandi (b) to impose> an adequate sch edu l<' of 
~harges and fe'<'S in order to provide· adequatP rPve-
14 
71- 152:3-0l'IKlO ... ' 
HUNT v. J eX Am 
nucs with which to operate and mai11tain tlw said 
facilities and to make the rental paynlC'nts . . . . :· 
App .. p. 18. 
In short, under the proposed Lease Agreement. neither 
the Authority nor a trustee bank ;vould b0 justified i11 
taking action unless the College fails to make the pn·-
scrib('d rental payments or otherwise defaults in it::; 
obligations. Only if the College refused to nwet rental 
payments or was unable to do so would the :\uthorit.1· 
or the trustee bf' obligated to take further action. In 
that t'vent. tlw Authority or trustee might eitlwr fore-
closf' on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting of 
rules. charges. and fees. It may be argued that only 
the former would be consistent with the Establishmrn t 
Clause. but wr clo not now have that situation beforr us 
lli 
1'his case comes to us as an actwn for lll.Junctlw and 
declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of thr 
Act as applied to a proposed-rather than an actual-
issuance of revenue bonds. The specific provisio11s uf 
th( Act under which the bonds will be issu0d, tlw Rules 
and Regulations of the Authority, and the College's pro-
posal-all as interpreted by the South Carolina ~uprenw 
Court- confine the scopf' of the assistance to the sPctilar 
aspects of this liberal arts college and do not foreshadoll' 
Pxcessivc entanglement between the State and religion . 
Accordingly. ,,.o affirm the holding of the court below 
that the Act is constitutional as intf'rpret<>rl and applied 
u1 this case. 
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The question presented in this case is whether South 
Carolina's assistance to the Baptist College at Charles-
town under the South Carolina Educational Facilitief' 
Authority Act constitutes constitutionally impermissibh~ 
aid by the ~tate for this sectarian institution.' The test 
to which I adhere for determining such questions 1s 
whether the arrangement between the State and tht> 
Baptist College is foreclosed under the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment because among 
"those involvements of religious with secular insti-
tutions which (a) serve the essentially religious 
activities of religious institutions; (b) em ploy the 
organs of ~overnment for essentially religious pur-
poses; or (c) use essentially religious means to 
secure governrnental ends. wherr secular means would 
suffice." Abinyton School District v. Schempp, 374 
F . S. 203. 294-295 (1963) (BRENNAN, J., con-
curring); Walz v. Tax· Commission, 397 U. S. 664. 
680- oRl (1970) (BRENNAN, J .. concurring); Lemon 
'No one de111r~ that tlw Baptt~t Collrgp at Charlr~town 1,; il 
"~rctariau" m~tltution -'t. e .. OIH' "m whtrh tht• propogntton and 
advancement of a particular religion are a function or purpo~e of thr 
in~titutwn ." Tiltou v. llirhardsrm. 40:-l tJ S fi72, (i59 (1971) 
( ~Pj)Hratr O]Hnton of RHENNA I' .. I,) 
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v. K-urtztnan. 40a 1) . ~. l:i02, 643 (1971) (Le-mon I) 
(separate opinion of BHENNAN , J. ). 
Because under that test it IS clear to me that the :::ltate's 
proposed scheme of assistance to the Baptist College is 
violative of the Establishment Clause, I dissent. 
The act authorizes a financing arra11gement between 
the Authority" and the Baptist College at Charlestowu, 
a ~outh Carolina educational corporation operated by the 
~outh Caroli11a Baptist Convention . Under that ar-
rangement, the College would convey a substantial por-
tion of its campus to thf' Authority, ancl the Authority 
would lease back the property to the College at an agreed 
rental. The Authority would then issue revenue bonds 
of the ~tate of 8outh Carolina i11 the amount of 
$3,500,000.00. which bonds would be payable, principal 
and interest, from the rents paid by the College to tht> 
Authority under the lease. The proceeds of the sale. 
of the bonds would be used to pay off outstanding in-
debtedness of the College " and to construct additional 
buildings ancl facilities for use in its higher education 
operations. Upon payment iu full of the principal and 
interest on the bonds, the arrangement requires that the 
Authority reconvey title to the r.ampuR properties to the 
2 The Sonth Carolina EdueatJOJHtl Fnril1t1E'H Authority i~ (·om-
[>OHecl of the mrmbrr;; of t hr Statr Budgrt and Control Board, who 
are thP Governor. the StntC' Trra~urrr, thP Statr Comptrollrr GeuNal. 
thr Chmrmnn of thr Finanre Committ<>r of tlw Statr S<>nate. and thr 
Chamnan of thr Wn~·~ nnd :Vfran~ Conumttrr of thr Statr Hou~r of 
Hrprr~entnt1vr~ . Thr HCl ~tatP~ that "all I hr funrtwu~ and powpr~ 
of the Atlthont\· an• her<>b~ · grautrd to thr 8tatr BudgPt and Control 
Board a~ an mc1drnt of 1t~ funrt1on~ til eonnertwu w1th thr publ1r 
fimmcr~ of tlw StatP " S (' Coclr Ann . ~ :2:2- 41.:2 ( [)) (Cum . Supp. 
1971) . 
a Thi~ oul~tamlmg m<kbtednr~s pPrlalll~ to ('C'rt ;un uuspPcJfird 
"capital improvrm(•nt~ " App., p 49 Thu~. 11 may br th<~t the 
indrbtrdness wn~ JnrurrPd for Jlll[H'OVPm<•nt~ to faril1lt<'~ usN[ for 
rehg1011~ pu rpm<P~ , 
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College free and clear of all lieus and encumbrances: 
The arrangement does not. however, amount merely to a 
mortgage on the campus property. The Authority is also 
empowered, inter alia, to determine the location and 
character of any project financed under the act; to con~ 
struct, maintain. manage, operate, lease as lessor or 
lessee, and regulate the same; to enter into contracts for 
the management and operation of such project!\ to es~ 
tablish rules and regulations for the use of the project 
or any portion thereof; and to fix and revise from time 
to time rates, rents. fees and charges for the use of a 
project and for the services furnished or to be furnished 
by a project or any portion thereof. In other words, 
the College turns over to the ~tate Authority control of 
substantial parts of the fiscal operation of thP school-
Its very life's blood 
It is true that the act expressly provides that ~tatr, 
financing will not bf' provided for 
''any facility used or to be used for sectarian ill.;; 
struction or as place of religious worship nor any 
facility which is used or to be used primarily in 
connection with any part of the program of a school 
or department of divinity for any religious denOlm -
nation ." ~ - C C'odP Ann . ~ 22~41.2 (b) (Cum . 
8upp. 1D71) " 
And tt IS also true that the Authonty, pursuant to 
granted rule-making power, has adopted a rule requiring 
that each leasf-' agrepment contain a covenant 
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased 
land, nor any facility locatPd thereon, shall be used 
for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious 
worship, or in connection with any part of the pro-
gram of a school or department of divinity of any 
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But policing by the Authority to ensure compliance 
with these restrictions is established by a provision re-
quired to be included in the lease agreement allowing the 
Authority to conduct on-sitr inspections of the facilities 
financed under the ad. 
Thus, it is crystal clear. l th1nk. that this scheme in-
volves the State in a degree of policing of the affairs of 
the College far exceeding that called for by the statutes 
struck down in LC'mon I. supra. See also Johnson v. 
Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421 (Conn . 1H70), aff'd, 403 U. S. 
955 (1971 ). indeed. under this scheme the policing by 
the foltate can become so etxensive that the State may 
well end up in complete control of the operation of the 
College, at least for the life of the bonds. The College 'R 
freedom to engage iu religious activities and to offer re-
ligious instruction is necessarily circumscribed by this 
pervasive state involvement forced upon the College if 
it is not to lose its benefits under the Act. For it seems 
inescapable that the content of courses taught in facili-
ties financed under the agreement must be closely moni-
tored by the State Authority in discharge of its duty to 
ensure that the facilities are not being used for sectanan 
mstruction. The Authority must also involve itself 
deeply m the fiscal affairs of the College. even to the 
point of fixing tuition rates, as part of its duty to assure 
sufficient revenues to meet bond and interest obligations. 
And should thr College find itself unable to meet these 
obligations. its continued existence as a viable sectarian 
institution is almost completely in the hands of thP 
State Authority . Thus, this agreement. with its con-
sequent state surveillance and ongoing administrative 
relationships, inescapably entails mutually-damaging 
Church-Statt> involvements. Abington School District 
v . Schempp, supra, 374 U. S .. at 295 (BRENNAN, J., con-
curring) ; Lemon I , supm, 403 {l ~ .. at 649 (separate 
opinion of BRENN AN . . J I, 
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In support of Its contrary argument, the Court adopts 
much of the reasoning of the plurality opinion in Tilton 
v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 ( 1971 ). I disagreed with 
that reasoning in Tilton because, as in this case. that 
reasoning utterly failed to explain how programs of sur-
veillance and inspection of the kind common to both 
cases differ from the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island 
programs invalidated in Lemon I . What I said in Tilton 
is equally applicable to the present case. 
"I do not see any significant difference in telling 
the secta.rian university not to teach any nonsecular 
subjects in a certain building, and Rhode Island's 
telling the Catholic school teacher [in Lemon I j not 
to teach religion . The vice is the creation through 
subsidy of a relationship in which the government 
polices the teaching practices of a religious school 
or university .'' 403 U. S .. at 660 (separate opi!1io1i 
of BRENN AN, ,) ) • 
In any event , Tilton is clearly not controlling hen:. 
The plurality opinion in Tiltor1 was expressly based on 
the premise. erroneous in my view . that the Federal 
Higher Education Assistance Act contained no significant 
intrusions into the everyday aft'airs of sectarian educa-
tional institutions. Thus, it was said in the plurality 
opinion : 
" I U J nlike the direct and continumg payments under 
the Pennsylvama program lin Lemon fl, and all 
the mcidents of regulatwn and surveillance, the 
Government aid here is a one-time, single-purpos<' 
construction grant. There are no continuing finan -
Cial relationships or dependencies, no annual audits, 
and no government analysis of an institution's ex-
penditures Oll secular as distinguished from reli~iow< 
arti vi ties " 4();3 l '. :-\ . at oRR, 
7 J - 152:~-DISSENT 
,HUNT v. McNAHt 
But under the South Carolina s~he1ne, "conti'nuing finafl-
cial relationships or dependencies,' ' "annual audits, " 
"government analysis,' ;· and "regulation and surveillance'' 
are the core features of the arrangement. In short, the 
'South Carolina statutory scheme as applied to this sec-
tarian institution presents the very sort of "intimate con-
tinuing relationship or dependency between government 
and religiously affiliated institutions" that in the plu-
rality's view was lacking in Tilton. lb·id. 
Nor is the South Carolina arrangement between the 
State and this College auy less offensive to the Constitu-
tion because it involves, as the Court asserts, no "direct" 
financial support to the College by the State. The Estab-
lishment Clause forbids far more than payment of public 
funds directly to support sectarian institutions. It for-
bids any offici~l.l involvement with religion, whatever its 
form, which tends to foster or discourage religious wor-
ship or belief. The cases are many in which we have 
struck down on establishment grounds state laws that 
provided, not direct financial support to religious institu-
tions, but various other forms of assistance. McCollum 
v. Board of Education, 333 U. 8. 200 (1948) ("release 
time" program); Engel v. ll1tale, 370 U. ::3. 421 ( 1962) 
(prayer reading 111 public schools); Abington School Dts-
trict v. Schempp, 374 U. ::3. 203 ( 1963) (Bible reading in 
public schools). Moreover, any suggestion that tht· 
constitutiOnality of a statutory program to aid sectarian 
institutions is dependent on whether that aid can be 
characterized as direct or indirect IS flatly refuted by 
the Court's decisions today m Committee for Public Edu-
catwn v. Nyqu1st, - U. S. - ( 1!:173), and Sloan v. 
Lemon, - U. ::3.- (1973) . ln those cases, we went 
behind the mere assertiOn that tuition reimbursement 
and tax exemption programs provided no direct aid to 
sectarian schools and concluded that the "substantive 
, 
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impact" of such programs was essentially the same as a 
( 
direct subsidy from the State. 
, The South Carolina arrangement has the identical 
constitutional infirmities. The State forthrightly aids 
the College by permitting the College to avail itself of 
the State's unique ability to borrow money at low in-
terest rates, and the College, in turn, surrenders to the 
State a comprehensive and continuing surveillance of 
the educational , religious, and fiscal affairs of the Col-
lege. The conclusion is compelh'cl that tlus involves thP 
State in the "essentially religious activities of religious 
institutions" and "employlsJ the organs of government 
for essentally religious purposes. " I therefore dissent 
and would reverse the JUdgment of the 8upreme Court of 
South Carolina, 
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Appellant, a South Carolina taxpayer, brought th1s 
action to challenge the South Carolina Educational 
Facilities Act (the "Act"), S. C. Code Ann. ~ ~ 22-41 
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1971), as violative of the Establish-
ment Clauo::e of the First Amendment insofar as it au-
thorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the 
issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of the Baptist 
College at Charleston (the "College").' The trial court's 
denial of relief was affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina. 255 S.C. 71, 177 S. E. 2d 362 (1070l 
This Court vacated the judgment and remanded the cas<> 
for reconsideration in light of the intervening decisions in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 F. S. 602 ( 1971); Earle.y ' 
DiCenso, 4o:i U. S. 602 (1971); Robin.so11 v. DiCe·nso, 
403 U. S. 602 ( 1971); and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U. S. 672 (1971). 403 U.S. 945 (1971). On remand, 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina adhered to Its 
1 At various pomt" dunng tlu" ht 1gation, appellant ha" made· 
reference to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 
but has made no arguments specifically addressed to vwlations of 
that clause except insofar as this Court's approach to rases involv · 
ing the Religion Clau::;es represents an iJ:Iteract ion of the two, 
clauses. 
71-152:3-0PINTO~ 
2 HUNT v. McNAIR 
earlier position. -S.C.-, 187 S. E. 2cl 645 (1972). 
We affirm. 
I 
We begin by setting out the general structure of the 
Act. The Act established an Educational Facilities Au-
thority (the "Authority"), the purpose of which is "to 
assist institutions for higher education m the construc-
tion, financing and refinancing of projects . . . " . S. C. 
Code Ann. § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971), primarily 
through the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms 
of the Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities, 
site preparation and related items, but may not include 
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian m-
struction or as n, place of religious worship nor any 
facility which is used or to be used primarily in 
connection with any part of the program of a school 
or department of divinity for any religious denomi-
nation.'.' S. C. Code Ann. ~ 22-41.2 (b) (Cum. 
Supp. 1971). 
Correspondingly, the Authority is accorded certam pow-
ers over the project, including the powers to determine· 
the fees to be charged for the use of the project and to· 
establish regulations for its use. See pp. - - -, infra. 
While revenue bonds to be used in connection with 
a project an' issued by the Authority, the Act is quite-
explicit that the bonds shall not be obligations of the 
State, directly or indirectly· 
"Revenue bonds issued under the provisions of 
this chapter shall not be deemed to constitute a 
debt or liability of the State or of any political sub-
division thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit 
of the State or of any such political subdivision, but 
shall be payable solely from the funds herein pro-
vided therefor from revenues. All such revenue 
bonds shall contain on the face thereof a statement. 
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to the effect that neither the State of South Car-
olina nor the Authority shall be obligated to pay 
the same or the interest thereon except from reve-
nues of the project or the portion thereof for which 
they are issued and that neither the faith and credit 
nor the taxing power of the State of South Carolina 
or of ally political subdivision thereof is pledged to 
the payment of the principal of or the interest on 
such bonds. The issuance of revenue bonds under 
the provisions of this act shall 11ot directly or in-
directly or contingently obligate the State or any 
political subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any 
form of taxation whatever therefor or to make any 
appropriation for their payment." S. C. Code Ann 
§ 22-41.10 (Cum. Supp. 1971) . 
Moreover, since all of the expenses of the Authonty 
must be paid from the revenues of the various projects 
in which it participates, S. C. Code Ann. ~ 22- 41.5 (Cum. 
Supp. 1971), none of the general revenues of South 
Carolina is used to support a project. 
On January 6, 1970, the College submitted to the 
Authority for preliminary approval an application for 
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the proposal, thP 
Authority would issue the bonds and make the pro-
ceeds available to the College for use in connection with 
a portion of its campus to be designated a project (the 
"Project") within the meaning of the Act. In return , 
the College would convey the Project, without cost, to 
the Authority, which would then lease the property so 
conveyed back to the College. After repayment in full 
of the bonds, the Project would be reconveyed to the 
College. The Authority granted preliminary approval 
on January 16, 1970, 255 S.C., at 76; 177 S. E. 2d, at 365. 
In its present form, the application requests the is-
suance of revenue bonds totaling $1,250,000, of which 
$1,050,000 would be applied to refund short term financ-
inlj'; of capital improvements and $200,000 would b~ 
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applied to the completion of dining hall facilit1es. 2 The 
advantage of financing educational institutions through 
a state created authority derives from relevant pro-
visions of federal and South Carolina state income tax 
laws which provide in effect that the interest on such 
bonds is not subject to income taxation. '1 The income tax 
exempt status of the interest enables the Authority, as 
an instrumentality of the State, to market the bonds at 
a significantly lower rate of interest than the educa-
tional institution would be forced to pay if it borrowed 
the money by conventional private financing. 
Because the College's application to the Authority wal:> 
a preliminary one. the details of the financing arrang;<' 
ment have not yet been fully worked out. But RulPb 
and Regulations adopted by the Authority govern cel-
tain of its aspects. See Jurisdictional Stat~:ment, Ap-
2 As originally ~ubmitted by the College and appro\'rcl hy t hr 
Authority, the• proposal callrcl for the issnnnrr of ''not rxrrrding 
$3,500,000 of revenue bonds. . .'' 255 S. C., at 75; 177 S. E 
2d, at 364. As mdicated by a sttpulation of counsel 111 tin;; Court , 
the College ~ubsequrntly :;rcmed a bank loan 111 t hr amount of 
$2,500,000 and 11ow propose::; til(' issuanrl' of only :)1 ,:2.50,000 m 
revrnue hone!~ under t hr Art, the proceed::; to hr n~rcl. 
" (i) to repay 1n full thr Collc•gp'~ Currrut Fund for the balamP 
(approximately 8:250,000) advanred to the Collegr ';; Plant Fund H:i 
aforr ·aid; (ti) to rrfund out:>tanding short-term loan~ in the amount 
of $800,000 whoHC' prorrrcb WPrP to pay off indrbtrchw:-;~ 11H'Ilrr<•d 
for capital imw ovrments, and (iti) to financr thr romplrtion of the 
d111ing hall facthtir:,; nt a co~t of approximatrl~· ;ll;200,000." (Emph:t 
siH in ongimd.) App .. p. 49 . 
" Grosl:l incomt· for federal mromt• tax purpo~r:,; dorl:i not mrludt• 
interest on " thr obligation:> of a Statr, a Terntory, or a po~;;e~~ton 
of the United State:>, or any political l:lubdivi~ion of any of thr 
foregoing. . ." 2t) U. S. C. § 10:3 (a) (1). For l:ltatr incomr tax 
purpol:le::;, grm;l:i mromr dors not include interrl:lt "upo11 obliga t ionH 
of tlw United Statr::; or itl:l JlOi:il:lel:ll:liOlll:i or of thts State or an~ 
political i:iUbdivil:lion thereof . " S. C. C'odr Ann. § 65- :25:3 (4)1 
(Cum. Supp. 1971) 
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pendix C. pp. 47-51. Every lease agreement between the 
Authority and an institution must contain a clause 
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased 
land, nor any facility located thereon, shall be used 
for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious 
worship. or in connection with any part of the pro-
gram of a school or department of divinity of any 
religious denomination." - S. C. , at --; 187 
S. E. 2d, at 647. 
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agree-
ment must allow the Authority to conduct inspections, 
and any reconveyance to the College must . ~ontain a 
restriction against use for sectarian purposes.' The Rules 
further provide that simultaneously with the execution 
4 Rulr 4 rrlating to the Lease Agreement prov1rle~ m part that · 
"If the Lease Agreement contains a provision prrm1tting the Inst i-
tution to rrpurchase the project upon paymrnt of the bond~, tlwn 
in such inRtancr tlw Lease Agrrrment ~hall provHir th;d thr DC'ed 
of reconveyance from the Authority to t be lnst1t u t 1011 shall be mad(' 
subject to the condition that so long a::; the Institution, or any 
voluntary grantre of the Institution, shall own t hr !rased prrm1~rs, 
or any part t hrreof, that no facility tberron, financed in wholr or 
in part with the proceeds of the bond~. ~hall l>r usrd for sectanan 
instructiOn or as a placr of rrligious worship, or used in connrctwn 
with any part of the program of a school or drpartment of divinitr 
of any rrligiou~ drnomination" - S. C'., at - li\i S. E. :Zd , at 
647-64.'1. 
The H.ule go(·~ on to allow the institutiOn to rrmovP tlns optl()ll Ill 
the case of Jllvoluntary salrs : 
"The conditiOn may provide, at the option of llw lnstitutwn, that 
if the leased premises shall become the subject of an involuntary 
judicial sal<' , a;; a result of any foreclosme of any mortgage, or tmlr 
pun;uant to any order of any court, that the t1tlr to be vrstrd m 
any purchasrr at :;ncb judicial ::;ale, other than thr Institution , shall 
be in fee ::;imple and shall be free of the conditwn applicable to tlw 
Institution or any voluntary grantee thrreof." - S C., at - ; 
187 S. E. 2d, at G48. Ser n. 6. infra. 
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of the lease agreement, the Authority and the trustee 
bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would 
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseable 
mortgage lien on the Project property including a mort~ 
gage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority iu 
and to the lease agreement.'' Jurisdictional fitatement . 
Appendix C, p. 50. 
Our consideration of appellant's Establishment Clause 
claim extends only to the proposal as approved pre~ 
liminarily with such additions as are contemplated by 
the Act, the rules, and the decisions of the courts below. 
II 
This Court has recently had occasion to synthesize the 
principles which govern our consideration of challenges 
to statutes as violative of the Establishment Clause . 
"Three . . . tests may be gleaned from our cases. 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must 
be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion, . . . ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an 
excessive entanglement with religion.' " Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., at 612-613. 
With full recognition that these are no more than help-
ful signposts, we consider the present statute and the 
proposed transactiou in terms of the three "tests". pur-
pose, effect, and entanglement. 
A 
The purpose of the statute is manifestly a secular one. 
The benefits of the Act are available to all institutions 
of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not 
having a religious affiliation. While a legislature's decla-
ration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its. 
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true intent. appellant makes no suggestion that the in-
troductory paragraph of the Act represents anything 
other than a good faith statement of purpose: 
"It is hereby declared that for the benefit of the 
people of the State. the increase of their commerce, 
welfare and prosperity and the improvement of 
their health and living conditions it is essential that 
this and future generations of youth be given the 
fullest opportunity to learn and to develop their 
intellectual and mental capacities; that it is es-
sential that institutions for higher education within 
the State be provided with appropriate additional 
means to assist such youth in achieving the required 
levels of learning and development of their intel-
lectual and mental capacities; and that it is the 
purpose of this section to provide a measure of as-
sistance and an alternative method to enable in-
stitutions for higher education in the Rtate to pro-
vide the facilities and structures which are sorely 
needed to accomplish the purposes of this act, all 
to the public benefit and good, to the extent and 
manner provided herein." S. C. Code Ann. ~ 22.41 
(Cum. Supp. 1971) . 
The College and other private institutiOns of higher 
education provide these benefits to the State." As of the 
academic year 1969-1970, there were 1,54~ students 
5ln Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. . 2:3G ( 19fl8), this Court 
commented on the importance of the role of private rducation m 
this country: 
"Underlying thesP cases, and undrrlying also tlw IPgislativf' judg-
ments that have preceded the court dPcisions, has brPn a recogmtion 
that private education has played and is playing a significant and 
valuable rolf in raising national levels of knowledge , competence, and 
experience." 392 U. S., at 247. 
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enrolled in the College, in addition to approximately 600 
night students. Of these students, 95% are residents of 
South Carolina who are thereby receiving a college edu-
cation without financial support from the State of South 
Carolina. 
B 
To identify "primary effect," we narrow our focus from 
the statute as a whole to the only transaction presently 
before us. Whatever may be its initial appeal, the prop-
osition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any pro-
gram which in some manner aids an institution with a 
religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. E. g., 
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Tilton v. Richardson, 
supra. Stated another way, the Court has not accepted 
the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because 
aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its 
other resources on religious ends. 
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect. 
of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in 
which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion I 
of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or· 
when it funds a specifically religious activity in an other-
wise substantially secular setting. In Tilton v. Richard-
son, supra, the Court refused to strike down a direct 
federal grant to four colleges and universities in Con-
necticut. Mn. CHIEF JuSTICE BuRGER, for the plurality, 
concluded that despite some institutional rhetoric, none 
of the four colleges was pervasively sectarian, but held 
open that possibility for future cases: 
"Individual projects can be properly evaluated if 
and when challenges arise with respect to particular 
recipients and some evidence is then presented to 
show that the institution does in fact possess these. 
cha.,racteristics." 403 U. S., at 682. 
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Appellant has introduced no evidence in the present 
case placing the College in such a category. It is true 
that the members of the College Board of Trustees are 
elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention, that 
the approval of the Convention is required for certaiu 
financial transactions, and that the charter of the College' 
may be amended only by the Convention. But it was 
likewise true of the institutions involved in 'l'ilton that 
they were "governed by Catholic religious organizations.!' 
403 U. S., at 686. What little there is in the record con-
cerning the College establishes that there are no re-
ligious qualifications for faculty membership or student 
admission, and that only 60 <,Yr of the College student body 
is Baptist. a percentage roughly equivalent to the p<'l 
centage of Baptists in that area of South Carolina. 
255 S.C., at 85; 177 S. E. 2d, at 369. On thE' record 11 1 
this case there is no basis to conclude that the College's 
operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian 
rather than secular education. 
Nor ca.n we conclude that the proposed transactiOn d 
will place the Authority in the position of proviclinJ'i'cc• ft~ 
the religious as opposed to the secular activities of th~: \ 
College. The scope of the Authority 's power ·to as~H>t 
institutions of higher education extends only to "pro,1 
ects." and the Act specifically states that a project "shall 
not includp" any buildings or facilities us<'d for t<'ligio tl~ 
purposes . In the absence of c•vidence to th<> contrary . 
we mu~t assume that all of the proposed finaucing all(! 
refinancing relates to buildings and facilit!Cs within a 
properly delimited project. It is not at all clear from 
the record that the portion of the campus to be conveyed 
by the College to the Authority and leased back is th<' 
same as that being financed. but in any event it too must 
be part of the Project and subject to the same prohibition 
against usC' for religious purposes. In addition. as wP 
have indicatf'd . f'vcry lPase agrecnwnt must contain a, 
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clause forbidding religious use and another allowing in· 
spections to enforce the agreement.u For these reasons, 
we are satisfied that implementation of the proposal will 
not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting 
religion. 7 
0 Appf'llant also takes issue with thf' Authority's rule allowing a 
purchaser at an involuntary ,;ale to take title free of restrictions as 
to religious use. Sec n. 4. ante. Appellant's rrlianre on Tilton 
v. Richardson, supra, in this respect is misplacf'd. There , the Court 
strnck down a provision under which the churrh-relatf'd colleges 
would have unrr~trirted use of a federally financed project after 
20 ~·ea r,;. In the present case, b~· contrast, the restriction against 
religious use is lifted not as to the institution seeking the assistance 
of the Authority nor as to voluntary transferees, but only as to a 
purchaser at a judicial sale. Because some other religious institution 
bidding for the property at a judicial sale could purchase the prop-
erty only by outbidding all other prospective purchasers, there is 
only a speculative po~sibility that the absence of a use limitation 
would ever afford aid to religion. Even in .such an event, the 
acquiring religious institution presumably would have had to pay 
the then fair value of the property. 
7 The "state aid" involved in this case is of a vrry special sort. 
We have here no expenditure of public funds, either b~· grant or 
loan, no reimbursement by a State for expenditures made b~· a 
parochial school or college, and no extending or committing of a 
State'~ credit. Hather, the on!~· state aid consists, not of financial 
assistancr direct!~· or indirectly which would implicatr public funds 
or credit, but the creation of an instrumentality (thr Authorit~·) 
through which rduf'a tiona! institutions ma~· borrow funds on thr· 
ha;;iH of th(•ir own credit and thr sccmit~· of their own property 
upon morr favorablt• interr:<t term~ thnn otherwise would be avail-
ablr. The Suprrme Court of New Jer::;ey characterized the assist-
ance rendered an rducational institution undrr an act generally 
,;imilar to the South Carolina Art a" mere!~· being a "governmental 
,;ervire." Clayton v. Ketvick. 56 N . .T. 523, 530-531, 267 A. 2d 
503, 506-507 (1970). The South Carolina Supreme Comt, in the 
opinion below, de~rribed the rol(' of the State as that of a "mere 
conduit." - S. C., at -; 1R7 S. E. 2d. at 650. Because we 
conclude that the primar~· effect of the al:'::;i~tance afforded h('re is 
neither to advanrr nor to inhibit religion under Lemon and Tilton, 
we need not decide whether, n:; appellee argues, Appellee's Brief, p. 
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c 
The final question posed by this case is whether under 
the arrangement there would be an unconstitutional de-
gree of entanglement betv.-een the State and the College. 
Appellant argues that the Authority would becomr in-
volved in the operation of the College both by inspecting 
the project to insure that it is not being used for religwm; 
purposes and by participating in the management de-
cisions of thr College. 
The Court's opinion in Lemo11 and the plurality opw-
ion in Tilton arc grounded on the proposition that the 
degree of entanglement arising from inspection of fa-
cilities as to use varies in large measure with the extent 
to which religion permeates the institution . In findmg 
excessive entanglement, the Court in Lemon relied ou 
the "substantial religious character of these church-
related" elementary schools. 403 U. ::-3 •• at 616. MR. 
CHIEF JusTICE BunGER's opinion for the plurality 1n 
Tilton placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the 
federal aid there approved would be spent 111 a college 
setting : 
"'Since religious IIH.loctrmation 1s not a substan-
tial purpose or activity of these church-related col-
leges and universities, there is less likelihood than 
m primary and secondary schools that rrligion will 
permeate tlw area of secular educatiOn ·· 403 1'. :..; 
at. 6R7 
Although MIL JusTICE WHITE saw no such clear chstll1(' 
tion, he concurred in tlw result, statin11, 
"It 1s enough for me that . . the .Frderal Govrn1 
ment lis] financing a separable fuuctwn of over-
14, the Importance' of th C' tax exemptiOn m the South Carohna 
scheme bring~ the present ca;;r undl'r Wa/z v. Tax C'omm'n, supm, 
whC're th1~ Conrt upheld a !oral property tax Pxc>mpt 1011 whirh lll -
rluded rrligwu~ mstit ut10no<. 
12 
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riding importance in order to sustain the legislation 
here challenged." 403 U. S., at 664. 
A majority of the Court in Tilton., then, concluded that 
on the facts of that case inspection as to use did not 
threaten excessive entanglement. As we have indicated 
above, there is no evidence here to demonstrate that tho 
College is any more an instrument of religious indoctrina., 
tion than were the colleges and universiti0s ipvolved it) 
TiUon" 8 
A closer 1ssue under our precedents is presented .by 
the contention that the Authority could become deeply 
involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions 
of the College. The Authority is empowered by the Act : 
"(g) [g]enerally, to fix and revise from time to 
time and charge and collect rates, rents, fees and 
charges for the use of and for the services furmshed 
or to be furnished by a project or any portion thereof 
and to contract with any person, partnership, asso-
ciation or corporation or other body public or pn-
vate in respect thereof; 
"(h) to establish rules and regulatwns for the use 
of a project or any portion thereof and to designate 
a participating institution for higher education as 
its agent to establish rules and regulations for tht> 
R Although th(• rt•cord m thi~ ca~r ~~ ;~bbr!:'vwtell aud not fret · 
from ambiguity, tht• burdrn re~t~:> on appellant to ~:>how t br extent 
I o· which the Collrgr i~ church-relat!:'d, cf. Board of Ed·ucatwn 1'. 
ALlen, supra, :~92 U. S., at 24~, and he has faded to ~how morr 
than a formali~t1c church reJationshtp. A~ Tilton r:stablished, for-
mal denominational control over a liberal art8 college does not 
render all aid to the institution a vwlation of thr Establi~:>hmrnt 
Clau;;e. So far a::; the record here is concerned, thrre is no showing 
that. the College places any sprcial emphasis on Bapti~t denomma-
twnal or any other ~ectarian type of education. As noted ftbove, 
both the faculty and the student body arr open to perHOU>< of any 
(or no) religiou~ affiliation, 
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use of a project undertaken for such participating 
institution for higher education. " S. C. Code 
Ann. ~ 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971). 
These powers are sweeping ones, and were there a 
realistic likelihood that they would be exercised in their 
full detail, thr entanglement problems with the pro· 
posed transaction would not be insignificant. 
As the South Carolina Supreme Court pointed out, 
the Act was patterned closely after the South Carolina 
Industrial Revenue Bond Act, - S. C., at -; 1X7 
S. E. 2d, at 651, and perhaps for this reason appears to 
confer unnecessarily broad power and responsibility on 
the Authority. The opinion of that court, how('ver, re~ 
fleets a narrow interpretation of the practical operation 
of these powers. 
"Counsel for plaintiff argues that thP broad lan 
guage of the Act causes the State, of necessity, to 
become excessively involved in the operatiOn, man-
agement and administration of the College. We do 
not so construe the Act. l Tl he basic functwn 
of the Authority is to see ... that fees are charged 
sufficieut to meet the bond paymrnts · S C 
at -, 187 S. E . 2d, at 651 
As we read the College's proposal, the Lease Agreement 
between the Authority and the College w1ll place on thl' 
College the responsibility for making the drtailed de-
cisions regarding the government of the campus and the 
fees to be charged for particular services. ~pecifically 
the proposal states that the Lease Agreement 
"will unconditionally obligate the College (aJ to 
pay sufficient rentals to meet the principal and m 
terest requirements as they become du<' on such 
bonds, [and] (b) to impose an adequate schedule of 
charges and fees in order to provide adequate r<'v~>-
14. 
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nues with which to operate and maintain the said 
facilities and to make thf' rental payments .. . .'' 
App. , p . 18. 
In short, under the proposed Lease Agreement, neither 
the Authority nor a trustee bank would be Justified 1n 
taking action unless the College fails to make the pre-
scribed rental payments or otherwise defaults in 1tR 
obligations. Only if the C::ollege refused to meet rental 
payments or was unable to do so would the Authority 
or the trustee be obligated to take further aetwn . In 
that event, the Authority or trustee might either for1 · 
clDse on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting of 
rules, charges, and fees. 1 t may be argued that only 
the former would be consistent with the Establishment. 
Clause, but Wf' do not now have that situation before UR. 
nr 
This case comes to us as an actwn for mJunctive and 
declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of th(' 
Act as applied to a proposed-rather than au actual-
issuance of revenue bonds. The specifie provisions of 
the Act under which the bonds will be issued, the Rules 
and Regulations of the Authority, and the College's pro-
posal-all as interpreted by the South Carolina Supreme 
Court-confine the scope of the assistance to the secular 
aspf'cts of this liberal arts college and do not forcshadov. 
excessive entanglement between the Htate and reli~wn 
Accordingly , we affirm the holding of the court below 
that the Act is constitutional as intf'rprf'ted and appliPrl 
Ln thJR caRe·. 
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Richard W. Hunt, Appellant, 
v. 
Robert E. MeN air, Governor 
of South Carolina, et al. 
.- ,n-1-rn··,, '"'.J·r' 1: 
On Appeal from the Su-
preme Court of South 
Carolina 
[June --, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Appellant. a South Carolina taxpayer, brought this 
action to challenge the South Carolina Educational 
Facilities Act (the "Act"), S. C. Code Ann. ~~ 22-41 
et seq. (Cum . Supp. 1971), as violative of the Establish ~ 
ment Clause of the First Amendment iusofar as it au~ 
thorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the 
issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of the Baptist 
College at Charleston (the "College") .' ThE' trial court 's 
denial of relief was affirmed by thE' t;uprE'me Court of 
South Carolina. 255 S. C'. 71 , 177 S. E. 2d :362 ( 1070) 
This Court vacated the judgment and remanded the casP 
for reconsideration in light of the intervening dE>cisions in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 l '. S. 602 ( 1971); Earley \ . 
DiCenso, 40:~ U. S. 602 (11)71); Robin.son v. DiCe-nso , 
403 U. S. 602 ( 1971); and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U. S. 672 (1971). 403 U. S. 945 (1971). On remand, 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina adhered to Jts 
1 At variou~ pomt~ during th1 · ht1gation, appellant ha;; made· 
reference to the Free Exerc1se Clause of the Fin;t Amendment, 
but has made no arguments ,;pccifically addres.sed to vwlation:; of 
that clause except insofar a:; thi~; Court'8 approach to ca8es jnvolv --
tng the Relig10n Clau8e<> represents an i11teraction of the two. 
clauses. 
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earlier position. - S. C. -, 187 S. E. 2d 645 (1972). 
We affirm. 
I 
We begin by setting out the general structure of the 
Act. The Act established an Educational Facilities Au-
thority (the "Authority"), the purpose of which is "to 
assist institutions for higher education in the construc-
tion, financing and refinancing of projects .... ", S. C. 
Code Ann. § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971), primarily 
through the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms 
of the Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities, 
site preparation and related items, but may not include 
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian m-
struction or as a place of religious worship nor any 
facility which is used or to be used primarily in 
connection with any part of the program of a school 
or department of divinity for any religious denomi-
nation.'' S. C. Code Ann. ~ 22-41.2 {b) (Cum. 
Supp. 1971). 
Correspondingly. the Authority is accorded certam pow-
ers over the project, including the powers to determine· 
the fees to be charged for the use of the project and to· 
establish regulations for its use. See pp. ---, infra. 
While revPnue bonds to be used in connection with 
a project an' issued by the Authority, the Act is quite· 
explicit that the bonds shall not be obligations of the 
State, directly or indirectly : 
"Revenue bonds issued under the provisions of 
this chapter shall not be deemed to constitute a 
debt or liability of the State or of any political sub-
division thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit 
of the State or of any such political subdivision, but 
shall be payable solely from the funds herein pro-
vided therefor from revenues. All such revenue 
bonds shall contain on the face thereof a statement. 
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to the effect that neither the State of South Car-
olina nor the Authority shall be obligated to pay 
the same or the interest thereon except from reve-
nues of the project or the portion thereof for which 
they are issued and that neither the faith and credit 
nor the taxing power of the State of South Carolina 
or of any political subdivision thereof is pledged to 
the payment of the principal of or the interest 011 
such bonds. The issuance of revenue bonds under 
the provisions of this act shall not directly or in-
directly or contingently obligate the State or any 
political subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any 
form of taxation whatever therefor or to make any 
appropriation for their payment." S. C. Code Ann 
§ 22-41.10 (Cum. Supp. 1971) 
Moreover, since all of the expenses of the Authonty 
must be paid from the revenues of the various projects 
in which it participates, S. C. Code Ann . ~ 22-41.5 (Cum. 
Supp. 1971), none of the general revenues of South 
Carolina is used to support a project. 
On January 6, 1970, the College submitted to the 
Authority for preliminary approval an application for 
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the proposal, tlw 
Authority would issue the bonds and make the pro-
ceeds available to the College for use in connection with 
a portion of its campus to be designated a project (the 
"Project") within the meaning of the Act. In return, 
the College would convey the Project, without cost, to 
the Authority, which would then lease the property so 
conveyed back to the College. After repayment in full 
of the bonds, the Project would be reconveyed to the 
College. The Authority granted preliminary approval 
on January 16, 1970. 255 S.C., at 76; 177 S. E. 2d, at 365. 
In its present form, the application requests the is-
suance of revenue bonds totaling $1,250,000, of which 
$1,050,000 would be applied to refund short term financ-
m~ of capital improvements and $200,000 would b~ 
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applied to the completion of dining hall facilit1es. 2 The 
advantage of financing educational institutions through 
a state created authority derives from relevant pro-
visions of federal and South Carolina tate income tax 
laws which provide in effect that the interest on such 
bonds is not subject to income taxation." The income tax 
exempt status of the interest enables the Authority, as 
an instrumentality of the State, to market the bonds at 
a significantly lower rate of interest than the educa-
tional institution would be forced to pay if it borrov,:ed 
the money by conventional private financing. 
Because the College's application to the Authority wa:. 
a preliminary one. the details of the financing arrange-
ment have not yet been fully \VOrked out. But RulPt> 
and Regulations adopted by the Authority govern cPt-
tain of its aspects. See Jurisdictional Statf'ment, Ap-
2 As originally :submittPd by thr Collrgr and approvrd hy t hr 
Authority, thr propo~al callrd for thr i~:;uaurr of "not rxcerding 
$3,500,000 of rrvenur bonds. . .'' 255 S. C., at 75; 177 S. E 
2d, at 364. A:s mdicatrd by a ~t 1pulation of coun:,;p] m t h1;; Court , 
the College ~ub:;cqurntly ;;ecmPd n bank loan 111 thr :nnount of 
$2,500,000 and now propo~e:; t hP J ;;~>twnc(' of only Sl ,2.50,000 111 
revcnur bomb undrr th<' Act, thr procpp(li:; to br u;;rd. 
"( i) to rrpay 111 full thP Collrgp';; Currrnt Fund for thr balaJH'l' 
(approximatrly 8250,000) advnncrd to thr Collrgr ':; Plant Fund a:; 
aforr~aid; (1i) to rrfund out:;tancling :,;hort-tri'lil lonn~ in thr amount 
of $800,000 wlwHe prorred~ WPrP to pay off indebtednp;.,; incl!lTPd 
for capital im]ll'ovements, and (i1i) to finnncr thr romplPtion of tlw 
dming hnll fac!IJtiP::> at n co~t of approximately ));200,000." (Empbn 
:;i:; in onginal.) App .. p. 49. 
" Oro:;~ mcomP for federal mcom(• tax purpo~r:; dorti not mrludP 
interest on " thP obligation;; of a Statr, a Trrntory, or a pot:~~e~~1on 
of thr Unitrd Stntes, or nn~· political subdiv1~ion of any of tlw 
foregomg. " 2!) U. S. C. § 10:3 (a) ( 1). For :;tate mcome tax 
purpo:;e:;, gro~~ IIH'ome doe;; nor include int rre;;! "upon obliga t wn~ 
of tho United States or it:; po:;;;r:;;;ion:; or of this State or :111) 
political ::;nbdivi:;ion thereof . " S. C. Code Ann. § ()5-25:3 (4 )
1 
(Cum. Supp. 1971) 
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pendix C, pp. 47-51. Every lease agreement between the 
Authority and an institution must contaiu a clause 
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased 
land, nor any facility located thereon, shall be used 
for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious 
worship, or in connection with any part of the pro-
gram of a school or department of divinity of any 
religious denomination." -- S. C. , at --; 187 
S. E. 2d, at 647. 
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agree-
ment must allow the Authority to conduct inspections, 
and any reconveyance to the College must . ~ontain a 
restriction against use for sectarian purposes.' The Rules 
further provide that simultaneously with the execution 
4 Rule 4 rf'latmg to the Lease Agreement provide~ m part that · 
"If the Lease Agref'ment contains a provi:,;ion pf'rmttting thr In~t I -
tution to rrpurchasf' the project upon payment of thf' bonds, tl1C'n 
in such instance t hr Lease Agrf'f'ment :-;hall provl(l<• that thr DPcd 
of reconvryance from the Authority to the ln:;titutwn shall br madr 
subject to the condition that so long nH tlw lm;titution, or an~ 
voluntar~· grantrf' of the Institution, ;;hall own thr !rased prrmi;;r,;, 
or any part therf'of, that no facility thrrron , financed in wholr 01 
in part with the proceed;; of the bond;;, ::;hall bf' u:;rd for "t'<'tanan 
instructwn or al:i a plncf' of religwus worship, or used 111 connrettoll 
with any pnrt of the program of a school or drpartment of divmit~· 
of any rrligiou;; drnomination " - S C'. , at -. lRi S. E. :2d . al 
G47-64H. 
The Rul<' gm·,., on to allow tlw in~titutwn to rrniov<· tins optwn Ill 
the case of mvoluntary sales: 
"The conditiOn may provide, at the option of tlw Institution, that 
if the lf'ased premises :;hall become the subject of an involuntary 
judicial :;air, a;; a result of any foreclosure of any mortgage, or :,;ale 
pursuant to any order of any court, that the titlr to be vested 111 
any purcha:;er at such judicial sale, other than the Institution, ;;hall 
be in fee simple and shall be frre of thr conditiOn apphcable to tlw 
Institution or any voluntary grantee thereof" - S. C., at - ; 
187 S. E 2d, at 648. See n. 6. infra. 
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of the lease agreement, the Authority and the trustee 
bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would 
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseable 
mortgage lien on the Project property including a mort-
gage on the "right, title and interest of thE' Authority iu 
and to the lease agreement.'' Jurisdictional Statemcu t. 
Appendix C. p. 50. 
Our consideration of appellant's Establishment Clause 
claim extends only to the proposal as approved pre-
liminarily with such additions as are contemplated by 
the Act, thE' rules, and the decisions of the courts below. 
II 
This Court has recently had occasion to synthesize the' 
principles which govern our consideration of challengPs 
to statutes as violative of the Establishment Clause 
"Three . . tests may be gleaned from our cases. 
First, the statute must have a secular legislatiVE' 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must 
be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion, . . . ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an 
excessive entanglement with religion .' " Lemon v 
Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., at 612-613. 
With full recognition that these are no more than help-
ful signposts, we consider the present statute and the 
proposed transaction in terms of thP three "tests". pur-
pose, effect, and entanglement. 
A 
The purpose of the statute is manifestly a secular one. 
The benefits of the Act are available to all institutions 
of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not 
having a religious affiliation. While a legislature's decla-
ration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its. 
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true intent, appellaut makes no suggestion that the in-
troductory paragraph of the Act represents anything 
other than a good faith statement of purpose: 
"It is hereby declared that for the benefit of the 
people of the State. the increase of their commerce, 
welfare and prosperity and the improvement of 
their health and living conditions it is essential that 
this and future generations of youth be given the 
fullest opportunity to learn and to develop their 
intellectual and mental capacities; that it is es-
sential that institutions for higher education within 
the State be provided with appropriate additional 
means to assist such youth in achieving the required 
levels of learning and development of their intel -
lectual and mental capacities; and that it is the 
purpose of this section to provide a measure of as-
sistance and an alternative method to enable in-
stitutions for higher education in the State to pro-
vide the facilities and structures which are sorely 
needed to accomplish the purposes of this act, all 
to the public benefit and good, to the extent and 
manner provided herein." S. C. Code Ann. ~ 22.41 
(Cum. Supp. 1971) . 
The College and other private institutiOns of higher 
education provide these benefits to the State." As of the 
academic year 1969-1970, there were 1,54~ students 
5 In Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 2:3() (19fi8) , tht~ Court 
commented on the importance of thr role of pnvatr education in 
this country : 
"Underlying these cases, and underlying abo tlw lrgislativ<' judg-
ments that have preceded the court d<'cisions, has been a recognition 
that privat<' education has played and is playing a significant and 
valuable rol<' 111 ntising national levels of knowl<'dge, comp<'tenr<', and 
e>.:perience." 392 U. S., at 247. 
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enrolled in the College. in addition to approximately 600 
night students. Of these students, 95% are residents of 
South Carolina who are thereby receiving a college edu-
cation without financial support from the State of South 
Carolina. 
B 
To identify "primary effect," we narrow our focus from 
the statute as a whole to the only transaction presently 
before us. Whatever may be its initial appeal, the prop·· 
osition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any pro-
gram which in some manner aids an institution with a 
religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. E. g. , 
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899) ; Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Tilton v. Richardson, 
supra. Stated another way, the Court has not accepted 
the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because 
aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its 
other resources on religious ends. 
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect. 
of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in 
which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion / 
of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or 
when it funds a specifically religious activity in an other-
wise substantially secular setting. In Tilton v. Richard-
son, supra, the Court refused to strike down a direct 
federal gran t to four colleges aud uuiversities in Cou-
necticut . MH. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER, for the plurality , 
concluded that despite some institutional rhetoric, none 
of the four colleges was pervasively sectarian, but held 
open that possibility for future cases : 
"Individual projects can be properly evaluated if 
and when challenges arise with respect to particular 
recipients and some evidence is then presented to 
show that the institution does in fact possess these. 
Gharacteristics." 403 U. S., at 682.. 
71-1523-0PINION 
HUNT v. McNAIR 
Appellant has introduced no evidence in the present 
case placing the College in such a category. It is true 
that the members of the College Board of Trustee!' are 
elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention, that 
the approval of the Convention is required for certain 
financial transactions, and that the charter of the College' 
may be amended only by the Convention. But it was 
likewise true of the institutions involved in Tilton that 
they were "governed by Catholic religious organizations.,' 
403 U. S., at 686. What little there is in the record con-
cerning the College establishes that there are no re-
ligious qualifications for faculty membership or student 
admission , and that only 60% of the College student bo<.ly 
is Baptist, a percentage roughly equiva!Pnt to the pc•r 
centage of Baptists in that area of South Carolina 
255 S. C., at 85; 177 S. E. 2d, at 369. On tlw rceord ll l 
this case there is no basis to conclude that the College's 
operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian 
rather than secular education. 
Nor can we conclude that the proposed transact10nr 
will place the Authority in the position of proviclin~ t:tt'd 
the religious as opposed to the secular activities of thP 
College. ThP scope of the Authority 's power to ass1st 
institutions of higher eclucation extends only to "pro.1 
ects." and the Act specifically states that a project "shall 
not include, '' any buildings or facilities used for tPli giotl~ 
purposes. l11 the absence of evidence> to the contrary . 
we must assu11w that all of the proposed financing and 
refinancing relates to buildings and facilitJCs within a 
properly delimited prOJect. [t is not at all clear fron1 
the record that the portion of the campus to be conveyed 
by the College to the Authority and leased back is thP 
sanw as that being financed. but in any event it too must 
he part of the Project and subject to the same prohibition 
against usc' for religious purposes. f n addition. as we· 
have indicated. every lE'ase agreenH'nt must contain 8, 
+o 
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clause forbidding religious use and another allowing in-
spections to enforce the agreement.'; For these reasons, 
we are satisfied that implementation of the proposal will 
not have the primary effect of ac.lvancing or inhibiting 
religion. 7 
11 Apprllant abo take:; i::;,;ue with thr Authorit~··~ rulr allowing a 
purcha:ser at 1111 involuntar~· salr to take t itlr frer of rr~trirtion~ a~ 
to religious 11~r. See n. 4. aute. ApJlPllant '~ n·lianrr on Tilton 
v. Richardson. :;upra. in this rt?::;prct i,.; mi:splarrd . Thrrr, the Court· 
struck down a provi:sion under whirh the churrh-rC'la trd colll?ges 
wo11ld hnvP unrr~trirtrd u;;e of a fedl?l'ally finan<·Nl project aftet 
20 yrar~. In the present ca:se, b~· contrn:st, the re::;trictiou ngainst 
religion::; u:;e i::; lifted not ns to the in:stit ution :seeking the assistance 
of the Authorit~· nor as to voluntary transft?ri?P~ , but onl~· as to a 
purchaser at a judirial :sale. Bt?cause :some other religious inHtitution 
bidding for the property at a judicial salt? could purcha::;p 1 he prop-
erty onl~· b~ · out bidding all other prospt?ct ive purchasers, there i:s-
only a ::;pt?culativp po:;;.;ibility that tht? ab:;eJH'e of a UHe limitntion 
would Pvl?r afford aiel to rrligion . EvPn in ::;uch an evrnt, the 
acq11iring religion:; in:stitution pre::;umabl~· woHlcl have had to pay 
tht? tht?n fair valuP of the propert~·. 
7 The "::;tate aid" involved in thi::; ca:sl? is of a very spt?rial ~ort. 
We have here no Pxpenditurr of publir f11nds , either b~ · grant or 
loan, no reimbm:sement by a State for expenditure;.; made b~· a 
parochial ~chool or collrge, and no extending or t'ommitt ing of a 
State'" credit. Rather, the onl~· :state aid con:;i:;t:;, uot of financial 
assistnnce direct!~· or indirectl~· which wo11ld implicat<• public fund::; 
or crPdit, but the crration of an in::;trumentalit~ · (the Authorit~·) 
t hmugh whi<·h P<iu<"ational in;.;tit ut ion~ ma~· bonow fund,.: ott tlH'· 
l!a:;i:-< of tlwir own c·redit and thP "<'<'lll'it~· of th<•ir O\\'n propert~· 
upon mon• fa\·ornbl<o intNe,.:t t<•rm;-; than otlwrwi~<· would ])(' antil-
able. The Supreme Court of i'\f'w .Trr~e~· charaeterizrd the n~o<:;i~t­
ancr rrnderrd an rducational in~titution 1mcler an net generally 
~imilar to thr South Carolina Al't a~ merd~· being a "govemmental 
~ervire." Cla!J(UII \', Kervirk. 56 X . .T. 5:2:3, s:3o-s:n, :207 A. 2d 
5o:3, 506-507 (1970). The South Carolina Supreme Court, in the 
opinion below, de;.;cribed the roll? of the State a~ that of a '· mere· 
ronduit." - S. C., nt -: 187 S. E. 2d, at 650. Brcau~e wr 
concludl' that t lw prima r~· l'ffeet of the a:;~i;-;tanrc nfforc!NI hrrr i;; 
nrither to advanr<' nor to inhibit religion undrr Lemon and TiLton , 
we nc<·d not decide whetlwr. a~ appellee argue~. Appellee'~ Brief, p. 
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The final question posed by this case is whether under 
the arrangement there would be an unconstitutional de-
gree of entanglement between the State and the College. 
Appellant argues that the Authority would become in-
volved in the operation of the College both by inspecting 
the project to insure that it is not being used for religious 
purposes and by participating in the management. de-
cisions of the College. 
The Court's opinion in Lemon and the plurality opill-
ion in Tilton are grounded on the proposition that the 
degree of entanglement arising from inspection of fa-
cilities as to use varies in large measure with the Pxtent 
to which religion permeates the institution. ln finding 
excessive entanglement, the Court in Lemon relied 011 
the "substantial religious character of these church -
related'' elementary schools. 403 U. S .. at 616. MR. 
CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER's opinion for the plurality m 
Tilton placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the 
federal aid there approved would be spent 111 a college 
setting : 
"'Rince religious indoctrination IS not a substan-
tial purpose or activity of these church-related col-
leges allCI universities, there is less likelihood than 
In primary alld secondary schools that religion will 
permeate the area of secular education ·· 403 U. ~ 
at 6R7, 
Although MR. JusTICE WHITE saw no such clear distme· 
tion, he concurred in the result, stating 
"It IS enough for me that ... the Federal Govern -
ment [is] financing a separable functwn of over-
14, the 1mportanct> of the tax exemptwn in tht> South Carolina 
scheme brings the present ca~r under Walz v. Tax Cornm'n, supra, 
whrrr this Court upheld a local property tnx PXE'mption which lll· 
eluded reJigio11S institution::<. 
12 
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riding importance in order to sustain the legislatiOn 
here challenged.'' 403 U. S., at 664. 
A majority of the Court in Tilton., then, concluded that 
on the facts of that case inspection as to use did not 
threaten excessive entanglement. As we have indicated 
above, there is no evidence here to demonstrate that the 
College is any more an instrument of religious indoctrina, 
tion than were the colleges and universiti0s ip volv~d ill 
TiUon. 8 
A closer Issue under our precedents is presented .by 
the contention that the Authority could become deeply 
involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions 
of the College. The Authority is empowered by the> Act . 
" (g) [ g j enerally. to fix and revise from time to 
time and charge and collect rates, rents. fees and 
charges for the use of and for the servJCes furmshed 
or to be furnished by a project or any portion thereof 
and to contract with any person, partnership, asso-
ciation or corporation or other body public or pn-
vate in respect thereof; 
"(h) to establish rules and regulatiOns for the use 
of a project or any portion thereof and to designate 
a participating institution for higher education as 
its agent to establish rules and regulations for the· 
'Althongb the n·corcl 111 tb1H ca~r Js :lbbrl:'vwtc·<.l ami not tn·c· 
!'rom ambiguity, the burden rests on appellant to show thr rxtrnt 
to· which the College is churcb-rrlated, cf. Board of Education v. 
Allen, supra., 392 U. S., at 24t-J, and he has failrd to show morr 
than a formalistic church relatwnslnp. A;; TiLton rstablished, for-
mal denominatwnal control over a liberal arts college dors not 
render all aid to the institution a vwlation of thr Establishment 
Clause. So far as the record here is concerned, there IS no showing 
that the College places any sp<:>cial empha~is on Baptist denomma-
twnal or any other sectarian type of education. As noted above, 
both the faculty and th<:> student body arc open to persons of any 
(or no) rrligiou~ aiftliation, 
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use of a project undertaken for such participating 
institution for higher education. " S. C. Code 
Ann. ~ 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971). 
These powers are sweeping ones, and were there a 
realistic likelihood that they would be exercised in thPJr 
full detail, the entanglement problems with the pro· 
posed transaction would not be insignifiran t . 
As the South Carolina Supreme Court pointed out, 
the Act was patterned closely after the Houth Carolina 
Industrial Revenue Bond Act, - S. C., at -; 1X7 
S. E. 2d, at 651, and perhaps for this reason appears to 
co:p.fer unnecessarily broad power and responsibility on 
the Authority. The opinion of that court, hov;rever, n'-
ftects a narrow interpretation of the practical operatwn 
of these powers. 
"Counsel for plaintiff argues that the broad lan 
guage of the Act causes the State, of necessity, to 
become excessively involved in the operatiOn, man-
agement and administration of the College. We do 
not so construe the Act. l T] he basic functJott 
of the Authority is to see . .. that fN'S arC' chargPd 
sufficient to meet the bond payment~ ' R C 
at -, 187 S. E. 2d. at 651 
As we read the College's proposal. the Lease Agreement 
between th e Authority and the College will place on th< · 
College the responsibility for making th e detailed d<>-
cisions regarding the government of the campus and tlw 
fees to be charged for particular services . 8pecifically, 
the proposal states that the Lease Agreement 
"will unconditionally obligate the College (a) to 
pay sufficient rentals to meet the prinCJpal and m 
terest requirements as they beconw due on such 
bonds, [and] (b) to impose an adequate schedule of 
charges and fees in ordt>r to provide adequate rt>w-
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nues w1th which to operate and maintaw the said 
facillties and to make the rental payn1ents '·' 
App .. p . 18. 
In short, under the proposed Least> Agreement, neither 
the Authority nor a trustee bank would be .I ustified 111 
taking action unless the College fails to make tht> pre-
scribed rental payments or otherwise defaults in 1t,~ 
obligations. Only if the College refused to meet rentE11 
payments or was unable to do so would the Authority 
or the trustee be obligated to take further actwn . In 
that event, the Authority or trustee might either for•· 
close on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting of 
rules, charges, and fees It may be argued that only 
the former would be consistent with the Establishment. 
Clause, but we do not now have that situation before uR. 
H I 
This case comes to us as an actwn f6r m,Junctive and 
declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of thf>· 
Act as applied to a proposed-rather thau an actual-
issuancr. of revenue bonds. The specific provisions of 
the Act under which the bonds will be issued, tht> Rules 
aud Regulations of thP Authority, and the College's pro-
posal-all as interpreted by the South Carolina Supreme 
Court-confine the scope of the assistance to the sAcular 
aspects of this liberal arts college and do not foreshado"' 
excessive entanglernent between the State and religion 
Accordingly, we affirm the holding of the court below 
that the Act is constitutional as interpreted and applierL 
tn tl-ui" case-. 
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Here on appeal from the Supreme Court of South Carollna, 
this case involves the validity of a state statute which creates an 
Fducational Facilities Authority - with power to issue revenue bonds 
on behalf of higher educational institutions for the financing of 
buildings and other facilities not used for religious purposes. 
The Baptist College at Charleston prti(>Oses to issue bonds 
through the Authority, and the Act is here challenged as violative 
of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment on thegground 
that the College is controlled by the Baptist Church. 
The revenue bonds to be issued will be sold to the public , 
secured by a mortgage on the campus buildings and facilities which 
may not, under the terms of the Act, be used for sectarian instruction 
or religious worship. 
It is nevertheless contended that the primary effect of financing 
through the Authority will be to advance religion, and also will result 
2. 
in excessive entanglement. 
The statute expressly provides that neither the state nor the 
Authority is obligated, directly or indirectly, to pay the principal 
of or interest on the bonds. Nor is the taxing power of the State 
pledged or implicated in any way. And all expenses of the Authority 
must be paid solely from the revenues of the projects. The danger 
of entanglement, as defined in our prior cases, is remote as the 
Authori$' s right to interfere in the affairs of the College does not 
become operative unless there is a default. 
We also note that the purposes of the ltatute are clearly 
secular, and its benefits are available to all institutions of higher 
education in the State. 
For reasons stated more fully in the opinion, we conclude 
that there is no violation of the IBtablishment Clause , and affirm 
the judgment below. 
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion in which 
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Here on appeal from the Supreme Court of South Carolina, 
this case involves the validity of a state statute which creates an 
Educational Facilities Authority. The Authority is authorized 
to issue revenue bonds on behalf of higher educational institutions 
for the financing of buildings and other facilities not used for 
religious purposes. 
The Baptist College at Charleston proposes to issue 
bonds through the Authority. The Act is challenged as violative 
of the Establishment Caluse of the First Amendment as the College 
is controlled by the Baptist Church. 
The revenue bonds to be issued will be sold to the public , 
secured by a mortgage on the campus buildings and facilities. 
These may not, under the terms of the Act, be used for sectarian 
instruction or religious worship. It is nevertheless contended that 
the primary effect of financing through the Authority will be to advance 
religion, and also will result in excessive entanglement. 
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The Act expressly provides that neither the State nor the 
Authority is obligated, directly or indirectly, to pay the principal 
of or interest on the bonds. Nor is the taxing power of the State 
pledged or implicated in any way. And all expenses of the Authority 
must be paid solely from the revenues of the projects. The danger 
of entanglement, as defined in our prior cases, is remote as the 
Authority's right to intervene in the affairs of the College does not 
become operative unless there is a default. 
We also note that the purposes of the statute are clearly 
secular, and its benefits are available to all institutions of higher 
education in the state. We conclude that there is no violation of the 
Establishment Clause, and affirm the judgment below. 
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion in which 
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall have joined. 
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bonds through the Authority. The Act is challenged as violative 
of the Establishment Caluse of the First Amendment as the College 
. ' 
is controlled by the Baptist Church. 
The revenue bonds to be issued will be sold to the public , 
secured by a mortgage on the campus buildings and facilities. 
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These may not, under the terms of the Act, be used for sectarian 
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Authority is obligated, directly or indirectly, to pay the principal 
of or interest on the bonds. Nor is the taxing power of the state 
pledged or implicated in any way. And all expenses of the Authority 
must be paid solely from the revenues of the projects. The danger 
of entanglement • as defined in our prior cases, is remote as the 
Authority's right to intervene in the affairs of the College does not 
become operative unle88 there is a default. 
We also note that the purposes of the statute are clearly 
secular, and its benefits are available to all institutions of higher 
education in the state. We conclude that there is no violation of the 
Establishment Clause, and affirm the judgment below. 
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion in which 
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall have joined. 
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to issue revenue bondsj on behalf of higher educational institutions/ 
for the financing of buildings and other facilitie~ot used for 
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if~~ 1\ 
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The revenue bonds to be issued will be sold to the public, 
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These may not, under the terms of the Act, be used for sectarian 
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The Act expressly provide~hat neither the State nor the 
Authority )s obligated, directly or indirectly, to pay the principal 
of or interest on the bonds. Nor is the taxing power of the State 
pledged or implicated in any way. And all expenses of the Authority 
must be paid solely from the revenues of the projects. The danger 
of entanglement, as defined in our prior cases, is remote as the 
Authority's right to intervene in the affairs of the College does not 
become operative unless there is a default. 
We also note that the purposes of the statute are clearly 
secular, and its benefits are available to all institutions of higher 
education in the State. We conclude that there is no violation of the 
Establishment Clause, and affirm the judgment below. 
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion in which 
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall have joined. 
NOTE: Where It Is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be re· 
lensed, as Is being done In connection with this case, at the time 
the opinion Is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no purt of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for 
the convenience of the reader. See Unitea States v. Detroit Lumber 
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
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HUNT v. MeN AIR, GOVERNOR OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA, ET AL. 
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
No. 71-1523. Argued February 21, 1973-Decided June 25, 1973 
In this action for injunctive and declaratory relief appellant chal-
lenges the South Carolina Educational Facilities Act as violative 
of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment insofar as 
it authorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the issu-
ance of revenue bonds benefiting a Baptist-controlled college. The 
Act establishes an Educational Facilities Authority to assist 
(through the issuance of revenue bonds) higher educational in-
stitutions in constructing and financing projects, such as buildings, 
facilities, and site preparation, but not including any facility for 
sectarian instruction or religious worship. Neither the State nor 
the Authority is obligated, directly or indirectly, to pay the 
principal of or interest on the bonds; nor is the State's taxing 
power pledged or implicated. All expenses of the Authority also 
must be paid solely from the revenues of the projects. The Au-
thority gave preliminary approval to an application submitted by 
the college, only 60% of whose students are Baptists. As subse-
quently modified, the application requests the issuance of revenue 
bond~ to be used for refinancing capital improvements and com-
pleting the dining hall. Under the statutory scheme the project 
would be conveyed to the Authority, which would lease it back 
to the college, with reconveyance to the college on full payment 
of the bonds. The lease agreement would contain a clause obli-
gating the institution to observe the Art's r~trictions on sectarian 
use and enabling the Authority to conduct inspections. The pro-
vision for reconveyance would restrict the project to nonsectarian 
use. The trial court denied appellant relief, and the State 
Supreme Court affirmed. After this Court had vacated the judg-
ment and remanded the case for reconsideration in the light of 
J,ernon v. K'l,frtzman, 403 U, S, 602, and other intervening deci~ 
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sion~, the State Supreme Court adhered to its earlier decision. 
Held: The Act as construed by the South Carolina Supreme Court 
does not, under the guidelines of Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 
612-613, violate the Establishment Clause. Pp. 6-14. 
(a) The purpose of the Act is secular, the benefits of the 
statute being available to all institutions of higher education in the 
State, whether or not they have a religious affliiation. Pp. 6-8. 
(b) The statute does not have the primary effect of advancing 
or inhibiting religion. The college involved has no significant 
sectarian orientation and the project must be confined to a secular 
purpose, with the lease agreement, enforced by inspection provi-
sions, forbidding religious use. Pp. 8-10. 
(c) The statute does not foster an excessive entanglement with 
religion. The record here does not show that religion so permeates 
the collegr that inspection by the Authority to insure that the 
project is not usrd for religious purposes would nrcessarily lead 
to such entanglement. The Authority's statutory power to par-
ticipate in certain management decisions also dors not have that 
effect, in view of the narrow construction by the State Supreme 
Court, limiting such power to insuring that the. college's fees suffice 
to meet bond payments. Absent default, the lease agreement 
would leave full responsibility with the college regarding fees and 
general operations. Pp. 11-14. 
258 S. C. 97, 187 S. E. 2d 645, affirmed. 
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGEn, 
C. J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., 
joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which DouGLAS 
and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. 
NOTICE: This opinion Is subject to formal revision before publication 
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are re-
quested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the 
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other 
formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the pre-
liminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71-1523 
Richard W. Hunt, Appellant, 
v. 
Robert E. MeN air, Governor 
of South Carolina, et al. 
On Appeal from the Su-
preme Court of South 
Carolina. 
.[June 25, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Appellant, a South Carolina taxpayer, brought this 
action to challenge the South Carolina Educational 
Facilities Act (the "Act"), S. C. Code Ann. §§ 22-41 
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1971), as violative of the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment insofar as it au-
thorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the 
issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of the Baptist 
College at Charleston (the "College") .1 The trial court's 
denial of relief was affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina. 255 S. C. 71 , 177 S. E. 2d 362 (1970). 
This Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case 
for reconsideration in light of the intervening decisions in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Earlew v. 
DiCenso, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Robinson v. DiCernso, 
403 U. S. 602 (1971); and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U. S. 672 (1971). 403 U. S. 945 (1971). On remand, 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina adhered to its 
1 At various points during this litigation, appellant has made 
reference to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 
but has made no arguments specifically addressed to violations of 
that clause except insofar as this Court's approach to cases involv-
ing the Religion Clauses represents an interaction of the two 
clauses. 
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earlier position. 258 S. C. 97. 187 S. E. 2d 645 (1972). 
We affirm . 
I 
We begin by setting out the general structure of the 
Act. The Act established an Educational Facilities Au-
thority (the "Authority"), the purpose of which is "to 
assist institutions for higher education in the construc-
tion, financing and refinancing of projects .... ", S. C. 
Code Ann. § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971), primarily 
through the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms 
of the Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities, 
site preparatiou and related items, but may not include 
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian in-
struction or as a place of religious worship nor any 
facility which is used or to be used primarily in 
connection with any part of the program of a school 
or department of divinity for any religious denomi-
nation." S. C. Code Ann. § 22-41.2 (b) (Cum. 
Supp. 1971) . 
Correspondingly, the Authority is accorded certain pow-
ers over the project, including the powers to determine 
the fees to be charged for the use of the project and to 
establish regulations for its use . See pp. ---, infra. 
While revenue bonds to be used in connection with 
a project are issued by the Authority, the Act is quite 
explicit that the bonds shall not be obligations of the 
State, directly or indirectly: 
"Revenue bonds issued under the provisions of 
this chapter shall not be deemed to constitute a 
debt or liability of the State or of any political sub-
division thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit 
of the State or of any such political subdivision, but 
shall be payable solely from the funds herein pro-
vided therefor from revenues. All such revenue 
bonds shall contain on the face thereof a statement. 
71-1523-0PINION 
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to the effect that neither the State of South Car-
olina nor the Authority shall be obligated to pay 
the same or the interest thereon except from reve-
nues of the project or the portion thereof for which 
they are issued and that neither the faith and credit 
nor the taxing power of the State of South Carolina 
or of any political subdivision thereof is pledged to 
the payment of the principal of or the interest on 
such bonds. The issuance of revenue bonds under 
the provisions of this act shall not directly or in· 
directly or contingently obligate the State or any 
political subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any 
form of taxation whatever therefor or to make any 
appropriation for their payment." S. C. Code AmL 
§ 22-41.10 (Cum. Supp. 1971). 
Moreover, since all of the expenses of the Authority 
must be paid from the revenues of the various projects 
in which it participates, S. C. Code Ann. § 22-41.5 (Cum. 
Supp. 1971), none of the general revenues of South 
Carolina is used to support a project. 
On January 6, 1970, the College submitted to the 
Authority for preliminary approval an application for 
the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the proposal, the 
Authority would issue the bonds and make the pro-
ceeds available to the College for use in connection with 
a portion of its campus to be designated a project (the 
"Project") within the meaning of the Act. In return, 
the College would convey the Project, without cost, to 
the Authority, which would then lease the property so 
conveyed back to the College. After repayment in full 
of the bonds, the Project would be reconveyed to the 
College. The Authority granted preliminary approval 
on January 16, 1970, 255 S. C., at 76; 177 S. E. 2d, at 365. 
In its present form, the application requests the is-
suance of revenue bonds totaling $1,250,000, of which 
$1,050,000 would be applied to refund short term financ-
ing, of capital improvements and $200,000 would ba 
' . 
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applied to the completion of dining hall facilities. 2 The 
advantage of financing educational institutions through 
a state created authority derives from relevant pro-
visions of federal and South Carolina state income tax 
laws which provide in effect that the interest on such 
bonds is not subject to income taxation.~ The income tax 
exempt status of the interest enables the Authority, as 
an instrumentality of the State, to market the bonds at 
a significantly lower rate of interest than the educa-
tional institution would be forced to pay if it borrowed 
the money by conventional private financing. 
Because the College's application to the Authority was 
a preliminary one, the details of the financing arrange-
ment have not yet been fully worked out. But Rules 
and Regulations adopted by the Authority govern cer-
tain of its aspects. See Jurisdictional Statement, Ap-
2 As originally submitted by the College and approved by the 
Authority, the proposal called for the issuance of "not exceeding 
$3,500,000 of revenue bonds .. . . " 255 S. C., at 75; 177 S. E. 
2d, at 364. As indicated by a stipulation of counsel in this Court, 
the College subsequently secured a bank loan in the amount of 
$2,500,000 and now proposes the issuance of only $1,250,000 in 
revenue bonds under the Act, the proceeds to be used: 
"(i) to repay in full the College's Current Fund for the balance 
(approximately $250,000) advanced to the College's Plant Fund as 
aforrsaid ; (ii) to refund outstanding short-term loans in the amount 
of $800,000 whose proceeds werr to pay off indebtedness incurred 
for capital improvements, and (iii) to finance the completion of the 
dining hall farilitirs at a cost of approximately $200,000." (Empha-
sis in original.) App ., p . 49 . 
3 Gross income for federal incomr tax purposes does not include 
interest on " the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession 
of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the 
foregoing . . ." 26 U. S. C. § 103 (a) (1). For state income tax 
purposes, gros::; income does not include interest "upon obligations 
of the United States or its possessions or of this State or any 
political subdivision thereof . . " S. C. Code Ann. § 65-253 (4) 
(Cum, Supp. 1971) 
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pendix C, pp. 47-51. Every lease agreement between the 
Authority and an institution must contain a clause 
"obligating the Institution that neither the leased 
land, nor any facility located thereon, shall be used 
for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious 
worship, or in connection with any part of the pro-
gram of a school or department of divinity of any 
religious denomination." 258 S. C., at 101; 18.7 
S. E. 2d, at 647. 
To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agree-
ment must allow the Authority to conduct inspections, 
and any reconveyance to the College must contain a 
restriction against use for sectarian purposes.4 The Rules 
further provide that simultaneously with the execution 
4 Rule 4 relating to the Lease Agreement provides in part that: 
"If the Lease Agreement contains a provision permitting the Insti-
tution to repurchase the project upon payment of the bonds, then 
in such instance the Lease Agreement shall provide that the Deed 
of reconveyance from the Authority to the Institution shall be made 
subject to the condition that so long as the Institution, or any 
voluntary grantee of the Institution, shall own the leased premises, 
or any part thereof, that no facility thereon, financed in whole or 
in part with the proceeds of the bonds, shall be used for sectarian 
instruction or as a place of religious worship, or used in connection 
with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity 
of any religiou ~ denomination." 258 S. C., at 101-102; 187 S. E. 2d, 
at 647-648. 
The Rule goes on to allow the institution to remove this option in 
the case of involuntary sales: 
"The condition may provide, at the option of the Institution, that 
if the leased premises shall become the subject of an involuntary 
judicial sale, as a result of any foreclosure of any mortgage, or sale 
pursuant to any order of any court, that the title to be vested in 
any purchaser at such judicial sale, other than the Institution, shall 
be in fee simple and shall be free of the condition applicable to the 
Institution or any voluntary grantee thereof." 258 S. C., at 102 ;· 
187 S. E. 2d, at 648. See n. 6, infra. 
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of the lease agreement, the Authority and the trustee 
bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would 
create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a forecloseable 
mortgage lien on the Project property including a mort-
gage on the "right, title and interest of the Authority in 
and to the lease agreement." Jurisdictional Statement, 
Appendix C, p. 50. 
Our consideration of appellant's Establishment Clause 
claim extends only to the proposal as approved pre-
liminarily with such additions as are contemplated by 
the Act, the rules, and the decisions of the courts below. 
II 
As we reaffirm today in Committee for Public Educa-
tion and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, ante, the principles 
which govern our consideration of challenges to statutes 
as violative of the Establishment Clause are three. 
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must 
be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion, ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an 
excessive entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S., at 612-613. 
With full recognition that these are no more than help-
ful signposts, we consider the present statute and the 
proposed transaction in terms of the three "tests": pur-
pose, effect, and entanglement. 
A 
The purpose of the statute is manifestly a secular one. 
The benefits of the Act are available to all institutions 
of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not 
having a religious affiliation. While a legislature's decla-
ration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its. 
71-1523-0PINION 
HUNT v. McNAIR 
true intent, appellant makes no suggestion that the in-
troductory paragraph of the Act represents anything 
1 other than a good faith statement of purpose: 
"It is hereby declared that for the benefit of the 
people of the State, the increase of their commerce, 
welfare and prosperity and the improvement of 
their health and living conditions it is essential that 
this and future generations of youth be given the 
fullest opportunity to learn and to develop their 
intellectual and mental capacities; ,that it is ·es-
sential that institutions for higher education within 
the State be provided with appropriate additional 
means to assist such youth in achieving the required 
levels of learning and development 'of their intel-
lectual and mental capacities; and that it is the 
purpose of this section to provide a measure of as-
sistance and an alternative method to enable in-
stitutions for higher education in the State to pro-
vide the facilities and structures which are sorely 
needed to accomplish the purposes of this act, all 
to the public benefit and good, to the extent and 
manner provided herein." S. C .. Code Ann. § 22.41 
(Cum. Supp. 1971). 
The College and other private institutions of higher 
education provide these benefits to the State.5 As ofthe 
academic year 1969- 1970, there were 1,548 students 
5 In Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), this Court 
commented on the importance of the role of private education in 
this country: 
"Underlying these cases, and underlying also the legislative judg-
ments that have preceded the court decisions, has been a recognition 
that private education has played and is playing a significant and 
valuable role in raising national levels of knowledge, competence, and 
experience," 392 U. S., at 247. 
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enrolled in the College, in addition to approximately 600 
night students. Of these students, 95% are residents of 
South Carolina who are thereby receiving a college edu-
cation without financial support from the State of South 
Carolina. 
B 
To identify "primary effect," we narrow our focus from 
the statute as a whole to the only transaction presently 
before us. Whatever may be its initial appeal, the prop-
osition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any pro-
gram which in some manner aids an institution with a 
religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. E. g., 
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Tilton v. Richardson, 
supra. Stated another way, the Court has not accepted 
the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because 
aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its 
other resources on religious ends. 
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect 
of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in 
which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion 
of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or 
when it funds a specifically religious activity in an other-
wise substantially secular setting. In Tilton v. Richard-
son, supra, the Court refused to strike down a direct 
federal grant to four colleges and universities in Con-
necticut. MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER, for the plurality, 
concluded that despite some institutional rhetoric, none 
of the four colleges was pervasively sectarian, but held 
open that possibility for future cases: 
"Individual projects can be properly evaluated if 
and when challenges arise with respect to particular· 
recipients and some evidence is then presented to 
show that the institution does in fact possess these; 
characteristics." 403 U. S., at 682, 
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Appellant has introduced no evidence in the present 
case placing the College in such a category. It is true 
that the members of the College Board of Trustees are 
elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention, that 
the approval of the Convention is required for certain 
financial transactions, and that the charter of the College 
may be amended only by the Convention. But it was 
likewise true of the institutions involved in Tilton that 
they were "governed by Catholic religious organizations." 
403 U. S., at 686. What little there is in the record con-
cerning the College establishes that there are no re-
ligious qualifications for faculty membership or student 
admission, and that only 60% of the College student body 
is Baptist, a percentage roughly equivalent to the per-
centage of Baptists in that area of South Carolina. 
255 S. C., at 85; 177 S. E. 2d, at 369. On the record in 
this case there is no basis to conclude that the College's 
operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian 
rather than secular education. 
Nor can we conclude that the proposed transaction 
will place the Authority in the position of providing aid to 
the religious as opposed to the secular activities of the 
College. The scope of the Authority's power ·to assist 
institutions of higher education extends only to "proj-
ects," and the Act specifically states that a project "shall 
not include" any buildings or facilities used for religious 
purposes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
we must assume that all of the proposed financing and 
refinancing relates to buildings and facilities within a 
properly delimited project. It is not at all clear from 
the record that the portion of the campus to be conveyed 
by the College to the Authority and leased back is the 
same as that being financed, but in any event it too must 
be part of the Project and subject to the same prohibition 
against use for religious purposes. In addition, as we 
have indicated, every lease agreement must contain a 
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clause forbidding religious use and another allowing in~ 
spections to enforce the agreement.a For these reasons, 
we are satisfied that implementation of the proposal will 
not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting 
religion. 7 
6 Appellant also takes issue with the Authority's rule allowing a 
purchaser at an involuntary sale to take title free of restrictions as 
to religious use. See n. 4, ante. Appellant's reliance on Tilton 
v. Richardson, supra, in this respect is misplaced. There, the Court 
struck down a provision under which the church-related colleges 
would have unrestricted use of a federally financed project after 
20 years. In the present case, by contrast, the restriction against 
religious use is lifted not as to the institution seeking the assistance 
of the Authority nor as to voluntary transferees, but only as to a 
purchaser at a judicial sale. Because some other religious institution 
bidding for the property at a judicial sale could purchase the prop-
erty only by outbidding all other prospective purchasers, there is 
only a speculative possibility that the absence of a use limitation 
would ever afford aid to religion. Even in such an event, the 
acquiring religious institution presumably would have had to pay 
the then fair value of the property. 
7 The "state aid" involved in this case is of a very special sort. 
We have here no expenditure of public funds, either by grant or 
loan, no reimbursement by a State for expenditures made by a 
parochial school or college, and no extending or committing of a 
State's credit. Rather, the only state aid consists, not of financial 
assistance directly or indirectly which would implicate public funds 
or credit, but the creation of an instrumentality (the Authority) 
through which educational institutions may borrow funds on the 
basis of their own credit and the security of their own property 
upon more favorable interest terms than otherwise would be avail-
able. The Supreme Court of New Jersey characterized the assist-
ance rendered an educational institution under an act generally 
similar to the South Carolina Act as merely being a "governmental 
service." Clayton v. Kervick, 56 N. J. 523, 530-531, 267 A. 2d 
503, 506-507 (1970). The South Carolina Supreme Court, in the 
opinion below, described the role of the State as that of a "mere 
conduit." 258 S. C., at 107; 187 S. E. 2d, at 650. Because we 
conclude that the primary effect of the assistance afforded here is 
neither to advance nor to inhibit religion under Lemon and Tilton, 
we need ·not decide whether, as appellee argues, Appellee's Brief, p, 
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c 
The final question posed by this case is whether under 
the arrangement there would be an unconstitutional de-
gree of entanglement between the State and the College. 
Appellant argues that the Authority would become in-
volved in the operation of the College both by inspecting 
the project to insure that it is not being used for religious 
purposes and by participating in the management de-
cisions of the College. 
The Court's opinion in Lemon and the plurality opin-
ion in Tilton are grounded on the proposition that the 
degree of entanglement arising from inspection of fa-
cilities as to use varies in large measure with the extent 
to which religion permeates the institution. In finding 
excessive entanglement, the Court in Lemon relied on 
the "substantial religious character of these church-
related" elementary schools. 403 U. S., at 616. MR. 
CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER's opinion for the plurality in 
.Tilton placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the 
federal aid there approved would be spent in a college 
setting: 
"Since religious indoctrination is not a substan-
tial purpose or activity of these church-related col-
leges and universities, there is less likelihood than 
in primary and secondary schools that religion will 
permeate the area of secular education." 403 U. S., 
at 687. 
Although MR. JusTICE WHITE saw no such clear distinc-
tion, he concurred in the result, stating: 
"It is enough for me that ... the Federal Govern-
ment [is] financing a separable function of over-
14, the importance of the tax exemption in the South Carolina 
scheme brings the present case under Walz v. Tax Comm'n, supra, 
where this Court upheld a local property tax exemption which in-· 
eluded religious institutiom'!- ,.· 
12· 
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riding importance in order to sustain the legislation 
here challenged." 403 U. S., at 664. 
A majority of the Court in Tilton, then, concluded that 
on the facts of that case inspection as to use did not 
threaten excessive entanglement. As we have indicated 
above, there is no evidence here to demonstrate that the 
College is any more an instrument of religious indoctrina-
tion than were the colleges and universities involved in 
Tilton. 8 
A closer issue under our precedents is presented by 
the contention that the Authority could become deeply 
involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions 
of the College. The Authority is empowered by the Act: 
"(g) [g]enerally, to fix and revise from time to 
time and charge and collect rates, rents, fees and 
charges for the use of and for the services furnished 
or to be furnished by a project or any portion thereof 
and to contract with any person, partnership, asso-
ciation or corporation or other body public or pri-
vate in respect thereof; 
"(h) to establish rules and regulations for the use 
of a project or any portion thereof and to designate 
a participating institution for higher education as 
its agent to establish rules and regulations for the 
8 Although the record in this case is abbreviated and not free 
from ambiguity, the burden rests on appellant to show the extent 
to which the College is church-related, cf. Board of Education v. 
Allen, supra, 392 U. S., at 248, and he has failed to show more· 
than a formalistic church relationship. As Tilton established, for-
mal denominational control over a liberal arts college does not 
render all aid to the institution a violation of the Establishment 
Clause. So far as the record here is concerned, there is no showing· 
that the College places any special emphasis on Baptist denomina-
tional or any other sectarian type of education. As noted above, 
both the faculty and the student body are open to persons of any-
(or no) religious affiliation, 
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use of a project undertaken for such participating 
institution for higher education .... " S. C. Code 
Ann. § 22-41.4 (Cum. Supp. 1971). 
'These powers are sweeping ones, and were there a 
realistic likelihood that they would be exercised in their 
full detail, the entanglement problems with the pro.-
posed transaction would ·not be insignificant. 
As the South Carolina Supreme Court pointed out, 
the Act was patterned closely after the South Carolina 
Industrial Revenue Bond Act, 258 S. C., at 107; 187 
S. E. 2d, at 651, and perhaps for this reason appears to 
confer unnecessarily broad power and responsibility on 
the Authority. The opinion of that court, however, re-
flects a narrow interpretation of the practical operation 
of these powers. 
"Counsel for plaintiff argues that the broad lan-
guage of the Act causes the State, of necessity, to 
. become excessively involved in the operation, man-
agement and administration of the College. We do 
not so construe the Act. . . . [T]he basic function 
of the Authority is to see ... that fee8 are charged 
sufficient to meet the bond payments." 258 S. C., 
at 108; 187 S. E. 2d, at 651. 
As we read the College's proposal, the Lease Agreement 
between the Authority and the College will place on the 
College the responsibility for making the detailed de-
cisions regarding the government of the campus and the 
fees to be charged for particular services. Specifically, 
the proposal states that the Lease Agreement 
"will unconditionally obligate the College (a) to 
pay sufficient rentals to meet the principal and in-
terest requirements as they become due on such 
bonds, [and] (b) to impose an adequate schedule of 
charges and fees in order to provide adequate reV:e-
14 
71-1523-0PINION 
HUNT v. McNAIR 
nues with which to operate and maintain the said 
facilities and to make the rental payments .. . . " 
App., p. 18. 
In short, under the proposed Lease Agreement, neither 
the Authority nor a trustee bank would be justified in 
taking action unless the College fails to make the pre-
scribed rental payments or otherwise defaults in its 
obligations. Only if the College refused to meet rental 
payments or was unable to do so would the Authority 
or the trustee be obligated to take further action. In 
that event, the Authority or trustee might either fore,. 
close on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting of 
rules, charges, and fees. It may be argued that only 
the former would be consistent with the Establishment 
Clause, but we do not now have that situation before us. 
III 
This case comes to us as an action for injunctive and 
declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of the 
Act as applied to a proposed-rather than an actual-
issuance of revenue bonds. The specific provisions of 
the Act under which the bonds will be issued, the Rules 
and Regulations of the Authority, and the College's pro-
posal-all as interpreted by the South Carolina Supreme 
Court--confine the scope of the assistance to the secular 
aspects of this liberal arts college and do not foreshadow 
excessive entanglement between the State and religion. 
Accordingly, we affirm the holding of the court below 
that the Act is constitutional as interpreted and applied 
in this caee. 

